For Stephanie

If memory serves, Stephanie Odom came to UT as a literature student, and she was a gifted reader and teacher of literature. But, as often happens, her experience teaching first year writing caused her to change course to rhetoric. She loved it. She loved what happens to students as they become better writers—more confident, more intellectually curious, better at research.

And she really enjoyed reading scholarship in rhetoric, as it was a “conversation” she wanted to join, asking questions that intrigued her,and to which she wanted answers.

But her love of literature, and her wide reading in it, meant that she was puzzled and sometimes irritated by what she saw as an unnecessary antagonism between literature and rhetoric. While it was long past the culture wars of the 80s and 90s that had led to the banning of literature from composition classes, literature was still banned. And, certainly, she saw the reasons for keeping first and second year writing courses from being intro to lit crit or literature appreciation classes—not that she saw such approaches to literature as bad, but simply as out of place–but she didn’t see why banning literary texts (still a common practice) was the necessary outcome of ways of teaching literature being not particularly useful to the goals of introductory writing classes.

Behind these arguments about literature, she thought, there was an argument about the purpose of humanistic studies. Initially, she imagined that she would write a dissertation that would focus on the term“humanism,” and its post-Matthew Arnold permutations. And she was well-trained and well-equipped for exactly that dissertation—one that would require close textual analysis, capacious reading, and precisely her kind of intellectual generosity. She could have written that dissertation about as easily as anyone writes a dissertation. She, however, did something that required more courage.

The problem for her, and this is typical of Stephanie, was that she wasn’t just interested in the theoretical disagreements or intellectual genealogy of the place of literature in writing classes: she wanted to do scholarship that would help teachers teach better. She wanted to know if bringing in literature did actually inhibit writing instruction. And that meant a whole set of other questions—how many people are bringing in literature? What are they doing with it? How do we assess the effectiveness of any teaching practice?

So, partway into her dissertation, she developed a set of questions that required that she learn entirely new methods—survey writing, qualitative analysis of data. She was brilliant, and so certainly smart enough to learn new material, new skills, and even new ways of conducting research. But it took more than intelligence to make that cognitive shift. It took a kind of bravery, and she did it. She was intellectually fierce.

She was also kind and funny, who inspired love, admiration, and respect everywhere she went. She was an Assistant Director in the Department of Rhetoric and Writing, meaning that she helped prepare others to teach writing, who was always kind and helpful to fellow graduate students as they were trying to learn the thing at which she was so skilled.

She was active in a graduate writing group for years, a kind, clear, generous, and usefully critical reader of fellow graduate students’ work. Perhaps more important, at times when other members were slacking off—or even thinking about slacking off—she was cheerfully fierce at holding everyone accountable, partially through her breathtakingly practical approach to solving whatever problems people were presenting as obstacles.

She worked in what was then the Undergraduate Writing Center, and was a respected and talented writing consultant, with whom everyone loved to work. When the Writing Center shifted to the University Writing Center, and moved to a new space, there were two major new opportunities. One was the opportunity to work with graduate students, something that would require establishing a cultural practice of accountable writing groups. The other was to have rooms which would be quieter and less distracting than the hectic and often noisy common space—rooms crucial for being able to resolve the problems faced by students whose hearing, cognitive processes, writing project,or previous experiences meant being in the midst of a crowded and very public consulting space wasn’t practical. 

Thus, when there was the possibility of naming one of those rooms, it was obvious that it should be named for Stephanie. Her commitment to writing—at both the graduate and undergraduate level—and her skill as a teacher and facilitator of writing meant that she was a model of what the UWC was trying to be. That the rooms were also a practical solution to a vexing problem of exclusion made it perfect.

When Stephanie was diagnosed with cancer, all those qualities—her brilliance, ferocity, pragmatism, and ability to inspire love—were tested. And still, she persisted.

And she got a really good job—Assistant Professor at UT-Tyler—where she branched into yet another area of research, working with a criminal justice professor on pragmatic ways of improving student writing. The smart and beautifully-written co-authored article ended up published in a journal on criminal justice education, another intellectually brave venture.

At UT-Tyler, she met a smart, kind, funny, and loving man, and it was wonderful to see her so happy. She also got an adorable dog, whom she loved even after the dog broke a sliding glass door multiple times (because squirrels).

Stephanie died yesterday. She was loved, admired, respected, and needed. I will miss her so very much. She was fierce.

From Trump’s interview with Wall Street Journal

[The short version is that he’s rambling, incoherent, and counter-factual. You should read the whole thing, but you have to have access.]

President Trump: We have money that is pouring into our treasury right now, and on January 1 it’ll become much more so. And here’s the story: If we don’t make a deal, then I’m going to put the $200 — and it’s really $67 — billion additional on at an interest rate between 10 and 25 depending.

Mr. Davis: Including even iPhones and laptops and things that people would know?

President Trump: Maybe. Maybe. Depends on what the rate is. I mean, I can make it 10 percent and people could stand that very easily. But if you read that recent poll that came out, we’re only being – most of this is being – the brunt of it is being paid by China. You saw that.

Mr. Davis: Right. Right. I mean, well, you know –

President Trump: On the tariffs.

Mr. Davis: It depends, like, who –

President Trump: Look, I happen to be a tariff person.

Mr. Davis: Yeah.

President Trump: I happen to be a tariff person because I’m a smart person, OK? We have been ripped off so badly by people coming in and stealing our wealth. The steel industry has been rebuilt in a period of a year because of what I’ve done. We have a vibrant steel industry again, and soon it’ll be very vibrant. You know, they’re building plants all over the country because I put steel – because I put tariffs, 25 percent tariffs, on dumping steel.

How reading Hitler’s deliberations with his generals might make you lose it with sociopathic scammers

When we moved into this neighborhood, an older man stopped by to welcome us, and we thought that was sweet. But, pretty quickly, it became clear that his agenda was warning us against the lesbian couple who lived across from him. He told us that “some people around here” were doing things “forbidden by the Bible.” I became very animated about my need to unpack this box in exactly the right way and said something about being really busy. But he went on spouting fundagelical (and false) talking points about homosexuality and Christianity, and put the cherry on the top by telling me, condescendingly, that he was an expert on the Bible, and willing to help me with it. That happened to be a point in my life when my ancient Greek was crappy, but manageable for the work I was doing (I couldn’t sit down and read Scripture in Greek because both my vocabulary and grammar sucked, but I could follow the arguments about translation in interesting ways), but I was furious. I said something along the lines of, “Oh, really, do you read Hebrew and Greek?” And he said, “No.” And I said something like, “Oh, well, I read Greek, but I’m always looking for someone who reads Hebrew.” He left. Chagrined.

I considered it a win.

As it happens, our son became really good friends with the son of the couple he hated, and so we learned that that bigot harassed that couple a lot.

He shares one of our last names, and lately we’ve been getting a lot of calls for him. We checked, and they’re scams. We don’t really know where he is (he might have moved, since the house seems to have had some remodelling), and we don’t really care. We had three choices: ignore the calls (it’s landline, so we can’t block), tell them they have the wrong people, or, what I did, since I spent much of today reading Hitler’s deliberations with his generals. I spent a day reading about how a guy who believed that what he wanted for himself and people like him merited the killing of 355 million people, so I was pretty much done with sociopaths who think they can make a buck this way.

I lost it, and called back one of the numbers and told the guy who answered the phone that I hope he spends every day of his life dealing with people like him, and that, when he’s old and vulnerable, he is the prey of people like him.

I was so enraged that I was completely incoherent and almost certainly ineffectual, and it was all in service of a bigot, but I’m still proud about it.

And, fyi, the numbers all seem to be 844 area code.

Racism, slavery, and nativity scenes

You might have noticed that nativity scenes have three wise men. Scripture doesn’t say there were three, nor does it specify that one is African. But, that’s what they always have (and the Holy Family is always white, often blond).

So, where did those details come from? From the need to shift slavery into a race-based and perpetual condition. In general, except for a few striking exceptions like the Spartans’ enslavement of the Helots, slavery was generally a temporary condition, the consequence of something like indebtedness or capture in war, and wasn’t connected to any notion of race (which itself wasn’t really a concept until the 15th or 16th centuries).  Enslaved people often had ways of working their way out of slavery, slavery didn’t necessarily extend to their children, and it certainly didn’t apply to everyone like them.

But, for various reasons, at a certain point, people needed to justify slavery as a necessary consequence of having a particular heritable identity. At that point, Christians adopted the Muslim reading of Scripture, and began to read Genesis IX as God’s creation of races. Genesis IX involves Noah’s three sons, and racists read that passage as God’s creation of Africans, whites, and Asians. That reading was especially useful for, and promoted among, pro-slavery rhetors in the US because it appeared to legitimate southern practices (actually very extreme) by grounding them in Scripture. So, as Stephen Haynes shows, reading and portraying the wise men as three–a white, African, and Asian–was part of back-reading Scripture to legitimate the notion of three races, and the notion that one was condemned to servitude.

It’s interesting to look at representations of the nativity, and notice the moment that you get the three races, and where those paintings are from.

I think of myself as a good listener, and a critical interpreter, but, when a pastor said, “Listen carefully to this passage,” and then read it, and then said, “How many wise men did the passage say there were,” I was certain I’d heard him say three. We always read by what we think we know.

Things like this Nativity scene are perfect examples of how racism actually works. Too many people think that racism involves self-conscious intent, a specific desire to oppress or slur a race, but nobody got up in the morning and, to meet their daily quota of racist acts, decided to put together this Nativity scene. They might have even thought (as I once mistakenly did) that such scenes are anti-racist because they show the diversity of people worshipping Jesus. And it wouldn’t be much better if they made all the participants white. The problem with racism and representations of traditional scenes is that those representations almost inevitably rely on conventional understandings of what happened (I thought there were three wise men). Given how deeply interwoven racism is in our traditions and conventions, a representation that is simultaneously comfortably traditional and not comfortably racist is often impossible. And that is how racism works.

The photo at the top of this article is from the paper copy of the catalog for Frontgate. You can get the whole set for about $2k, or maybe not. It appears to have disappeared from their online ordering.

Democracy and the Rhetoric of Demagoguery (ODU talk, hosted by RSA)

Thank-you so much for having me; I’ve been obsessed with the issue of a culture of demagoguery for at least fifteen years, and I’m always glad to talk about it with people who care.

My basic argument is that demagoguery is a way of shifting disagreements from policy argumentation to questions of group identity and loyalty.

People go along with that shift because policy argumentation is complicated, uncertain, and risky, and demagoguery promises to reduce its complexity, uncertainty, and risk.

As Hannah Arendt so elegantly argues in The Human Condition, participation in politics requires a certain amount of faith in our own agency, while it simultaneously so very clearly demonstrates the limits of human agency. Argumentation about politics requires that we make claims about the consequences of policies, all the while knowing that many—and perhaps all—of those claims will be wrong. Political decision-making is riddled with uncertainty. We might feel certain about a decision, but we can’t be certain about all of its consequences. Advocating a political argument is and should be a transcendental leap into the unknown. All the while, with data and reason to support that leap. And the profound uncertainty, and the deep argumentative support, are both part of that leap, when people are engaged in responsible argumentation.

Demagoguery is about dodging the responsibility, the argumentation, and the uncertainty by focusing instead on how much we all hate an out-group.

That simple fact about the uncertainty of decision making is a reminder the world is not fully constituted by how it looks to us—our viewpoint is not all there is.

What’s even more concerning is that it is possible to consider a policy with due diligence, to do one’s best to investigate it from various angles, and with all the best data available, to enact it, and then for our policy to cause tremendous harm. It’s probably impossible to find a policy that doesn’t hurt some innocent being, and some well-intentioned policies hurt a lot. A thorough process doesn’t guarantee a good outcome, even if the people involved have good intentions. Meaning well doesn’t guarantee that we will do the right thing.

All of these characteristics inherent, as Arendt would say, to the human condition mean that it is difficult for us to be honest with ourselves about our limitations and yet think of ourselves as good people with good judgment.

We want to think of ourselves as good people with good judgment and good intentions, and we want policy decisions that benefit us, but, if we support policy decisions that benefit us at the expense of others that is dissonant with our desires to think well of ourselves.

What I’m saying that participation in policy disagreements creates cognitive dissonance between who we want to think we are, what we think we’re capable of, how much control we like to think we have, and what we can see happen time after time—votes don’t turn out the way we want, they do and we still don’t get what we want, despite tremendous work problems still remain.

Because the stakes are so high in politics, we want certainty—we want there to be guarantees, necessary consequences, and promises that if you do this or believe that, things will get better. We all want a pony. But we want more than just certain policy outcomes—we want more than a pony—we want to feel that what we’re doing is good and right.

Demagoguery helps silence the cognitive dissonance by saying that there are certainties, and the main certainty is that the in-group is good and just and smart. Demagoguery says, “Politics is very simple, and the answers are obvious to people of intelligence and goodwill.” If policies promised by in-group politicians and pundits don’t play out the way they were supposed to, it’s the fault of an out-group. Were it not for that out-group, the policies that seem obviously right to us would be enacted and would make everything better.

Demagoguery says everything can be divided into binaries, with us v. them being the Ur binary. It isn’t always emotional; it isn’t always populist; but it does always make some version of the move of taking a very complicated situation and breaking it into two sides. Once that move is made, once we’re talking about “both sides” or “two sides,” we’re strengthening one of the foundational pillars of demagoguery.

So, the apparently “fair” claim that “both sides are just as bad” is actually demagogic. That isn’t to say that “both sides” aren’t just as bad—it’s saying that the second you move to “two sides” regarding political deliberation you’re in a realm of imagined identities and not policy argumentation. Not only is it reinforcing the fallacy of the false dilemma but it’s strengthening yet another foundational pillar of demagoguery—that all political questions should be cast in terms of group identity, that to raise a question about political deliberation is always really a question about which group is better.

A persistent hope of humans is that if you free your mind, your ass will follow—that, if you get your theory right, or your intentions right, then your actions will be right.

And that’s a third foundational pillar of demagoguery—that bad things in human history are the consequence of groups with bad motives. That’s a non-falsifiable claim, since no group has entirely good people, and no human has entirely good motives. We’d like to believe that people engaged in genocide know that what they’re doing is murder, but they actually believe that what they’re doing is right. They thought they were on the side of right, and they thought they had good motives.

Right now, you’re probably feeling kind of discouraged—because I’m saying there is no perfect policy solution, that you shouldn’t be certain that your political agenda is right, and that, regardless of your motives, you’re going to make decisions that hurt people.

And demagoguery responds to that feeling of being discouraged by saying, “Don’t listen to her. It might seem complicated and imperfect, but with this one simple trick…” (Which is intriguing—demagoguery often relies on the same moves as self-help rhetoric. That isn’t to say that all self-help rhetoric is demagogic, although some is [such as PUA, get rich quick, and some MLM]) In this case, the simple trick is to stop thinking and settle for believing. It doesn’t frame the choice quite that way—it says, everything you believe is right, the answers to apparently complicated problems are actually simple and obvious to people like you, so you should invest all the power in people who think like you. Because the answers are simple and clear, anyone who says they aren’t, or who has answers different from you is evil, stupid, and/or biased. Any source that provides information different from what we tell you is “biased.”

In other words, demagoguery isn’t just a way of arguing; it’s a way of thinking about public discourse. Demagoguery is epistemic.

Demagoguery invites people into a world but it doesn’t reduce agency or responsibility of the people who accept that invitation. Increasingly, I’m coming to think that demagoguery works primarily by making people feel better about a choice they would already have made, and once they’ve made the initial choice to join a world of demagoguery, it’s easier to get them to commit more—it’s the Spanish Prisoner con of discourse. So, the media isn’t responsible for demagoguery; consumers of demagoguery are responsible for making it profitable.

Demagoguery doesn’t reduce agency or responsibility, but, when it’s a world of demagoguery, it can make people feel as though have more agency and less responsibility. It gives people agency by proxy (when members of their in-group triumph over an out-group, they feel powerful, and as though that was their agency) while always providing plausible deniability for responsibility. There are lots of ways that they have plausible deniability—the fallacy of false equivalence, claims of pre-emptive self-defense, projection of violent intention onto the out-group(s), holding the out-group responsible for their own reaction (what’s called complementary projection—if I feel angry toward you, you must be hostile)—but the one I want to pursue here is just not thinking about it.

If all of your policies would have worked if not for the mendacious and corrupt out-group, then you don’t really have to think about whether they failed for good reason. If every good person agrees with you, then you don’t have to think about the problems others point out with your beliefs, politicians, or policies. That doesn’t make you a mindless person, nor does it make you a person who can’t support their beliefs.

Here, again, I’m following Arendt. Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem has been persistently misread in two important ways. First, an argument that the prosecutor made and that she reported (that Jewish Councils helped the Nazis) was attributed to her; second, her subtle argument about Eichmann was turned into a simplistic one, and then she was criticized for making a simplistic argument. She never claimed he was mindless, or an automaton, nor that he had no antisemitism. She argued inductively, and seems to have expected that people would understand her conclusion (an interesting pragmatic contradiction, as Deborah Lipstadt notes). In her last book, Life of the Mind, she explains how the Eichmann trial got her thinking about thinking. Since what Eichmann had done was so deeply evil, she (and many others) expected a Satanic figure who would glory in what he did—Milton’s Satan or Shakespeare’s Iago. So, she went to the trial expecting someone like that, someone like Goring, perhaps.

However, what I was confronted with was utterly different and still undeniably factual. I was struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the uncontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives. The deeds were monstrous, but the doer—at least the very effective one now on trial—was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous. There was no sign in him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives, and the only notable characteristic one could detect in his past behavior as well as in his behavior during the trial and throughout the pre-trial police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity, but thoughtlessness. (4)

Arendt doesn’t mean he was mindless; she meant he didn’t think. That understudied and underappreciated book is about arguing for her version of what thinking should be, and she doesn’t mean some reductive positivism. She never accepts the emotion/reason dichotomy, and she is interested in the role of language, of what we would now call talking points.

She was fascinated with how animated Eichmann became when he repeated various Nazi talking points, “but, when confronted with situations for which such [Nazi] routine procedures did not exist, he was helpless” (4). He had beliefs, about Jews, about Nazis, and, most of all, about his career, and he had been given a language that made him feel comfortable about those beliefs. But, when confronted with people who didn’t agree, he didn’t know what to say, and often said bizarre things (such as whingeing to his Jewish guards that he hadn’t advanced as much in the Nazi regime as he wanted).

And, like Orwell, Arendt noted the relationship of “winged words” (again, talking points) and Eichmann’s ability to not think about what he was doing.

Cliches, stock phrases, adherence to conventional standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence. (4)

Arendt goes on to say, in one of those moments that explain why I admire her so much, “If we were responsive to this claim all the time, we would soon be exhausted; Eichmann differed from the rest of us only in that he clearly knew of no such claim at all” (4).

Eichmann was rabidly antisemitic, but, when he was faced with the reality of what he was doing, he threw up. (Supposedly, so did Himmler.) He could follow a policy as long as he didn’t think about what the policy really meant. After throwing up, he went back to his office and kept doing the thing that resulted in a situation that made him throw up because, as he said to anyone who would listen, he wasn’t killing anyone; he was just making sure they got on trains. The rhetoric of the danger of Jews, the rhetoric about a Jewish conspiracy, the rhetoric about being loyal to Germany—the rhetoric didn’t persuade him to do what he was doing (careerism did that), but it made him feel better about what he wanted to do (that is, get advancement and kill a lot of Jews).

When he was confronted with what his desires really meant, he was appalled, so he tried not to think about it. And he succeeded, because the whole function of Nazi propaganda was why you shouldn’t think about what it might be like to be a Jew. And that is Arendt’s whole point: what she means by “thinking” isn’t some positivist exclusion of feeling; it’s about stepping above your position to consider the situation from various positions. For Arendt, thinking is imagining.

It’s imagining being someone else.

Imagining being someone else and having compassion for them are two very different things. I spend a lot of time trying to understand the worldviews of people I think are engaged in inexcusably harmful actions. As Martin Luther King, Jr. said, I don’t have to like them, even if my religion says I should love them. I’m not sure how the conversion of white supremacists works, since all the data is anecdotal, and I think, from that kind of research, that sometimes compassion works, and sometimes it doesn’t, and sometimes shaming does, and sometimes just ignoring them works. But I think worrying about white supremacists might be the wrong concern.

I think there are two different ways that demagoguery can be hopelessly damaging. One is when a culture is dominated by demagoguery as the only form of public reasoning. In that case, a demagogic post on a cooking blog is harmful, insofar as it confirms that this is how we manage disagreement. But, if the culture isn’t demagogic, there’s no real harm.

In other words, and I hope it’s clear this is my main point in my whole career: there are always two arguments going on in a culture: what should we do, and how should we argue about what to do.

Demagoguery answers both questions with “be rabidly loyal to the in-group.”

In a weird way, then, this means that, when we’re arguing with someone who is deep in a culture of demagoguery, and repeating the talking points that make them feel good about their political agenda, we shouldn’t argue with them about what they believe, we should argue with them about how they believe—about whether their beliefs are falsifiable, why they’re so afraid of out-group sources of information, whether they believe their own major premises.

And so I keep ending up back on teaching. We need to teach logic (not as unemotional, and not as a list of formal fallacies, but as failures in a person’s consistency—a sign (but not a necessary one) of in-group thinking, and our intervention is to get people to move to meta-cognition.

Propaganda works by not looking like propaganda

You don’t get your information from propaganda. Your sources are good and objective and unbiased. You have a good and unbiased view of the overall political situation because you know what both sides think, and you’re clear that your side is more sensible.

So, let’s talk about why they are such sheeple and believe propaganda.

First, effective propaganda inoculates its viewers against criticism of the in-group, and it does so in two ways. Inoculation is the rhetorical tactic of presenting your audience with weak versions of out-group arguments—straw men, really—and persuading your audience that they shouldn’t even listen to the other side because their arguments are so bad.

Imagine that you believe that people should be able to have guns in easy access in case there are break-ins, and you can cite statistics about people who have protected their home that way. A medium opposed to gun ownership of any kind engaged in inoculation wouldn’t mention any statistics about people protecting themselves, and would say that, anyone who wants to have guns in their home for personal protection wants to take guns everywhere, including airplanes, and that would be incredibly dangerous, so it’s clearly a stupid argument. But they wouldn’t just say that—they would have a “debate” between people who want to ban all guns and some dumb jerk who says people should be able to take guns on airplanes.

So, viewers of that program would sincerely believe that they’d seen “both sides” of the debate when, actually, they’d watched propaganda. Really effective propaganda appears to present “both sides” by having stooges who argue for really dumb counter-arguments and actually confirm stereotypes about “those people.”

Second, propaganda spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is and (and this is the important point), saying they are so awful that you shouldn’t even look at them.

Vehement political criticism, as opposed to propaganda, spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is and (and this is the important point) providing links so you can see for yourself. What makes propaganda different from vehement political criticism is that propaganda says, “Rely on us for understanding what they believe” and vehement political criticism insists you read the primary material.

If you are watching media that spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is, and that has spokespeople who claim to represent that other side—instead of linking to the other side—you’re watching propaganda.

As Aristotle said, all things being equal, the truth will tend to emerge. And, oddly enough, one of the ways you can tell if a source is propaganda is by Aristotle’s rule—they make sure all things aren’t equal. They know that they have very fragile arguments that will crinkle up and die if exposed to the light of counter-arguments with data, and that’s why they spend so much time in inoculation. They don’t say, “Those people are idiots—go and look at what they’re saying.” They say, “Don’t go look at those sites or listen to those arguments because we will tell you what they are and they’re dumb.”

Any medium that says there is an out-group that is evil, and you should never listen to them, and doesn’t link to their arguments is propaganda.[1]

But, by refusing to link to their opposition, they’re making an admission too–that their claims can’t withstand scrutiny. Propaganda always throws around the term “objective” (it would be interesting to see whether Hitler or Stalin used that term more–it might be a dead heat). Claiming to be objective doesn’t mean you are. Having a good argument means that it can withstand argument–good arguments don’t need inoculation.

I’ve crawled around dark corners of social media, and the worst arguments in all sorts of enclaves have links to claims that support them, but never links to the opposition. They can support what they claim. Anyone can support any claim.

People think that propaganda is rhetoric that is obviously wrong and that has no evidence. But, were that propaganda, it would never work. Propaganda always has evidence and citations. What it doesn’t have is links to opposition sources; it doesn’t have fair representations of the opposition. It doesn’t make falsifiable claims.

The whole point of propaganda is not just to persuade people of your particular claims (since a lot of those claims change for political purposes), but that some media are reliable, and others are too toxic to touch. Propaganda isn’t about “believe this” as much as it is about “never listen to anyone who isn’t in-group.”

If you are relying on your source for what “they” believe, you are drinking deep at the well of propaganda. I hope that Flavor-Aid doesn’t stain your teeth.

[In case you’re wondering why I don’t have links in this post, it’s because my claim is that propaganda misrepresents the opposition and doesn’t link to them. I found, when I started making links, that I was still enforcing the notion that there are two sides, or that propaganda is an either/or rather than a continuum–that I had an opposition whom I should represent fairly. Since I really don’t want to endorse one “side” or another, as much as make a general point about argumentation, I thought that it would make more sense to strip off the links.]

When GOP rabid factionalists discover the concept of a qualifying phrase or clause

I believe in democracy, and that means that I believe that we reason best when we reason together. A good government strives to find the best ways to get good policies is to consider the impact of a policy from the point of view of all the citizens in our diverse world. I don’t think that people of my political group should dominate—my ideal political world is not one in which everyone agrees with me. My ideal political world is one in which people of all sorts of views engage in political argumentation with one another.

Conservatives share that value of an inclusive realm of argumentation, and they believe that we should be careful to conserve the traditions we have, and that we should move slowly when we come up with a new idea. Eisenhower, for instance, supported the Supreme Court in rejecting white supremacy, and insisted on respecting the Constitution, even when he didn’t like what it required him to do.

Eisenhower believed that being conservative meant that you worked as hard as you could to get your political agenda effected by using processes you would think legitimate if the other party used them. You conserved the processes.

The problem is that people who now identify as “conservative” (who perhaps are actuallyneo-conservative” or paleoconservative) don’t believe that we should be cautious about social change, nor that the restraints of the constitution should apply. They are trying to conserve their group, and their group’s status, and not the processes. Being conservative used to mean having a consistent principle about how to reason regarding social and fiscal policy. That isn’t what it means now. Now, calling yourself “conservative” means that you are irrationally committed to your party’s political policy and hate “liberals,” even when the policy flips (increasing the debt is bad if Dems do it, but fine if the GOP does it). Conservatives cannot express a principle that operates logically across all their claims.

Here’s what I’m saying: “conservatism” has ceased to be a principle or set of principles from which one decides policy, and has instead become a claim of rabid and irrational factional attachment to whatever benefits the current claims of the Republican Party.

So, to defend this policy, supporters of the current GOP will reason one way, but reason in a different—contradictory—way to support another GOP policy. This incompatible reasoning is particularly clear with the Second Amendment—that absolutist reading is not applied to the First Amendment, nor is there a consistent argument about the impact of bans.  In addition, to support the reading of the Second Amendment that it’s all guns all the time, GOP supporters ignore the qualifying phrase “a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State.” Paying attention to that phrase would imply that gun ownership is connected to militia duties—a militia that is regulated. And the absolutist reading of the Second Amendment ignores the historical context of the amendment (such as the lack of police force, its importance for slaveholders, and its role in wars against Native Americans). [1]

But, when it comes to do with the 14th Amendment, suddenly there are arguments for thinking carefully about the historical context ,  and they’ve suddenly discovered the importance of a claim being grammatically (and logically) qualified.

Were the current talking points about the 14th Amendment part of a principle of how to read the Constitution, then they would be made by people who also pay attention to the qualifying phrase and historical context of the Second Amendment, but they aren’t. So they’re what scholars of rhetoric call “post hoc reasoning”—you have a position, and then you go looking for ways to support it. Post hoc reasoning is irrational.

Rabid supporters of the GOP, in their race to provide talking points to justify Trump, have missed the most disturbing aspect of what Trump is saying and doing: he wants to undo a long history of Supreme Court decisions by executive order. A sophomore in high school should know that the President can’t do that. It’s not just a violation of the Constitution, but of the principle on which the Constitution is based–of checks and balances.

If Obama had suggested such a thing, or shown such ignorance of the Constitution, the very people who are supporting Trump would have hit the streets screaming. A President who doesn’t understand his own powers, who wants to be able to control every aspect of the government, is an ignorant authoritarian. If he gets his way, and gets appointed hot-tempered rabidly factional justices who will make decisions that protect the President from being called in front of a grand jury (a tactic the GOP used against Bill Clinton)[2], from being required to be transparent about financial dealings that might violate the emoluments clause, and that would allow a President to pardon anyone in order to keep people from testifying about his dealings, he will set in place decisions that would benefit any corrupt President, regardless of political party. No sensible person wants that, regardless of party.

[1] The NYTimes article overstates the connection, in that the idea of having an armed populace that trained regularly and could be called up–a state militia–was not just for slavery. It was also related to fears of the British again attacking, a desire not to have a standing army, and conflicts with Native Americans. But, in the South, the main function of the militia was to protect against slave revolts and to attack Native American tribes who might have escaped slaves.

[2] And here I will confess to a deep and abiding loathing for Bill Clinton. So I’ll point out that, because paleoconservatives and neoconservatives like Trump’s political agenda, they’re letting him put in places processes that would prevent any investigation of a President like Clinton. Processes matter more than the immediate outcome.

Binary (either/or) thinking

Binary thinking is when a person assumes that the situation can be broken into only two options. You either stop or go. You’re with us or against us. You’re loyal or disloyal. You’re us or them. Fight or flight.

It’s pretty rare that a situation is actually a binary, although there are times. But, in general, when people make bad decisions it’s because they thought it was a binary situation and it wasn’t.

For instance, imagine that you’re trying to get somewhere, and your normal route has terrible traffic. If you say, “Maybe this route isn’t working,” and the other person in the car says, “Oh, so you’re saying we should just go home,” they’re engaged in binary thinking. Or imagine that you’re trying fix a lawn mower, and what you’re doing just isn’t working, and you say, “This method isn’t working,” and the other person says, “So, you’re saying we should just give up.”

Humans are comfortable with binaries,[1] and so skeezy salespeople will always try to get you to reduce your choices to a binary. The fundamental binary is us or them.

Sometimes people think they aren’t engaged in binary thinking because they think there is a continuum between the two extremes. But, that’s still deeply fallacious, in that it’s rare that there are two options between which one must choose, especially in politics (there is not a continuum of furthest “left” to furthest “right”–political affiliations, at least as far as policy, are more usefully described in matrices), and the continuum model makes the situation a zero-sum. If there is a binary between black and white, then the more black something is, the less white it is. The less white something is, the more black it must be. Binary thinking contributes to zero-sum thinking, in which people approach a situation as though any gain for them is a loss for us. While business discourse long ago abandoned that way of thinking, it’s heavily promoted by tribal media.

[1] The research on the attractions and fallacies of binary thinking are usefully summarized in Mistakes Were Made, Superforecasting, and Thinking, Fast and Slow.

Compliance-gaining rhetoric

One of the major problems with political deliberation is that people think that the main reason to talk with anyone else is to get them to submit to your views. But, that isn’t the only option.

What are you trying to do when you start talking to someone with whom you disagree?

You might be trying to understand their position, or maybe just getting them to hear what you’re saying, or trying to work with them toward a solution that works for everyone, or trying to use their disagreement to figure out what’s true (in other words, what things you might have missed), or find ways to bargain with them about the outcome, or a lot of other options. One of those other options is: going into this discussion is that you will get them to comply with your view. You will sell them a car, you will get them to support your candidate, you will get them to date you.

It’s a Machiavellian approach to rhetoric, in that you believe that your ends justify any rhetorical means. You can lie, threaten, distort, or in various other ways engage in rhetorical practices you would condemn if the out-group did them.

Whether other people are consuming propaganda doesn’t matter. That there is propaganda for “the other side” doesn’t matter.

Class size and college writing (another version of the same argument)

[Also co-authored by Reinhold Hill, and also from the early 2000s]

Introduction

Any Writing Program Administrator occasionally has the frustrating experience of failing to get administrators, colleagues, parents, and even students to understand the bases of our decisions–why classes must remain small, why instructors need training in rhetoric and composition, and so on. This kind of experience is frustrating because we often find ourselves talking to someone with different assumptions about teaching, writing, and research. For such an audience, position statements are often not helpful, as our interlocutors do not even know the organizations whose position statements we’re likely to cite.

This is not to say that such discussions are necessarily an impasse, nor that the different assumptions interlocutors have are incommensurable. It is simply that, often being from different disciplines, we all bring different assumptions that seem transparently obvious to each of us. We may know from experience that one gets better writing from students if they are required to revise, but an administrator with a different disciplinary background may be sincerely concerned that we are not assessing our classes and students on the extent to which students have retained the information we have given them in lectures and readings. For many people, that is learning. As far as they are concerned, if we are not lecturing and assigning reading, then we are not teaching; if we are not testing our students, then we are not assessing students objectively.

In addition, the articles and books that we are likely to cite to explain our practices look very strange to some people–it’s just argument, a colleague once complained. We can rely on argument because we teach argument, and we are comfortable assessing arguments. We can rely on anecdote and personal experience more than people in many fields because we share an experience–the teaching of writing. Thus, if an author narrates a specific incident, we are likely to find it a reasonable form of proof, if the incident is typical of our own experience. In some other fields, however, quantified, empirical evidence is the only credible sort of proof, or an assertion must be supported by a large number of studies (regardless of how problematic any individual study might be). This is particularly an issue with class size, as minor change in enrollment (from an administrator’s perspective) are strongly resisted by Writing Program Administrators. Our intention in this article is to try to help Writing Program Administrators argue for responsible and ethical class sizes in writing courses.

There are few topics about which Writing Program Administrators and upper administrators are likely to disagree quite so unproductively as class size. While Writing Program Administrators typically argue for keeping first year writing courses as small as possible, upper administrators are often focussed on the considerable savings that could be effected by even a small change in enrollment. WPAs can cite position statements and recommendations from NCTE and ADE, but upper administrators cite such passages as the following from Pascarella and Terenzini who summarize the “substantial amount of research over the last sixty years” on class size in college teaching:

The consensus of these reviews–and of our own synthesis of the existing evidence–is that class size is not a particularly important factor when the goal of instruction is the acquisition of of subject matter knowledge and academic skills. (87).

With the backing of such an authority, upper administrators are likely to be mystified at WPA’s resistance to first year writing classes of twenty-five to thirty.

This is not to say that WPAs have no research on the side of smaller classes. Despite what Pascarella and Terenzini say, there is considerable research which identifies benefits in smaller classes. The meta-analysis of Glass and Smith (not mentioned by Pascarella and Terenzini) concludes that reduced class size is beneficial at all grade levels; Slavin found small positive short-term benefit; and several studies found benefit if (and only if) teachers engaged in teaching strategies that took advantage of the smaller size (Chatman, Tomlinson). On the other hand, there is at least one study too recent to be cited by Pascarella and Terenzini that concludes no demonstrable benefit to reducing class size (e.g., David Williams). Thus, it may seem to be a case of warring research.

On the contrary,  we will argue that the apparently disparate results of research can be explained, in a comment made by Pascarella and Terenzini. After the passage quoted above, they say “It is probably the case, however, that smaller classes are somewhat more effective than larger ones when the goals of instruction are motivational, attitudinal, or higher-level cognitive processes” (87).

There are two points which we wish to make about Pascarella and Terenzini’s negative conclusion regarding class size. First, it is striking how dated the research is–although Pascarella and Terenzini’s book came out in 1991, the most recent study they cite is 1985. Of the eighteen studies they mention, three are from the twenties, one from 1945, two from the fifties, two from the sixties, seven from the seventies, and three from the eighties. This is particularly important for the teaching of writing, as there was a major reversal in the sixties in pedagogy, returning from the lecture-based presentation of models which students were expected to imitate to the classical method which put greater emphasis on the process of inventing and arranging an effective argument.

This issue of teaching model is crucial. The impact that varying class size has on the outcome in terms of student writing depends heavily on the goal and method of the writing courses in question. If the courses are lecture courses, in which only the teacher is expected to read the students’ writing, then the only limit on class size comes from the amount of time one expects the teacher to spend grading. While that is not a model we endorse (and we will discuss the reasons below), it can still be the basis of a useful discussion.

At a “Research I” institution, faculty members are usually assessed on the assumption that they spend forty per cent of their time teaching two courses, or, one day out of a five day work week (eight hours). At schools with more teaching responsibilities, the math works out in similar ways (with a fairly ugly exception for universities with Research I publishing expectations and a three or four course teaching load). Graduate students are usually assumed to have teaching responsibilities that account for half of their half-time appointment, or ten hours per course. With three hours per week in the classroom, and three hours of office hours, graduate students instructors are left with four hours per week of grading and course preparation.

One reason that administrators and WPAs often disagree about the amount of work involved in teaching writing courses is that administrators’ experience is with what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode of teaching. The first year is hellish, but then the instructor has prepared the presentations, and future years involve tinkering with prepared lectures. Hence, course preparation is presumed to be minimal. But, of course, most WPAs are not imagining instructors’ spending class time lecturing because the presentational mode has been demonstrated, conclusively, to be the least effective method of teaching writing.

Still and all, if one assumes that a course is supposed to take 150 hours of an instructor’s time over the course of a semester (not including pre-semester course preparation), and 45 hours of that time is spend in class, and another 45 hours is spent in office hours, there are 60 hours left for individual conferences, grading, and course preparation. If there are twenty students per class, then meeting twice with each student for a half hour conference uses up 20 hours. Even assuming an efficient teacher who is dusting off lecture notes for course preparation, one should expect an hour per week of course preparation (15), leaving 25 hours for grading. Advocates of minimal marking (a problematic issue to be discussed below) describe a process that takes only twenty minutes per paper. Obviously, then, the amount of time an instructor spends on grading depends upon the number of papers, but a course with only three papers would use up almost all of the time left. Since most programs require more than three papers (and most instructors spend more than twenty minutes per paper), more than twenty students per course puts instructors into unethical working conditions.[1]

But, as we said, the deeper issue concerns just what happens in a writing class. The issue is whether one sees writing instruction as the inculcation of subject matter knowledge or as the development of higher-level cognitive processes. To the extent that it is the latter, classes should be small; to the extent that it is the former, class size is limited only by instructor workload Or, in other words, what do we teach when we teach college writing?

Interestingly enough, this is one of those questions that is not a question for people outside of the field. It seems obvious enough to people unfamiliar with research in Linguistics, Rhetoric, and English Education who tend to give what appears a straightforward answer: we teach the rules of good writing. Behind that apparent consensus is an interesting disagreement. For some people, the “rules of good writing” describe formal characteristics in writing that all educated readers acknowledge is high quality (e.g., the thesis in the first paragraph, an interest-catching first sentence). For others, those rules describe procedures that all good writers follow when writing (e.g., keep notes on three by five cards, write a formal outline with at least two sub-points). As qualitative and quantitative research has shown, however, both of those perceptions regarding the rules of good writing–regardless of how widespread they are–are false.

In the first place, there is less consensus about what constitutes “good” writing than many people think. Writers have fallen in and out of fashion, so that there is not any author who has not had his or her detractors–critical reception of Henry David Thoreau’s Walden was so hostile that it was nearly turned into pulp; Addison and Steele, always included in composition textbooks until the 1960s, are now considered nearly unreadable; even Shakespeare has been severely criticized for his mixed metaphors, complicated language, and drops into purple prose. As research in reader response criticism demonstrated as long ago as the early part of this century (see I.A. Richards), students (and readers) do not immediately recognize the merits of canonical literature; there is considerable disagreement as to just what the best writing is, so that the “canon” of accepted great writing has constantly been in flux (see Ohmann, Fish, Graff).

To a large degree, this disagreement is disciplinary; that is, different disciplines have different requirements for writing. This divergence is most obvious in regard to format–such as citation methods and order of elements. It is equally present and more important in regard to style: in the experimental and social sciences, for instance, “good” writing uses passive voice, nominalization, long clusters of noun phrases, and various other qualities which are considered “bad” writing in journalism, literature, and various humanistic disciplines. Even the notion of what constitutes error varies–social science writing is rife with what most usage handbooks identify as mixed metaphors, predication errors, reference errors, non parallel structure, split infinitives, dangling modifiers, and agreement errors. Lab reports, resumes, and much business writing permit, if not require, fragment sentences. Meanwhile, people from some disciplines recoil at the use of first person in ethnographic writing, literary criticism, some journalism, and other humanistic courses.

Disciplines also disagree as to what constitutes good evidence (for more on this issue, see Miller, Bazerman). Some disciplines accept personal observation (e.g., cultural anthropology), while some do not (e.g., economics). There are similarly profound disagreements regarding the validity of textual analysis, quantitative experimentation, qualitative research, interviews, argument from authority, and so on. There is a tendency for people to be so convinced of the epistemological superiority of their form of research that, when confronted with the fact of differing opinions on what constitutes good writing, they dismiss the standards of some other discipline (thus, for instance, Richard Lanham’s popular textbook Revising Prose condemns all use of the passive voice, and Joseph Williams’ even more popular Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace prohibits clusters of nouns). Our goal is not to take a side in the issue of which discipline promotes the best writing, but to insist upon the important point out that there is disagreement. Thus, a writing course cannot teach “the” rules of good writing that will be accepted in all disciplines because no such rules exist (unless the rules are extremely abstract, as discussed below).

In the second place, as several studies have shown, the ‘”rules” of good writing which we give students for student writing do not describe published writing.  For instance, students are generally told to end their introductions with their ‘thesis statements,” to begin each paragraph with their topic sentences (which is assumed to be the main claim of the paragraph), and to focus on the use of correct grammar. Published writing, however, does not have those qualities. Thesis statements are usually in conclusions (Trail), and introductions most often end with a clear statement of the problem (Swale), or what classical rhetoricians called the “hypothesis” (meaning a statement that points toward the thesis). Textbook advice regarding topic sentences is simply false (Braddock), and, readers are much more oblivious about errors in published writing than much writing instruction would suggest (Williams). In fact, error may not have quite the role that many teachers think–while college instructors say that correctness is an important quality of good writing (Hairston), studies in which they rank actual papers shows a privileging of what compositionists call “higher order concerns”–appropriateness to assignment, quality of reasoning, and organization over format and correctness (see Huot’s review of research on this issue).

Finally, several meta-analyses of research conclude that teaching writing as rules has a harmful effect on student writing (see especially Knoblauch and Brannon, Hillocks, Rose). The common sense assumption is that students prone to writing blocks lack the knowledge of rules for writing that effective writers have; on the contrary, students prone to writing block may know too many rules. In contrast to more fluid writers, who tend to focus on what is called “the rhetorical situation” (explained below), student writers prone to writing blocks focus on rules they have been told (Flower and Hayes, Rose).  Students taught these rules of writing try to produce an error-free first draft  which they minimally revise (Emig, Sommers). Effective and accomplished writers, in contrast, have rich and recursive writing processes that depends heavily upon revision (Emig, Flower and Hayes, Berkenkotter, Faigley and Witte).

For many people unaware of research in linguistics and English education, the assumption is that the “rules” of good writing are the rules regarding usage (usually described as “grammar rules,” which is itself an instance of an error in usage). It is assumed that there is agreement regarding these rules, and they are to be found in any usage handbook. Further, it is assumed that one can improve students’ “grammar” (another interesting usage error–what people mean is “reduce usage error” or “improve correctness”) by getting them to memorize those universally agreed-upon usage rules.  These assumptions are wrong in almost every way.

Research in linguistics demonstrates that language has considerable variation over time and region. To put it simply, at any given moment, there are numerous dialects within a language which are each “correct” within their community of discourse (e.g., “impact” for “influence,” “thinking outside the box”). Some dialects are more privileged than others, and the uninformed often assume that facility with the more privileged dialect signifies greater intelligence; this is patently false (Chomsky, Labov and Smitherman, Baron). All dialects have a grammar, so students (and colleagues) who use a different dialect are not ignorant of “grammar;” they know the grammar of a dialect not considered appropriate in academic discourse, the dialect which linguists sometimes call “standard edited English.” It is easy to overstate agreement regarding “standard edited English,” as that dialect has varied substantially over time; the “shall” versus “will” distinction used to be considered extraordinarily important, “correct” comma usage differs in British and American English and even more from the nineteenth century to now, and usage handbooks disagree on numerous issues (such as agreement). The notion of a correct dialect upon which there is universal agreement is simply a fantasy.

In our experience, people respond to this research by objecting to the pedagogy they assume it necessarily implies. People assume that to note the reality–considerable regional and historical disagreement regarding linguistic correctness–necessarily implies a complete abandonment of attention to error. That is not the necessary conclusion, nor is it our point. Our point here is simply that one central assumption in this view of writing instruction is wrong–there is not universal agreement as to rules regarding “correct” language use.

In addition, this research does not necessarily imply a “whatever goes” pedagogy. While some have drawn that conclusion, others have used this research to argue for teaching grammar and usage as a community of discourse issue (e.g., Labov and Smitherman); that is, rather than denigrate some dialects, teachers should present “standard edited English” as a useful dialect which students should use under some circumstances and with some audiences (see, for instance, “Students’ Right to Their Own Language”). Others have argued that grammar and usage should be taught as a rhetorical issue, as a question of clarity and rhetorical effect (Williams, Kolln, Dawkins).

And this leads us to the second point–the assumption that one can reduce errors in student writing through making students learn the rules of standard edited English. On the contrary, in the nearly one hundred years that this issue has been studied, there has not been a single study which showed improvement in student writing resulting from formal instruction in the rules of grammar, while there are several studies which showed a mark deterioration (see Knoblauch and Brannon, Hartwell, Hillocks for more on the history of this research). That deterioration may be the consequence of increased anxiety leading to students’ mistrusting their implicit knowledge (Hartwell), or that the time taken for grammar instruction was time away from more productive forms of writing instruction (Knoblauch and Brannnon).

In our experience, this point too is misunderstood. We are not saying that instruction in grammar and usage is pointless, but that certain approaches to it demonstrably are. And those are precisely the pedagogies into which one is forced in large classes–lecturing, drilling, assigning worksheets, and testing students on usage rules.

Indeed, research suggests that there is probably not a pedagogy which can be applied to all students in the same way. Issues of linguistic correctness result from different causes, depending upon the students. Hence, the solution varies. For students whose native dialect is fairly close to standard edited English, for instance, errors in usage sometimes result from lack of clarity about their own argument; students make more usage errors, for instance, when they are writing about something they do not fully understand. For such students, clarifying the concepts will enable the students to correct the errors.

For other students, usage errors are a time management issue–they did not leave themselves time to proofread. What Haswell has somewhat misleadingly called “minimal marking” is generally the best strategy under those circumstances (it is misleading in that it depends upon students’ resubmitting their corrected papers, so it can be fairly time-consuming for the instructor, albeit far less time-consuming and more effective than copy-editing). What he advocates, however, is not a kind of marking that takes minimal time on the part of the instructor.

For students whose dialect is markedly different from standard edited English, there is the possibility of what linguists call “dialect interference”–instances of using their (academically inappropriate) dialect, engaging in hypercorrectness (“between you and I”), or  simply being unsure how to apply the rules. There are also students whose experience with written English is minimal, and who may have a tendency toward what are called “errors of transciption” (e.g., errors regarding the placement of commas and periods).  For these students, “minimal marking” is ineffective, but neither do they benefit from lectures and quizzes on grammar rules. Instead, they seem to benefit most from individual instruction. Several studies show strong short-term improvement from sentence embedding (Hillocks), but  many instructors moved away from it due to its inherently time-consuming nature.

In short, as Mina Shaughnessy pointed out long ago, improving students’ usage is not something one can do in the same way with all students. One must know exactly what specific problems exist with each student, why that student is having that problem, and what method will best work with that problem and that student.  In other words, effective instruction in grammar and usage necessitates classes small enough that the teacher can know students well enough to know the cause of the problem. If the students have major problems, as from dialect interference, then the classes have to be small enough for the teacher to be able to engage in the extremely time-consuming methods necessary for such students.

One might wonder, if writing teachers are not teaching rules of writing, what are we teaching?  And the answer seems to be that we are teaching rhetoric. That is, while one cannot present students with rules that apply to all circumstances–never use I, always begin with a personal anecdote, your thesis should have three reasons–there are principles which do seem effective in most circumstances. Those principles are encapsulated in the concept of the “rhetorical situation”–that the quality of a piece of discourse is determined by the extent to which its strategies are appropriate for effecting the author(s) particular intention on the specific audience. Thus, were one to examine prize-winning articles in philosophy, economics, literary criticism, engineering, behavioral psychology, and theoretical physics, one would see wide variation in terms of  format, style, organization, and nature of evidence, one would see that each piece was appropriate for its audience.

One advantage of this approach to the teaching of writing is that it is more effective. Lecturing and drilling are, as several studies have shown, ineffective methods of writing instruction (Hillocks). This method remains tremendously popular, however, especially among teachers whose own instruction followed that method, who are cynical regarding student achievement, and who are generally convinced that the teaching of writing is the transmission of information (Hillocks).  This point is important, as it showed up in our own experiment with reducing class size–students in classes with teachers who relied heavily on lecture did not show any benefit from a smaller class. The fact is that lectures are ineffective in writing classes; reducing the class size does not suddenly make lecturing an effective teaching strategy.

When we had the opportunity to look closely at class size at our previous institution, we made some surprising discoveries.  One of the major motivations for undertaking the experiment was a sense of frustration, among faculty and graduate students, with graduate student instructors’ progress toward their degrees. Prior to the change in program emphasis, a large number of our instructors used class time to present advice on writing papers as well as to present writing products which students used as models (what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode, and which he identifies as the least effective method of writing instruction). Perhaps because this method of instruction did not work particularly well for so many students, instructors also relied heavily on individual conferences with students–conferences which took so much time that they necessitated long blocks of time outside normal office hours. The dominance of this mixing of presentational and individualized modes of instruction had fairly predictable consequences.

The accretion of assignments and expectations for the course meant that it was actually impossible to teach the course in the ten hours per week a graduate student was supposed to spend on it. While such a situation is far from uncommon–many programs pay writing teachers a salary that presumes that the course takes much less time than it actually does–it is unethical. It also means that instructors, especially ones with multiple commitments (e.g., graduate students who are also taking courses, part-time instructors with obligations at several campuses, tenure-track teachers facing publication pressures), are encouraged to adopt pedagogies which feel more efficient but which research strongly indicates are less effective (i.e., the presentational mode of teaching, discussed previously).

Graduate student instructors responded to this situation in various ways. According to a survey, as well as faculty observation, many let their own coursework suffer in favor of their teaching. Others simplified assignments, so that the papers were short and simple enough that they could be graded in ten to fifteen minutes a piece. Several instructors essentially abandoned assessing student work, and graded students purely on attendance. Many instructors reported spending long hours on teaching, something that, not surprisingly, resulted in frustration–the first year composition course was openly discussed as the least desirable teaching assignment. In this context, it should be clear why we were looking for a method that would reduce the amount of time that instructors spent on their first year composition courses, without simply shifting them to quick, but ineffective, methods such as lecturing, drilling, and superficial grading.

When we reduced class size to fifteen for many of the instructors, we found that those instructors generally spent less time on the course (instructors in control groups reported spending an average of ten to fourteen hours per week on their courses, instructors in the sections with reduced class size reported averages of between twelve and fifteen). We also found that many instructors took advantage of the reduced class size to create new assignments, to take more time to comment on papers, to meet more often with students, or to add another project. Such a consequence–instructors taking the opportunity to increase the amount of work in the course–is echoed in at least one other study on class size.  The San Juan Unified School District report on the results of the Morgan-Hart Class Size Reduction Act of 1989 concludes that

As a result of smaller classes, students were more actively involved in the instructional process.  This was demonstrated by an increase in the number of student reading and writing assignments, more oral presentations and frequent classroom discussions.  Students also received increased feedback on their English assignments and teachers had time to work with students individually.

One benefit of reducing class size, then, is that instructors appear more willing to experiment with and examine their teaching styles. Whether this is a bug or feature would depend on the program goals. Certainly, although they may not have spent less time on the courses, they reported much higher satisfaction. Teachers like smaller classes.

But, they did not always use the time well. We found that instructors heavily committed to the presentational mode did not effect much change in their students’ writing processes. Similarly, class size did not increase overall student satisfaction if the instructor engaged in the presentational mode.

In conclusion, our experience fits with Sheree Goettler-Sopko’s summary of research on class-size and reading achievement. She concludes that “The central theme which runs through the current research literature is that academic achievement does not necessarily improve with the reduction of student/teacher ratio unless appropriate learning styles and effective teaching styles are utilized” (5).

Class Size and Minimal Teaching

George Hillocks long ago showed the importance and superiority of constructivist approaches to the teaching of writing (Research in Written Composition, Teaching Writing as Reflective Practice, and more recently Ways of Thinking, Ways of Teaching).  This means that effective teaching requires an approach which does not set the task of teaching writing as getting students to memorize and understand certain objects of knowledge (the objectivist approach), but as setting students tasks during which they will learn and giving them appropriate feedback along the way.  The more that one engages in constructivist teaching, the more important is class size; the more that the goals and practices of a program are objectivist, the less class size matters. While reducing class size does not guarantee constructivist teaching, increasing class size does prevent it.

One can see this effect simply by thinking about the amount of time for which writing instructors are paid. The assumption at many universities is that each class is supposed to take 8-10 hours per week of instructor time. Instructors spend three hours each week in class, and it is optimistic, but not necessarily irrationally so, to assume that an efficient and highly experienced teacher can prepare for class on a one-to-one basis (that is, that it takes approximately one hour to prepare for one hour of class). A teacher therefore has two to four hours a week (almost precisely what is required by most universities for office hours). If an instructor has twenty students per class, s/he has, over the course of the semester 30-60 hours, which comes, at best, to three hours per student for conferences and grading. This situation necessitates cutting the students short on something–short papers which can be graded quickly, cursory grading of student work generally, discouraging students from using office hours. All in all, it means that one cannot do what Pascarelli and Terenzini say “effective teachers do” when “They signal their accessibility in and out of the classroom” (652).  Simply put, if instructors have to use office hours to grade student work, they cannot signal accessibility. Pascarelli and Terenzini say, “They give students formal and informal feedback on their performance” (652), but, if instructors are restricted to three hours of grading per semester per student, they have to minimize the amount of feedback given. In other words, large classes force instructors away from what “we know” to be good practice.

The larger the class, the more the teacher is forced into lecturing. Yet, according to Pascarelli and Terenzini,

            Our review indicates that individualized instructional approaches that accommodate variations in students’ learning styles and rates consistently appear to produce greater subject matter learning than do more conventional approaches, such as lecturing. These advantages are especially apparent with instructional approaches that rely on small, modularized content units, require a student to master one instructional unit before proceeding to the next, and elicit active student involvement in the learning process. Perhaps even more promising is the evidence suggesting that these learning advantages are the same for students of different aptitudes and different levels of subject area competence. Probably in no other realm is the evidence so clear and consistent. (646, emphasis added)

If we want instructors to be effective writing instructors, then we have to ensure that they are in a situation which will permit good practice. Reducing class size will not necessarily cause such practice, but it is a necessary condition thereof.

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[1] Unhappily, in our experience, the expectation is that instructors should spend more than forty hour per week on their jobs, or cut corners in various ways. For instance, it is often assumed that office hours can be used for course preparation or grading, but that amounts to an official policy that office hours are not times when students can expect the full attention of the instructor. Hence, when upper administrators say that office hours should not be counted separately from course preparation, the correct answer is, “Put that in writing.”