LBJ Deliberations on Vietnam: “Our indolence at Munich”

A common description of the LBJ Administration decision-making regarding Vietnam was that it was an instance of “groupthink”—that decision-makers in the administration were unwilling to disagree with one another (e.g, Irving Janis Groupthink). Another description is that the administration was excessively optimistic, duped, or otherwise unwilling to consider reasonably the likelihood of success.

It turns out it was much more complicated than that. I was looking for times that decision-makers used the cudgel of “but appeasement!” to deflect reasonable dissent, and came across this exchange.

In June of 1965, Westmoreland had asked for additional troops, arguing that escalating US involvement would “give us a substantial and hard hitting offensive capability on the ground to convince the VC that they cannot win.”

George Ball argued that escalation was a mistake. In a July 1, 1965 memo, for instance, he said,

“So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the U.S. and a large part of the population of South Vietnam, organized and directed from North Vietnam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.
“The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct combat, they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill‐equipped to fight in a non‐cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.
“Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well‐nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after we have paid terrible costs.”

On July 20, 1965, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara sent a memo to LBJ arguing for raising US personnel in Vietnam from 75k to 175k (perhaps even 200k). On July 21, 1965, LBJ and his advisors met to discuss that memo. I was surprised by the transcript of the meeting. It doesn’t show ideal deliberation, but it does show that LBJ wanted to hear what Ball said, and wanted options considered. Ball was invited to make his argument, and LBJ specifically asked McNamara to reply to them. He also asked for a second meeting just to discuss Ball’s argument. The transcript of both meetings is fascinating, but this exchange (from the afternoon meeting) is particularly important for thinking about deliberation.

Ball: We can’t win. Long protracted. The most we can hope for is messy conclusion. There remains a great danger of intrusion by Chicoms.
Problem of long war in US:
1. Korean experience was galling one. Correlation between Korean casualties and public opinion (Ball showed Pres. a chart)5 showed support stabilized at 50%. As casualties increase, pressure to strike at jugular of the NVN will become very great.
2. World opinion. If we could win in a year’s time—win decisively—world opinion would be alright. However, if long and protracted we will suffer because a great power cannot beat guerrillas.
3. National politics. Every great captain in history is not afraid to make a tactical withdrawal if conditions are unfavorable to him. The enemy cannot even be seen; he is indigenous to the country.
Have serious doubt if an army of westerners can fight orientals in Asian jungle and succeed.
President: This is important—can westerners, in absence of intelligence, successfully fight orientals in jungle rice-paddies? I want McNamara and Wheeler to seriously ponder this question.
Ball: I think we have all underestimated the seriousness of this situation. Like giving cobalt treatment to a terminal cancer case. I think a long protracted war will disclose our weakness, not our strength.
The least harmful way to cut losses in SVN is to let the government decide it doesn’t want us to stay there. Therefore, put such proposals to SVN government that they can’t accept, then it would move into a neutralist position—and I have no illusions that after we were asked to leave, SVN would be under Hanoi control.
What about Thailand? It would be our main problem. Thailand has proven a good ally so far—though history shows it has never been a staunch ally. If we wanted to make a stand in Thailand, we might be able to make it.
Another problem would be South Korea. We have two divisions there now. There would be a problem with Taiwan, but as long as Generalissimo is there, they have no place to go. Indonesia is a problem—insofar as Malaysia. There we might have to help the British in military way. [Page 195] Japan thinks we are propping up a lifeless government and are on a sticky wicket. Between long war and cutting our losses, the Japanese would go for the latter (all this on Japan according to Reischauer).
President: Wouldn’t all those countries say Uncle Sam is a paper tiger—wouldn’t we lose credibility breaking the word of three presidents—if we set it up as you proposed. It would seem to be an irreparable blow. But, I gather you don’t think so.
Ball: The worse blow would be that the mightiest power in the world is unable to defeat guerrillas.
President: Then you are not basically troubled by what the world would say about pulling out?
Ball: If we were actively helping a country with a stable, viable government, it would be a vastly different story. Western Europeans look at us as if we got ourselves into an imprudent fashion [situation].
[….]
President: Two basic troublings:
1. That Westerners can ever win in Asia.
2. Don’t see how you can fight a war under direction of other people whose government changes every month.
Now go ahead, George, and make your other points.
Ball: The cost, as well as our Western European allies, is not relevant to their situation. What they are concerned about is their own security—troops in Berlin have real meaning, none in VN.
President: Are you saying pulling out of Korea would be akin to pulling out of Vietnam?
Bundy: It is not analogous. We had a status quo in Korea. It would not be that way in Vietnam.
Ball: We will pay a higher cost in Vietnam.
This is a decision one makes against an alternative.
On one hand—long protracted war, costly, NVN is digging in for long term. This is their life and driving force. Chinese are taking long term view—ordering blood plasma from Japan.
On the other hand—short-term losses. On balance, come out ahead of McNamara plan. Distasteful on either hand.
Bundy: Two important questions to be raised—I agree with the main thrust of McNamara. It is the function of my staff to argue both sides.
To Ball’s argument: The difficulty in adopting it now would be a radical switch without evidence that it should be done. It goes in the face of all we have said and done.
His whole analytical argument gives no weight to loss suffered by other side. A great many elements in his argument are correct.
We need to make clear this is a somber matter—that it will not be quick—no single action will bring quick victory.
I think it is clear that we are not going to be thrown out.
Ball: My problem is not that we don’t get thrown out, but that we get bogged down and don’t win.
Bundy: I would sum up: The world, the country, and the VN would have alarming reactions if we got out.
Rusk: If the Communist world finds out we will not pursue our commitment to the end, I don’t know where they will stay their hand.
I am more optimistic than some of my colleagues. I don’t believe the VC have made large advances among the VN people.
We can’t worry about massive casualties when we say we can’t find the enemy. I don’t see great casualties unless the Chinese come in.
Lodge: There is a greater threat to World War III if we don’t go in. Similarity to our indolence at Munich.

As I said it’s far from ideal deliberation, but it isn’t as bad as I’d expected. LBJ wanted disagreement, and wanted people to take Ball’s arguments seriously. And they didn’t. It wasn’t groupthink; it was something more complicated.

Ball’s concerns were legitimate and prescient, and he got shut down. Because Munich.