This is no time for compromise

When confronted with a world in which decisions that seemed certainly and obviously right (think of the arguments for invading Iraq as a policy option we should feel certain is correct) that turn out to be wrong, things get a little vexed for the people who insisted what they’d been saying was obviously true. Turns out they were not so obviously true after all. In fact, they were false.

Fox and various other media relentlessly promoted the WMD argument, as well as the argument that even Bush said was false (that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 9/11), and when media and pundits were now faced with the problem that even the lowest bar of journalistic responsibility would involve their admitting they were either fools or liars, they either stopped talking about it, or claimed that Bush was responsible.

Their argument was often a little odd, though. They sometimes said that they couldn’t be blamed for being loyal to a person who had turned out to lie. I think that’s interesting. They were admitting that they saw their job as supporting the Republican Party, and not promoting the truth. The traditional distinction between a medium of party propaganda and a medium that is at least trying to be above faction is the willingness to investigate and report on information that hurts its preferred party.

Fox not only didn’t investigate the WMD claims, but it slammed anyone who said what turned out to be true. It promoted, relentlessly, a claim that was obviously a lie (that Iraq was behind 9/11)—even Bush said so–, and another set of claims that were deeply problematic (such as the WMD accusation, or various arguments Colin Powell made before the UN). Fox didn’t do that investigation, or if it did, it gleefully promoted what it knew to be a lie. (At this point, people who are deeply immersed in the tragic narrative that our complicated and vexed political options are reduced to the fallacious question of whether Dems or Republicans are better will say, but the Dems do it too! Maybe, but the Dems lying doesn’t mean that what Fox said was true. Fox was either irresponsible or dishonest, and any behavior on the part of the Dems doesn’t change that. If I rob a bank, that someone else did it too doesn’t magically change my robbing a bank from anything other than what it was.)

The failure to investigate was spread all over the political spectrum of media. For instance, Colin Powell’s speech before the UN was deeply problematic, but, instead of doing responsible investigation, or even reporting accurately (such as saying “Powell showed” when the accurate report would have been “Powell claimed”), media endorsed his problematic argument. His argument was so problematic that even the conservative–and pro-invasion–British periodical The Economist noted his case was thin in some places. But, in most media, his argument wasn’t reported as wobbly (and, again, not on any one place on the political spectrum).

Fox and various other media outlets were, from the perspective of someone who studies demagoguery, pretty extreme. It wasn’t just that they promoted various false claims–again, even ones Bush said were false–, but that they promoted those false claims as the only thing a reasonable person could believe. The amount of propaganda—that is, the factional promotion of false claims—is one reason that 40% of the American public believed that it should be legal to prohibit dissenting from the invasion.

What that means is that 40% of the American public were fine with silencing the point of view that turned out to be right. And that is really worrisome for democracy.

Even more worrisome is that the people I know who were part of that 40% have yet to admit that they were wrong to want to silence the people who turned out to be right. And their having been completely wrong about Iraq didn’t caused them to question the sources that led them astray, nor, more important, the underlying (and false) narrative that the correct course of action is so obvious to good people that dissent should be dismissed as biased or duped.

And that’s my experience with people all over the political spectrum–that people who believe that it is obvious that we should do this thing now, and that everyone who disagrees should be dismissed (as biased, ignorant, duped, dishonest) never admit that their having been wrong in the past is any reason to reconsider their narrative about political decision making.

When people are frightened, faced with uncertainty, or have failed, in-group entitativity increases. Group entitativity is what social psychologists call the sense a person has 1) that their mental categories of kinds of people (Christians, liberals, Texans) are Real; and 2) that their loyalty and commitment to their in-group is essential and unarguable. (Scholars in rhetoric would say that their sense of group identification is constitutive.)

Fear, uncertainty, and failure all increase the belief that The In-Group is Real, and thereby paradoxically encourage people to feel that the solution to our current problem is to purify the in-group. Politically, this means that a failure encourages people to believe that the solution is for the political group not to be a coalition of various interests, but for every member of the in-group, who is Really in-group, to commit more purely to a more pure vision of the in-group.

The train wrecks in public deliberation that I study all have calls for purer commitment to the pure in-group. But, at times, a group’s decision to stop disagreeing, and just work together has been effective. So, how do you disagree between the irrational response that what we need now is purity (because the in-group has failed) and what we need now is to stop disagreeing?

You don’t do it through deductive reasoning. You don’t do it through the circular reasoning process of deciding that only commitment to your narrative is right, and so only people who agree to that narrative can be right. You reconsider the narrative.

Or you don’t. Instead, you engage in Machiavellian unifying strategies.

The problem is that no political party can win an election without gathering together people with wildly different narratives. So, a party needs what rhetoricians call “a unifying device.” There are a lot (Kenneth Burke listed them pretty effectively in 1939).

The easiest strategy is to unify by opposition to a common enemy. Burke says that Hitler unified Germans (who were a very disparate group) by opposition to the Jews, and, while that was true in Mein Kampf (and Hitler’s ideology generally), when it came to the Nazis’ best electoral successes, it was by unifying voters against “Bolsheviks”—he included any form of socialism in that category (and his base knew he meant Jews). Hitler argued for purifying the community of dissenters.

William Lloyd Garrison made a similar argument in the era before the Civil War. Abolitionists couldn’t count on the government to help them, and they suffered a lot of failures. And so Garrison decided there was one right way to think about the vexed question of whether the Constitution allowed slavery, and he thereby alienated Frederick Douglass.

Hitler was evil; Garrison was not. In other words, the notion that the solution to our problem is to insist on one narrative and crush all dissent is something that both good and bad people share.

Good decision-making requires that, at some point, people stop arguing, and commit to the plan. If my unit has decided that we’re going to issue red balls to all dogs, then we need to get full-in on issuing red balls. But there needs to be an opportunity for the people who think the issuing red balls is a dumb plan. In other words, every good plan makes falsifiable claims.

In the decisions I’ve studied, when communities have decided to make disastrous decisions, or even made good decisions that ended badly, they have gotten feedback that their decisions were bad, and they decided that the response to that setback was increased in-group purity.

Responding to failure by believing that our problem is that our in-group was not pure enough, and that therefore the solution is to be more pure in our ideological commitment, is a natural human bias.

But it isn’t a useful way to deliberate.