Racism, slavery, and nativity scenes

You might have noticed that nativity scenes have three wise men. Scripture doesn’t say there were three, nor does it specify that one is African. But, that’s what they always have (and the Holy Family is always white, often blond).

So, where did those details come from? From the need to shift slavery into a race-based and perpetual condition. In general, except for a few striking exceptions like the Spartans’ enslavement of the Helots, slavery was generally a temporary condition, the consequence of something like indebtedness or capture in war, and wasn’t connected to any notion of race (which itself wasn’t really a concept until the 15th or 16th centuries).  Enslaved people often had ways of working their way out of slavery, slavery didn’t necessarily extend to their children, and it certainly didn’t apply to everyone like them.

But, for various reasons, at a certain point, people needed to justify slavery as a necessary consequence of having a particular heritable identity. At that point, Christians adopted the Muslim reading of Scripture, and began to read Genesis IX as God’s creation of races. Genesis IX involves Noah’s three sons, and racists read that passage as God’s creation of Africans, whites, and Asians. That reading was especially useful for, and promoted among, pro-slavery rhetors in the US because it appeared to legitimate southern practices (actually very extreme) by grounding them in Scripture. So, as Stephen Haynes shows, reading and portraying the wise men as three–a white, African, and Asian–was part of back-reading Scripture to legitimate the notion of three races, and the notion that one was condemned to servitude.

It’s interesting to look at representations of the nativity, and notice the moment that you get the three races, and where those paintings are from.

I think of myself as a good listener, and a critical interpreter, but, when a pastor said, “Listen carefully to this passage,” and then read it, and then said, “How many wise men did the passage say there were,” I was certain I’d heard him say three. We always read by what we think we know.

Things like this Nativity scene are perfect examples of how racism actually works. Too many people think that racism involves self-conscious intent, a specific desire to oppress or slur a race, but nobody got up in the morning and, to meet their daily quota of racist acts, decided to put together this Nativity scene. They might have even thought (as I once mistakenly did) that such scenes are anti-racist because they show the diversity of people worshipping Jesus. And it wouldn’t be much better if they made all the participants white. The problem with racism and representations of traditional scenes is that those representations almost inevitably rely on conventional understandings of what happened (I thought there were three wise men). Given how deeply interwoven racism is in our traditions and conventions, a representation that is simultaneously comfortably traditional and not comfortably racist is often impossible. And that is how racism works.

The photo at the top of this article is from the paper copy of the catalog for Frontgate. You can get the whole set for about $2k, or maybe not. It appears to have disappeared from their online ordering.

Democracy and the Rhetoric of Demagoguery (ODU talk, hosted by RSA)

Thank-you so much for having me; I’ve been obsessed with the issue of a culture of demagoguery for at least fifteen years, and I’m always glad to talk about it with people who care.

My basic argument is that demagoguery is a way of shifting disagreements from policy argumentation to questions of group identity and loyalty.

People go along with that shift because policy argumentation is complicated, uncertain, and risky, and demagoguery promises to reduce its complexity, uncertainty, and risk.

As Hannah Arendt so elegantly argues in The Human Condition, participation in politics requires a certain amount of faith in our own agency, while it simultaneously so very clearly demonstrates the limits of human agency. Argumentation about politics requires that we make claims about the consequences of policies, all the while knowing that many—and perhaps all—of those claims will be wrong. Political decision-making is riddled with uncertainty. We might feel certain about a decision, but we can’t be certain about all of its consequences. Advocating a political argument is and should be a transcendental leap into the unknown. All the while, with data and reason to support that leap. And the profound uncertainty, and the deep argumentative support, are both part of that leap, when people are engaged in responsible argumentation.

Demagoguery is about dodging the responsibility, the argumentation, and the uncertainty by focusing instead on how much we all hate an out-group.

That simple fact about the uncertainty of decision making is a reminder the world is not fully constituted by how it looks to us—our viewpoint is not all there is.

What’s even more concerning is that it is possible to consider a policy with due diligence, to do one’s best to investigate it from various angles, and with all the best data available, to enact it, and then for our policy to cause tremendous harm. It’s probably impossible to find a policy that doesn’t hurt some innocent being, and some well-intentioned policies hurt a lot. A thorough process doesn’t guarantee a good outcome, even if the people involved have good intentions. Meaning well doesn’t guarantee that we will do the right thing.

All of these characteristics inherent, as Arendt would say, to the human condition mean that it is difficult for us to be honest with ourselves about our limitations and yet think of ourselves as good people with good judgment.

We want to think of ourselves as good people with good judgment and good intentions, and we want policy decisions that benefit us, but, if we support policy decisions that benefit us at the expense of others that is dissonant with our desires to think well of ourselves.

What I’m saying that participation in policy disagreements creates cognitive dissonance between who we want to think we are, what we think we’re capable of, how much control we like to think we have, and what we can see happen time after time—votes don’t turn out the way we want, they do and we still don’t get what we want, despite tremendous work problems still remain.

Because the stakes are so high in politics, we want certainty—we want there to be guarantees, necessary consequences, and promises that if you do this or believe that, things will get better. We all want a pony. But we want more than just certain policy outcomes—we want more than a pony—we want to feel that what we’re doing is good and right.

Demagoguery helps silence the cognitive dissonance by saying that there are certainties, and the main certainty is that the in-group is good and just and smart. Demagoguery says, “Politics is very simple, and the answers are obvious to people of intelligence and goodwill.” If policies promised by in-group politicians and pundits don’t play out the way they were supposed to, it’s the fault of an out-group. Were it not for that out-group, the policies that seem obviously right to us would be enacted and would make everything better.

Demagoguery says everything can be divided into binaries, with us v. them being the Ur binary. It isn’t always emotional; it isn’t always populist; but it does always make some version of the move of taking a very complicated situation and breaking it into two sides. Once that move is made, once we’re talking about “both sides” or “two sides,” we’re strengthening one of the foundational pillars of demagoguery.

So, the apparently “fair” claim that “both sides are just as bad” is actually demagogic. That isn’t to say that “both sides” aren’t just as bad—it’s saying that the second you move to “two sides” regarding political deliberation you’re in a realm of imagined identities and not policy argumentation. Not only is it reinforcing the fallacy of the false dilemma but it’s strengthening yet another foundational pillar of demagoguery—that all political questions should be cast in terms of group identity, that to raise a question about political deliberation is always really a question about which group is better.

A persistent hope of humans is that if you free your mind, your ass will follow—that, if you get your theory right, or your intentions right, then your actions will be right.

And that’s a third foundational pillar of demagoguery—that bad things in human history are the consequence of groups with bad motives. That’s a non-falsifiable claim, since no group has entirely good people, and no human has entirely good motives. We’d like to believe that people engaged in genocide know that what they’re doing is murder, but they actually believe that what they’re doing is right. They thought they were on the side of right, and they thought they had good motives.

Right now, you’re probably feeling kind of discouraged—because I’m saying there is no perfect policy solution, that you shouldn’t be certain that your political agenda is right, and that, regardless of your motives, you’re going to make decisions that hurt people.

And demagoguery responds to that feeling of being discouraged by saying, “Don’t listen to her. It might seem complicated and imperfect, but with this one simple trick…” (Which is intriguing—demagoguery often relies on the same moves as self-help rhetoric. That isn’t to say that all self-help rhetoric is demagogic, although some is [such as PUA, get rich quick, and some MLM]) In this case, the simple trick is to stop thinking and settle for believing. It doesn’t frame the choice quite that way—it says, everything you believe is right, the answers to apparently complicated problems are actually simple and obvious to people like you, so you should invest all the power in people who think like you. Because the answers are simple and clear, anyone who says they aren’t, or who has answers different from you is evil, stupid, and/or biased. Any source that provides information different from what we tell you is “biased.”

In other words, demagoguery isn’t just a way of arguing; it’s a way of thinking about public discourse. Demagoguery is epistemic.

Demagoguery invites people into a world but it doesn’t reduce agency or responsibility of the people who accept that invitation. Increasingly, I’m coming to think that demagoguery works primarily by making people feel better about a choice they would already have made, and once they’ve made the initial choice to join a world of demagoguery, it’s easier to get them to commit more—it’s the Spanish Prisoner con of discourse. So, the media isn’t responsible for demagoguery; consumers of demagoguery are responsible for making it profitable.

Demagoguery doesn’t reduce agency or responsibility, but, when it’s a world of demagoguery, it can make people feel as though have more agency and less responsibility. It gives people agency by proxy (when members of their in-group triumph over an out-group, they feel powerful, and as though that was their agency) while always providing plausible deniability for responsibility. There are lots of ways that they have plausible deniability—the fallacy of false equivalence, claims of pre-emptive self-defense, projection of violent intention onto the out-group(s), holding the out-group responsible for their own reaction (what’s called complementary projection—if I feel angry toward you, you must be hostile)—but the one I want to pursue here is just not thinking about it.

If all of your policies would have worked if not for the mendacious and corrupt out-group, then you don’t really have to think about whether they failed for good reason. If every good person agrees with you, then you don’t have to think about the problems others point out with your beliefs, politicians, or policies. That doesn’t make you a mindless person, nor does it make you a person who can’t support their beliefs.

Here, again, I’m following Arendt. Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem has been persistently misread in two important ways. First, an argument that the prosecutor made and that she reported (that Jewish Councils helped the Nazis) was attributed to her; second, her subtle argument about Eichmann was turned into a simplistic one, and then she was criticized for making a simplistic argument. She never claimed he was mindless, or an automaton, nor that he had no antisemitism. She argued inductively, and seems to have expected that people would understand her conclusion (an interesting pragmatic contradiction, as Deborah Lipstadt notes). In her last book, Life of the Mind, she explains how the Eichmann trial got her thinking about thinking. Since what Eichmann had done was so deeply evil, she (and many others) expected a Satanic figure who would glory in what he did—Milton’s Satan or Shakespeare’s Iago. So, she went to the trial expecting someone like that, someone like Goring, perhaps.

However, what I was confronted with was utterly different and still undeniably factual. I was struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the uncontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives. The deeds were monstrous, but the doer—at least the very effective one now on trial—was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous. There was no sign in him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives, and the only notable characteristic one could detect in his past behavior as well as in his behavior during the trial and throughout the pre-trial police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity, but thoughtlessness. (4)

Arendt doesn’t mean he was mindless; she meant he didn’t think. That understudied and underappreciated book is about arguing for her version of what thinking should be, and she doesn’t mean some reductive positivism. She never accepts the emotion/reason dichotomy, and she is interested in the role of language, of what we would now call talking points.

She was fascinated with how animated Eichmann became when he repeated various Nazi talking points, “but, when confronted with situations for which such [Nazi] routine procedures did not exist, he was helpless” (4). He had beliefs, about Jews, about Nazis, and, most of all, about his career, and he had been given a language that made him feel comfortable about those beliefs. But, when confronted with people who didn’t agree, he didn’t know what to say, and often said bizarre things (such as whingeing to his Jewish guards that he hadn’t advanced as much in the Nazi regime as he wanted).

And, like Orwell, Arendt noted the relationship of “winged words” (again, talking points) and Eichmann’s ability to not think about what he was doing.

Cliches, stock phrases, adherence to conventional standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence. (4)

Arendt goes on to say, in one of those moments that explain why I admire her so much, “If we were responsive to this claim all the time, we would soon be exhausted; Eichmann differed from the rest of us only in that he clearly knew of no such claim at all” (4).

Eichmann was rabidly antisemitic, but, when he was faced with the reality of what he was doing, he threw up. (Supposedly, so did Himmler.) He could follow a policy as long as he didn’t think about what the policy really meant. After throwing up, he went back to his office and kept doing the thing that resulted in a situation that made him throw up because, as he said to anyone who would listen, he wasn’t killing anyone; he was just making sure they got on trains. The rhetoric of the danger of Jews, the rhetoric about a Jewish conspiracy, the rhetoric about being loyal to Germany—the rhetoric didn’t persuade him to do what he was doing (careerism did that), but it made him feel better about what he wanted to do (that is, get advancement and kill a lot of Jews).

When he was confronted with what his desires really meant, he was appalled, so he tried not to think about it. And he succeeded, because the whole function of Nazi propaganda was why you shouldn’t think about what it might be like to be a Jew. And that is Arendt’s whole point: what she means by “thinking” isn’t some positivist exclusion of feeling; it’s about stepping above your position to consider the situation from various positions. For Arendt, thinking is imagining.

It’s imagining being someone else.

Imagining being someone else and having compassion for them are two very different things. I spend a lot of time trying to understand the worldviews of people I think are engaged in inexcusably harmful actions. As Martin Luther King, Jr. said, I don’t have to like them, even if my religion says I should love them. I’m not sure how the conversion of white supremacists works, since all the data is anecdotal, and I think, from that kind of research, that sometimes compassion works, and sometimes it doesn’t, and sometimes shaming does, and sometimes just ignoring them works. But I think worrying about white supremacists might be the wrong concern.

I think there are two different ways that demagoguery can be hopelessly damaging. One is when a culture is dominated by demagoguery as the only form of public reasoning. In that case, a demagogic post on a cooking blog is harmful, insofar as it confirms that this is how we manage disagreement. But, if the culture isn’t demagogic, there’s no real harm.

In other words, and I hope it’s clear this is my main point in my whole career: there are always two arguments going on in a culture: what should we do, and how should we argue about what to do.

Demagoguery answers both questions with “be rabidly loyal to the in-group.”

In a weird way, then, this means that, when we’re arguing with someone who is deep in a culture of demagoguery, and repeating the talking points that make them feel good about their political agenda, we shouldn’t argue with them about what they believe, we should argue with them about how they believe—about whether their beliefs are falsifiable, why they’re so afraid of out-group sources of information, whether they believe their own major premises.

And so I keep ending up back on teaching. We need to teach logic (not as unemotional, and not as a list of formal fallacies, but as failures in a person’s consistency—a sign (but not a necessary one) of in-group thinking, and our intervention is to get people to move to meta-cognition.

Propaganda works by not looking like propaganda

You don’t get your information from propaganda. Your sources are good and objective and unbiased. You have a good and unbiased view of the overall political situation because you know what both sides think, and you’re clear that your side is more sensible.

So, let’s talk about why they are such sheeple and believe propaganda.

First, effective propaganda inoculates its viewers against criticism of the in-group, and it does so in two ways. Inoculation is the rhetorical tactic of presenting your audience with weak versions of out-group arguments—straw men, really—and persuading your audience that they shouldn’t even listen to the other side because their arguments are so bad.

Imagine that you believe that people should be able to have guns in easy access in case there are break-ins, and you can cite statistics about people who have protected their home that way. A medium opposed to gun ownership of any kind engaged in inoculation wouldn’t mention any statistics about people protecting themselves, and would say that, anyone who wants to have guns in their home for personal protection wants to take guns everywhere, including airplanes, and that would be incredibly dangerous, so it’s clearly a stupid argument. But they wouldn’t just say that—they would have a “debate” between people who want to ban all guns and some dumb jerk who says people should be able to take guns on airplanes.

So, viewers of that program would sincerely believe that they’d seen “both sides” of the debate when, actually, they’d watched propaganda. Really effective propaganda appears to present “both sides” by having stooges who argue for really dumb counter-arguments and actually confirm stereotypes about “those people.”

Second, propaganda spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is and (and this is the important point), saying they are so awful that you shouldn’t even look at them.

Vehement political criticism, as opposed to propaganda, spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is and (and this is the important point) providing links so you can see for yourself. What makes propaganda different from vehement political criticism is that propaganda says, “Rely on us for understanding what they believe” and vehement political criticism insists you read the primary material.

If you are watching media that spends a lot of time telling you how awful the other side is, and that has spokespeople who claim to represent that other side—instead of linking to the other side—you’re watching propaganda.

As Aristotle said, all things being equal, the truth will tend to emerge. And, oddly enough, one of the ways you can tell if a source is propaganda is by Aristotle’s rule—they make sure all things aren’t equal. They know that they have very fragile arguments that will crinkle up and die if exposed to the light of counter-arguments with data, and that’s why they spend so much time in inoculation. They don’t say, “Those people are idiots—go and look at what they’re saying.” They say, “Don’t go look at those sites or listen to those arguments because we will tell you what they are and they’re dumb.”

Any medium that says there is an out-group that is evil, and you should never listen to them, and doesn’t link to their arguments is propaganda.[1]

But, by refusing to link to their opposition, they’re making an admission too–that their claims can’t withstand scrutiny. Propaganda always throws around the term “objective” (it would be interesting to see whether Hitler or Stalin used that term more–it might be a dead heat). Claiming to be objective doesn’t mean you are. Having a good argument means that it can withstand argument–good arguments don’t need inoculation.

I’ve crawled around dark corners of social media, and the worst arguments in all sorts of enclaves have links to claims that support them, but never links to the opposition. They can support what they claim. Anyone can support any claim.

People think that propaganda is rhetoric that is obviously wrong and that has no evidence. But, were that propaganda, it would never work. Propaganda always has evidence and citations. What it doesn’t have is links to opposition sources; it doesn’t have fair representations of the opposition. It doesn’t make falsifiable claims.

The whole point of propaganda is not just to persuade people of your particular claims (since a lot of those claims change for political purposes), but that some media are reliable, and others are too toxic to touch. Propaganda isn’t about “believe this” as much as it is about “never listen to anyone who isn’t in-group.”

If you are relying on your source for what “they” believe, you are drinking deep at the well of propaganda. I hope that Flavor-Aid doesn’t stain your teeth.

[In case you’re wondering why I don’t have links in this post, it’s because my claim is that propaganda misrepresents the opposition and doesn’t link to them. I found, when I started making links, that I was still enforcing the notion that there are two sides, or that propaganda is an either/or rather than a continuum–that I had an opposition whom I should represent fairly. Since I really don’t want to endorse one “side” or another, as much as make a general point about argumentation, I thought that it would make more sense to strip off the links.]

When GOP rabid factionalists discover the concept of a qualifying phrase or clause

I believe in democracy, and that means that I believe that we reason best when we reason together. A good government strives to find the best ways to get good policies is to consider the impact of a policy from the point of view of all the citizens in our diverse world. I don’t think that people of my political group should dominate—my ideal political world is not one in which everyone agrees with me. My ideal political world is one in which people of all sorts of views engage in political argumentation with one another.

Conservatives share that value of an inclusive realm of argumentation, and they believe that we should be careful to conserve the traditions we have, and that we should move slowly when we come up with a new idea. Eisenhower, for instance, supported the Supreme Court in rejecting white supremacy, and insisted on respecting the Constitution, even when he didn’t like what it required him to do.

Eisenhower believed that being conservative meant that you worked as hard as you could to get your political agenda effected by using processes you would think legitimate if the other party used them. You conserved the processes.

The problem is that people who now identify as “conservative” (who perhaps are actuallyneo-conservative” or paleoconservative) don’t believe that we should be cautious about social change, nor that the restraints of the constitution should apply. They are trying to conserve their group, and their group’s status, and not the processes. Being conservative used to mean having a consistent principle about how to reason regarding social and fiscal policy. That isn’t what it means now. Now, calling yourself “conservative” means that you are irrationally committed to your party’s political policy and hate “liberals,” even when the policy flips (increasing the debt is bad if Dems do it, but fine if the GOP does it). Conservatives cannot express a principle that operates logically across all their claims.

Here’s what I’m saying: “conservatism” has ceased to be a principle or set of principles from which one decides policy, and has instead become a claim of rabid and irrational factional attachment to whatever benefits the current claims of the Republican Party.

So, to defend this policy, supporters of the current GOP will reason one way, but reason in a different—contradictory—way to support another GOP policy. This incompatible reasoning is particularly clear with the Second Amendment—that absolutist reading is not applied to the First Amendment, nor is there a consistent argument about the impact of bans.  In addition, to support the reading of the Second Amendment that it’s all guns all the time, GOP supporters ignore the qualifying phrase “a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State.” Paying attention to that phrase would imply that gun ownership is connected to militia duties—a militia that is regulated. And the absolutist reading of the Second Amendment ignores the historical context of the amendment (such as the lack of police force, its importance for slaveholders, and its role in wars against Native Americans). [1]

But, when it comes to do with the 14th Amendment, suddenly there are arguments for thinking carefully about the historical context ,  and they’ve suddenly discovered the importance of a claim being grammatically (and logically) qualified.

Were the current talking points about the 14th Amendment part of a principle of how to read the Constitution, then they would be made by people who also pay attention to the qualifying phrase and historical context of the Second Amendment, but they aren’t. So they’re what scholars of rhetoric call “post hoc reasoning”—you have a position, and then you go looking for ways to support it. Post hoc reasoning is irrational.

Rabid supporters of the GOP, in their race to provide talking points to justify Trump, have missed the most disturbing aspect of what Trump is saying and doing: he wants to undo a long history of Supreme Court decisions by executive order. A sophomore in high school should know that the President can’t do that. It’s not just a violation of the Constitution, but of the principle on which the Constitution is based–of checks and balances.

If Obama had suggested such a thing, or shown such ignorance of the Constitution, the very people who are supporting Trump would have hit the streets screaming. A President who doesn’t understand his own powers, who wants to be able to control every aspect of the government, is an ignorant authoritarian. If he gets his way, and gets appointed hot-tempered rabidly factional justices who will make decisions that protect the President from being called in front of a grand jury (a tactic the GOP used against Bill Clinton)[2], from being required to be transparent about financial dealings that might violate the emoluments clause, and that would allow a President to pardon anyone in order to keep people from testifying about his dealings, he will set in place decisions that would benefit any corrupt President, regardless of political party. No sensible person wants that, regardless of party.

[1] The NYTimes article overstates the connection, in that the idea of having an armed populace that trained regularly and could be called up–a state militia–was not just for slavery. It was also related to fears of the British again attacking, a desire not to have a standing army, and conflicts with Native Americans. But, in the South, the main function of the militia was to protect against slave revolts and to attack Native American tribes who might have escaped slaves.

[2] And here I will confess to a deep and abiding loathing for Bill Clinton. So I’ll point out that, because paleoconservatives and neoconservatives like Trump’s political agenda, they’re letting him put in places processes that would prevent any investigation of a President like Clinton. Processes matter more than the immediate outcome.

Binary (either/or) thinking

Binary thinking is when a person assumes that the situation can be broken into only two options. You either stop or go. You’re with us or against us. You’re loyal or disloyal. You’re us or them. Fight or flight.

It’s pretty rare that a situation is actually a binary, although there are times. But, in general, when people make bad decisions it’s because they thought it was a binary situation and it wasn’t.

For instance, imagine that you’re trying to get somewhere, and your normal route has terrible traffic. If you say, “Maybe this route isn’t working,” and the other person in the car says, “Oh, so you’re saying we should just go home,” they’re engaged in binary thinking. Or imagine that you’re trying fix a lawn mower, and what you’re doing just isn’t working, and you say, “This method isn’t working,” and the other person says, “So, you’re saying we should just give up.”

Humans are comfortable with binaries,[1] and so skeezy salespeople will always try to get you to reduce your choices to a binary. The fundamental binary is us or them.

Sometimes people think they aren’t engaged in binary thinking because they think there is a continuum between the two extremes. But, that’s still deeply fallacious, in that it’s rare that there are two options between which one must choose, especially in politics (there is not a continuum of furthest “left” to furthest “right”–political affiliations, at least as far as policy, are more usefully described in matrices), and the continuum model makes the situation a zero-sum. If there is a binary between black and white, then the more black something is, the less white it is. The less white something is, the more black it must be. Binary thinking contributes to zero-sum thinking, in which people approach a situation as though any gain for them is a loss for us. While business discourse long ago abandoned that way of thinking, it’s heavily promoted by tribal media.

[1] The research on the attractions and fallacies of binary thinking are usefully summarized in Mistakes Were Made, Superforecasting, and Thinking, Fast and Slow.

Compliance-gaining rhetoric

One of the major problems with political deliberation is that people think that the main reason to talk with anyone else is to get them to submit to your views. But, that isn’t the only option.

What are you trying to do when you start talking to someone with whom you disagree?

You might be trying to understand their position, or maybe just getting them to hear what you’re saying, or trying to work with them toward a solution that works for everyone, or trying to use their disagreement to figure out what’s true (in other words, what things you might have missed), or find ways to bargain with them about the outcome, or a lot of other options. One of those other options is: going into this discussion is that you will get them to comply with your view. You will sell them a car, you will get them to support your candidate, you will get them to date you.

It’s a Machiavellian approach to rhetoric, in that you believe that your ends justify any rhetorical means. You can lie, threaten, distort, or in various other ways engage in rhetorical practices you would condemn if the out-group did them.

Whether other people are consuming propaganda doesn’t matter. That there is propaganda for “the other side” doesn’t matter.

Class size and college writing (another version of the same argument)

[Also co-authored by Reinhold Hill, and also from the early 2000s]

Introduction

Any Writing Program Administrator occasionally has the frustrating experience of failing to get administrators, colleagues, parents, and even students to understand the bases of our decisions–why classes must remain small, why instructors need training in rhetoric and composition, and so on. This kind of experience is frustrating because we often find ourselves talking to someone with different assumptions about teaching, writing, and research. For such an audience, position statements are often not helpful, as our interlocutors do not even know the organizations whose position statements we’re likely to cite.

This is not to say that such discussions are necessarily an impasse, nor that the different assumptions interlocutors have are incommensurable. It is simply that, often being from different disciplines, we all bring different assumptions that seem transparently obvious to each of us. We may know from experience that one gets better writing from students if they are required to revise, but an administrator with a different disciplinary background may be sincerely concerned that we are not assessing our classes and students on the extent to which students have retained the information we have given them in lectures and readings. For many people, that is learning. As far as they are concerned, if we are not lecturing and assigning reading, then we are not teaching; if we are not testing our students, then we are not assessing students objectively.

In addition, the articles and books that we are likely to cite to explain our practices look very strange to some people–it’s just argument, a colleague once complained. We can rely on argument because we teach argument, and we are comfortable assessing arguments. We can rely on anecdote and personal experience more than people in many fields because we share an experience–the teaching of writing. Thus, if an author narrates a specific incident, we are likely to find it a reasonable form of proof, if the incident is typical of our own experience. In some other fields, however, quantified, empirical evidence is the only credible sort of proof, or an assertion must be supported by a large number of studies (regardless of how problematic any individual study might be). This is particularly an issue with class size, as minor change in enrollment (from an administrator’s perspective) are strongly resisted by Writing Program Administrators. Our intention in this article is to try to help Writing Program Administrators argue for responsible and ethical class sizes in writing courses.

There are few topics about which Writing Program Administrators and upper administrators are likely to disagree quite so unproductively as class size. While Writing Program Administrators typically argue for keeping first year writing courses as small as possible, upper administrators are often focussed on the considerable savings that could be effected by even a small change in enrollment. WPAs can cite position statements and recommendations from NCTE and ADE, but upper administrators cite such passages as the following from Pascarella and Terenzini who summarize the “substantial amount of research over the last sixty years” on class size in college teaching:

The consensus of these reviews–and of our own synthesis of the existing evidence–is that class size is not a particularly important factor when the goal of instruction is the acquisition of of subject matter knowledge and academic skills. (87).

With the backing of such an authority, upper administrators are likely to be mystified at WPA’s resistance to first year writing classes of twenty-five to thirty.

This is not to say that WPAs have no research on the side of smaller classes. Despite what Pascarella and Terenzini say, there is considerable research which identifies benefits in smaller classes. The meta-analysis of Glass and Smith (not mentioned by Pascarella and Terenzini) concludes that reduced class size is beneficial at all grade levels; Slavin found small positive short-term benefit; and several studies found benefit if (and only if) teachers engaged in teaching strategies that took advantage of the smaller size (Chatman, Tomlinson). On the other hand, there is at least one study too recent to be cited by Pascarella and Terenzini that concludes no demonstrable benefit to reducing class size (e.g., David Williams). Thus, it may seem to be a case of warring research.

On the contrary,  we will argue that the apparently disparate results of research can be explained, in a comment made by Pascarella and Terenzini. After the passage quoted above, they say “It is probably the case, however, that smaller classes are somewhat more effective than larger ones when the goals of instruction are motivational, attitudinal, or higher-level cognitive processes” (87).

There are two points which we wish to make about Pascarella and Terenzini’s negative conclusion regarding class size. First, it is striking how dated the research is–although Pascarella and Terenzini’s book came out in 1991, the most recent study they cite is 1985. Of the eighteen studies they mention, three are from the twenties, one from 1945, two from the fifties, two from the sixties, seven from the seventies, and three from the eighties. This is particularly important for the teaching of writing, as there was a major reversal in the sixties in pedagogy, returning from the lecture-based presentation of models which students were expected to imitate to the classical method which put greater emphasis on the process of inventing and arranging an effective argument.

This issue of teaching model is crucial. The impact that varying class size has on the outcome in terms of student writing depends heavily on the goal and method of the writing courses in question. If the courses are lecture courses, in which only the teacher is expected to read the students’ writing, then the only limit on class size comes from the amount of time one expects the teacher to spend grading. While that is not a model we endorse (and we will discuss the reasons below), it can still be the basis of a useful discussion.

At a “Research I” institution, faculty members are usually assessed on the assumption that they spend forty per cent of their time teaching two courses, or, one day out of a five day work week (eight hours). At schools with more teaching responsibilities, the math works out in similar ways (with a fairly ugly exception for universities with Research I publishing expectations and a three or four course teaching load). Graduate students are usually assumed to have teaching responsibilities that account for half of their half-time appointment, or ten hours per course. With three hours per week in the classroom, and three hours of office hours, graduate students instructors are left with four hours per week of grading and course preparation.

One reason that administrators and WPAs often disagree about the amount of work involved in teaching writing courses is that administrators’ experience is with what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode of teaching. The first year is hellish, but then the instructor has prepared the presentations, and future years involve tinkering with prepared lectures. Hence, course preparation is presumed to be minimal. But, of course, most WPAs are not imagining instructors’ spending class time lecturing because the presentational mode has been demonstrated, conclusively, to be the least effective method of teaching writing.

Still and all, if one assumes that a course is supposed to take 150 hours of an instructor’s time over the course of a semester (not including pre-semester course preparation), and 45 hours of that time is spend in class, and another 45 hours is spent in office hours, there are 60 hours left for individual conferences, grading, and course preparation. If there are twenty students per class, then meeting twice with each student for a half hour conference uses up 20 hours. Even assuming an efficient teacher who is dusting off lecture notes for course preparation, one should expect an hour per week of course preparation (15), leaving 25 hours for grading. Advocates of minimal marking (a problematic issue to be discussed below) describe a process that takes only twenty minutes per paper. Obviously, then, the amount of time an instructor spends on grading depends upon the number of papers, but a course with only three papers would use up almost all of the time left. Since most programs require more than three papers (and most instructors spend more than twenty minutes per paper), more than twenty students per course puts instructors into unethical working conditions.[1]

But, as we said, the deeper issue concerns just what happens in a writing class. The issue is whether one sees writing instruction as the inculcation of subject matter knowledge or as the development of higher-level cognitive processes. To the extent that it is the latter, classes should be small; to the extent that it is the former, class size is limited only by instructor workload Or, in other words, what do we teach when we teach college writing?

Interestingly enough, this is one of those questions that is not a question for people outside of the field. It seems obvious enough to people unfamiliar with research in Linguistics, Rhetoric, and English Education who tend to give what appears a straightforward answer: we teach the rules of good writing. Behind that apparent consensus is an interesting disagreement. For some people, the “rules of good writing” describe formal characteristics in writing that all educated readers acknowledge is high quality (e.g., the thesis in the first paragraph, an interest-catching first sentence). For others, those rules describe procedures that all good writers follow when writing (e.g., keep notes on three by five cards, write a formal outline with at least two sub-points). As qualitative and quantitative research has shown, however, both of those perceptions regarding the rules of good writing–regardless of how widespread they are–are false.

In the first place, there is less consensus about what constitutes “good” writing than many people think. Writers have fallen in and out of fashion, so that there is not any author who has not had his or her detractors–critical reception of Henry David Thoreau’s Walden was so hostile that it was nearly turned into pulp; Addison and Steele, always included in composition textbooks until the 1960s, are now considered nearly unreadable; even Shakespeare has been severely criticized for his mixed metaphors, complicated language, and drops into purple prose. As research in reader response criticism demonstrated as long ago as the early part of this century (see I.A. Richards), students (and readers) do not immediately recognize the merits of canonical literature; there is considerable disagreement as to just what the best writing is, so that the “canon” of accepted great writing has constantly been in flux (see Ohmann, Fish, Graff).

To a large degree, this disagreement is disciplinary; that is, different disciplines have different requirements for writing. This divergence is most obvious in regard to format–such as citation methods and order of elements. It is equally present and more important in regard to style: in the experimental and social sciences, for instance, “good” writing uses passive voice, nominalization, long clusters of noun phrases, and various other qualities which are considered “bad” writing in journalism, literature, and various humanistic disciplines. Even the notion of what constitutes error varies–social science writing is rife with what most usage handbooks identify as mixed metaphors, predication errors, reference errors, non parallel structure, split infinitives, dangling modifiers, and agreement errors. Lab reports, resumes, and much business writing permit, if not require, fragment sentences. Meanwhile, people from some disciplines recoil at the use of first person in ethnographic writing, literary criticism, some journalism, and other humanistic courses.

Disciplines also disagree as to what constitutes good evidence (for more on this issue, see Miller, Bazerman). Some disciplines accept personal observation (e.g., cultural anthropology), while some do not (e.g., economics). There are similarly profound disagreements regarding the validity of textual analysis, quantitative experimentation, qualitative research, interviews, argument from authority, and so on. There is a tendency for people to be so convinced of the epistemological superiority of their form of research that, when confronted with the fact of differing opinions on what constitutes good writing, they dismiss the standards of some other discipline (thus, for instance, Richard Lanham’s popular textbook Revising Prose condemns all use of the passive voice, and Joseph Williams’ even more popular Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace prohibits clusters of nouns). Our goal is not to take a side in the issue of which discipline promotes the best writing, but to insist upon the important point out that there is disagreement. Thus, a writing course cannot teach “the” rules of good writing that will be accepted in all disciplines because no such rules exist (unless the rules are extremely abstract, as discussed below).

In the second place, as several studies have shown, the ‘”rules” of good writing which we give students for student writing do not describe published writing.  For instance, students are generally told to end their introductions with their ‘thesis statements,” to begin each paragraph with their topic sentences (which is assumed to be the main claim of the paragraph), and to focus on the use of correct grammar. Published writing, however, does not have those qualities. Thesis statements are usually in conclusions (Trail), and introductions most often end with a clear statement of the problem (Swale), or what classical rhetoricians called the “hypothesis” (meaning a statement that points toward the thesis). Textbook advice regarding topic sentences is simply false (Braddock), and, readers are much more oblivious about errors in published writing than much writing instruction would suggest (Williams). In fact, error may not have quite the role that many teachers think–while college instructors say that correctness is an important quality of good writing (Hairston), studies in which they rank actual papers shows a privileging of what compositionists call “higher order concerns”–appropriateness to assignment, quality of reasoning, and organization over format and correctness (see Huot’s review of research on this issue).

Finally, several meta-analyses of research conclude that teaching writing as rules has a harmful effect on student writing (see especially Knoblauch and Brannon, Hillocks, Rose). The common sense assumption is that students prone to writing blocks lack the knowledge of rules for writing that effective writers have; on the contrary, students prone to writing block may know too many rules. In contrast to more fluid writers, who tend to focus on what is called “the rhetorical situation” (explained below), student writers prone to writing blocks focus on rules they have been told (Flower and Hayes, Rose).  Students taught these rules of writing try to produce an error-free first draft  which they minimally revise (Emig, Sommers). Effective and accomplished writers, in contrast, have rich and recursive writing processes that depends heavily upon revision (Emig, Flower and Hayes, Berkenkotter, Faigley and Witte).

For many people unaware of research in linguistics and English education, the assumption is that the “rules” of good writing are the rules regarding usage (usually described as “grammar rules,” which is itself an instance of an error in usage). It is assumed that there is agreement regarding these rules, and they are to be found in any usage handbook. Further, it is assumed that one can improve students’ “grammar” (another interesting usage error–what people mean is “reduce usage error” or “improve correctness”) by getting them to memorize those universally agreed-upon usage rules.  These assumptions are wrong in almost every way.

Research in linguistics demonstrates that language has considerable variation over time and region. To put it simply, at any given moment, there are numerous dialects within a language which are each “correct” within their community of discourse (e.g., “impact” for “influence,” “thinking outside the box”). Some dialects are more privileged than others, and the uninformed often assume that facility with the more privileged dialect signifies greater intelligence; this is patently false (Chomsky, Labov and Smitherman, Baron). All dialects have a grammar, so students (and colleagues) who use a different dialect are not ignorant of “grammar;” they know the grammar of a dialect not considered appropriate in academic discourse, the dialect which linguists sometimes call “standard edited English.” It is easy to overstate agreement regarding “standard edited English,” as that dialect has varied substantially over time; the “shall” versus “will” distinction used to be considered extraordinarily important, “correct” comma usage differs in British and American English and even more from the nineteenth century to now, and usage handbooks disagree on numerous issues (such as agreement). The notion of a correct dialect upon which there is universal agreement is simply a fantasy.

In our experience, people respond to this research by objecting to the pedagogy they assume it necessarily implies. People assume that to note the reality–considerable regional and historical disagreement regarding linguistic correctness–necessarily implies a complete abandonment of attention to error. That is not the necessary conclusion, nor is it our point. Our point here is simply that one central assumption in this view of writing instruction is wrong–there is not universal agreement as to rules regarding “correct” language use.

In addition, this research does not necessarily imply a “whatever goes” pedagogy. While some have drawn that conclusion, others have used this research to argue for teaching grammar and usage as a community of discourse issue (e.g., Labov and Smitherman); that is, rather than denigrate some dialects, teachers should present “standard edited English” as a useful dialect which students should use under some circumstances and with some audiences (see, for instance, “Students’ Right to Their Own Language”). Others have argued that grammar and usage should be taught as a rhetorical issue, as a question of clarity and rhetorical effect (Williams, Kolln, Dawkins).

And this leads us to the second point–the assumption that one can reduce errors in student writing through making students learn the rules of standard edited English. On the contrary, in the nearly one hundred years that this issue has been studied, there has not been a single study which showed improvement in student writing resulting from formal instruction in the rules of grammar, while there are several studies which showed a mark deterioration (see Knoblauch and Brannon, Hartwell, Hillocks for more on the history of this research). That deterioration may be the consequence of increased anxiety leading to students’ mistrusting their implicit knowledge (Hartwell), or that the time taken for grammar instruction was time away from more productive forms of writing instruction (Knoblauch and Brannnon).

In our experience, this point too is misunderstood. We are not saying that instruction in grammar and usage is pointless, but that certain approaches to it demonstrably are. And those are precisely the pedagogies into which one is forced in large classes–lecturing, drilling, assigning worksheets, and testing students on usage rules.

Indeed, research suggests that there is probably not a pedagogy which can be applied to all students in the same way. Issues of linguistic correctness result from different causes, depending upon the students. Hence, the solution varies. For students whose native dialect is fairly close to standard edited English, for instance, errors in usage sometimes result from lack of clarity about their own argument; students make more usage errors, for instance, when they are writing about something they do not fully understand. For such students, clarifying the concepts will enable the students to correct the errors.

For other students, usage errors are a time management issue–they did not leave themselves time to proofread. What Haswell has somewhat misleadingly called “minimal marking” is generally the best strategy under those circumstances (it is misleading in that it depends upon students’ resubmitting their corrected papers, so it can be fairly time-consuming for the instructor, albeit far less time-consuming and more effective than copy-editing). What he advocates, however, is not a kind of marking that takes minimal time on the part of the instructor.

For students whose dialect is markedly different from standard edited English, there is the possibility of what linguists call “dialect interference”–instances of using their (academically inappropriate) dialect, engaging in hypercorrectness (“between you and I”), or  simply being unsure how to apply the rules. There are also students whose experience with written English is minimal, and who may have a tendency toward what are called “errors of transciption” (e.g., errors regarding the placement of commas and periods).  For these students, “minimal marking” is ineffective, but neither do they benefit from lectures and quizzes on grammar rules. Instead, they seem to benefit most from individual instruction. Several studies show strong short-term improvement from sentence embedding (Hillocks), but  many instructors moved away from it due to its inherently time-consuming nature.

In short, as Mina Shaughnessy pointed out long ago, improving students’ usage is not something one can do in the same way with all students. One must know exactly what specific problems exist with each student, why that student is having that problem, and what method will best work with that problem and that student.  In other words, effective instruction in grammar and usage necessitates classes small enough that the teacher can know students well enough to know the cause of the problem. If the students have major problems, as from dialect interference, then the classes have to be small enough for the teacher to be able to engage in the extremely time-consuming methods necessary for such students.

One might wonder, if writing teachers are not teaching rules of writing, what are we teaching?  And the answer seems to be that we are teaching rhetoric. That is, while one cannot present students with rules that apply to all circumstances–never use I, always begin with a personal anecdote, your thesis should have three reasons–there are principles which do seem effective in most circumstances. Those principles are encapsulated in the concept of the “rhetorical situation”–that the quality of a piece of discourse is determined by the extent to which its strategies are appropriate for effecting the author(s) particular intention on the specific audience. Thus, were one to examine prize-winning articles in philosophy, economics, literary criticism, engineering, behavioral psychology, and theoretical physics, one would see wide variation in terms of  format, style, organization, and nature of evidence, one would see that each piece was appropriate for its audience.

One advantage of this approach to the teaching of writing is that it is more effective. Lecturing and drilling are, as several studies have shown, ineffective methods of writing instruction (Hillocks). This method remains tremendously popular, however, especially among teachers whose own instruction followed that method, who are cynical regarding student achievement, and who are generally convinced that the teaching of writing is the transmission of information (Hillocks).  This point is important, as it showed up in our own experiment with reducing class size–students in classes with teachers who relied heavily on lecture did not show any benefit from a smaller class. The fact is that lectures are ineffective in writing classes; reducing the class size does not suddenly make lecturing an effective teaching strategy.

When we had the opportunity to look closely at class size at our previous institution, we made some surprising discoveries.  One of the major motivations for undertaking the experiment was a sense of frustration, among faculty and graduate students, with graduate student instructors’ progress toward their degrees. Prior to the change in program emphasis, a large number of our instructors used class time to present advice on writing papers as well as to present writing products which students used as models (what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode, and which he identifies as the least effective method of writing instruction). Perhaps because this method of instruction did not work particularly well for so many students, instructors also relied heavily on individual conferences with students–conferences which took so much time that they necessitated long blocks of time outside normal office hours. The dominance of this mixing of presentational and individualized modes of instruction had fairly predictable consequences.

The accretion of assignments and expectations for the course meant that it was actually impossible to teach the course in the ten hours per week a graduate student was supposed to spend on it. While such a situation is far from uncommon–many programs pay writing teachers a salary that presumes that the course takes much less time than it actually does–it is unethical. It also means that instructors, especially ones with multiple commitments (e.g., graduate students who are also taking courses, part-time instructors with obligations at several campuses, tenure-track teachers facing publication pressures), are encouraged to adopt pedagogies which feel more efficient but which research strongly indicates are less effective (i.e., the presentational mode of teaching, discussed previously).

Graduate student instructors responded to this situation in various ways. According to a survey, as well as faculty observation, many let their own coursework suffer in favor of their teaching. Others simplified assignments, so that the papers were short and simple enough that they could be graded in ten to fifteen minutes a piece. Several instructors essentially abandoned assessing student work, and graded students purely on attendance. Many instructors reported spending long hours on teaching, something that, not surprisingly, resulted in frustration–the first year composition course was openly discussed as the least desirable teaching assignment. In this context, it should be clear why we were looking for a method that would reduce the amount of time that instructors spent on their first year composition courses, without simply shifting them to quick, but ineffective, methods such as lecturing, drilling, and superficial grading.

When we reduced class size to fifteen for many of the instructors, we found that those instructors generally spent less time on the course (instructors in control groups reported spending an average of ten to fourteen hours per week on their courses, instructors in the sections with reduced class size reported averages of between twelve and fifteen). We also found that many instructors took advantage of the reduced class size to create new assignments, to take more time to comment on papers, to meet more often with students, or to add another project. Such a consequence–instructors taking the opportunity to increase the amount of work in the course–is echoed in at least one other study on class size.  The San Juan Unified School District report on the results of the Morgan-Hart Class Size Reduction Act of 1989 concludes that

As a result of smaller classes, students were more actively involved in the instructional process.  This was demonstrated by an increase in the number of student reading and writing assignments, more oral presentations and frequent classroom discussions.  Students also received increased feedback on their English assignments and teachers had time to work with students individually.

One benefit of reducing class size, then, is that instructors appear more willing to experiment with and examine their teaching styles. Whether this is a bug or feature would depend on the program goals. Certainly, although they may not have spent less time on the courses, they reported much higher satisfaction. Teachers like smaller classes.

But, they did not always use the time well. We found that instructors heavily committed to the presentational mode did not effect much change in their students’ writing processes. Similarly, class size did not increase overall student satisfaction if the instructor engaged in the presentational mode.

In conclusion, our experience fits with Sheree Goettler-Sopko’s summary of research on class-size and reading achievement. She concludes that “The central theme which runs through the current research literature is that academic achievement does not necessarily improve with the reduction of student/teacher ratio unless appropriate learning styles and effective teaching styles are utilized” (5).

Class Size and Minimal Teaching

George Hillocks long ago showed the importance and superiority of constructivist approaches to the teaching of writing (Research in Written Composition, Teaching Writing as Reflective Practice, and more recently Ways of Thinking, Ways of Teaching).  This means that effective teaching requires an approach which does not set the task of teaching writing as getting students to memorize and understand certain objects of knowledge (the objectivist approach), but as setting students tasks during which they will learn and giving them appropriate feedback along the way.  The more that one engages in constructivist teaching, the more important is class size; the more that the goals and practices of a program are objectivist, the less class size matters. While reducing class size does not guarantee constructivist teaching, increasing class size does prevent it.

One can see this effect simply by thinking about the amount of time for which writing instructors are paid. The assumption at many universities is that each class is supposed to take 8-10 hours per week of instructor time. Instructors spend three hours each week in class, and it is optimistic, but not necessarily irrationally so, to assume that an efficient and highly experienced teacher can prepare for class on a one-to-one basis (that is, that it takes approximately one hour to prepare for one hour of class). A teacher therefore has two to four hours a week (almost precisely what is required by most universities for office hours). If an instructor has twenty students per class, s/he has, over the course of the semester 30-60 hours, which comes, at best, to three hours per student for conferences and grading. This situation necessitates cutting the students short on something–short papers which can be graded quickly, cursory grading of student work generally, discouraging students from using office hours. All in all, it means that one cannot do what Pascarelli and Terenzini say “effective teachers do” when “They signal their accessibility in and out of the classroom” (652).  Simply put, if instructors have to use office hours to grade student work, they cannot signal accessibility. Pascarelli and Terenzini say, “They give students formal and informal feedback on their performance” (652), but, if instructors are restricted to three hours of grading per semester per student, they have to minimize the amount of feedback given. In other words, large classes force instructors away from what “we know” to be good practice.

The larger the class, the more the teacher is forced into lecturing. Yet, according to Pascarelli and Terenzini,

            Our review indicates that individualized instructional approaches that accommodate variations in students’ learning styles and rates consistently appear to produce greater subject matter learning than do more conventional approaches, such as lecturing. These advantages are especially apparent with instructional approaches that rely on small, modularized content units, require a student to master one instructional unit before proceeding to the next, and elicit active student involvement in the learning process. Perhaps even more promising is the evidence suggesting that these learning advantages are the same for students of different aptitudes and different levels of subject area competence. Probably in no other realm is the evidence so clear and consistent. (646, emphasis added)

If we want instructors to be effective writing instructors, then we have to ensure that they are in a situation which will permit good practice. Reducing class size will not necessarily cause such practice, but it is a necessary condition thereof.

Works Cited

ADE.  “ADE Guidelines for Class Size and Workload for College and University Teachers of English: A Statement of Policy.” Online. http://www.ade.org/policy/policy_guidelines.htm. 1998.

Baron, Dennis E. Grammar and Good Taste : Reforming the American Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

Bazerman, Charles. Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999.

Berkentotter, Carol. “Decisions and Revisions: The Planning Strategies of a Publishing Writer.”  Landmark Essays on Writing Process.  Sondra Perl, ed. Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1994. 127-40.

Braddock, Richard.  “The Frequency and Placement of Topic Sentences in Expository Prose.” On Writing Research: The Braddock Essays, 1975-1998.  Ed. Lisa Ede. New York:  Bedford, St. Martin’s, 1999. 29-42.

Chatman, Steve.  “Lower Division Class Size at U.S. Postsecondary Institutions.”  Paper presented at the Annual Forum of the Association for Institutional Research. Albuquerque: 1996.

Chomsky, Noam. N. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge:

MIT P, 1965.

Davis, Barbara Gross, Michael Scriven, and Susan Thomas.  The Evaluation of Composition Instruction. 2nd. Ed. New York: Teachers College Press. 1987.

Dawkins, John. “Teaching Punctuation as a Rhetorical Tool.” CCC (Dec. 1995): 533-548.

Emig, Janet.  The Composing Processes of Twelfth Graders. Urbana: NCTE, 1971.

Faigley, Lester, and Stephen Witte. Evaluating College Writing Programs. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983.

Fish, Stanley. Is There a Text in this Class? Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982.

Flower, Linda, and John R. Hayes. “The Cognition of Discovery: Defining a Rhetorical Problem.” Landmark Essays on Writing Process. Sondra Perl, ed. Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1994. 63-74.

Glass, Gene V., and Mary Lee Smith.Meta-Analysis of Research on the Relationship of Class-Size and Achievement.  The Class Size and Instruction Project.”  Washington D.C.: National Institute of Education, 1978.

Goettler-Sopko, Sheree. “The Effect of Class Size on Reading Achievement.” Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1990.

Graff, Gerald. Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education. New York: WW Norton, 1993.

Hairston, Maxine. “Working with Advanced Writers.” CCC 35(1984): 196–208.

Hartwell, Patrick. “Grammar, Grammars, and the Teaching of Grammar.” College English 47 (February 1985): 105–27.

Haswell, Richard H.  “Minimal Marking.” College English 45.6 (1983): 166-70.

Hillocks, George.  Research in Written Composition: New Directions for Teaching.  Urbana: NCTE, 1986.

– – -. Teaching Writing as Reflective Practice: Integrating Theories. New York: Teachers College P., 1995.

– – -. Ways of Thinking, Ways of Teaching. New York: Teachers College P., 1999.

Huot, Brian.  “Toward a New Theory of Writing Assessment.” CCC 47.4 (1996): 549-66.

Knoblauch, C.H. and Lil Brannon. “On Students’ Rights to Their Own Texts: A Model of Teacher Response”, College Composition and Communication, 33 (1982): 157-66.

Kolln, Martha. Rhetorical Grammar: Grammatical Choices, Rhetorical Effects. 4th Ed. New York: Pearson, 2002.

Labov, William. The Logic of Non-Standard English. Champaign: National Council of Teachers of English, 1970.

Lanham, Richard. Revising Prose. 4th ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 1999.

Miller, Susan. Textual Carnivals: The Politics of Composition. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1991.

NCTE College Section Steering Committee. “Guidelines for the Workload of the College English Teacher.” Online. http://www.ncte.org/positions/workload-col.html. 1998.

Ohman, Richard. English in America: A Radical View of Profession. New York: Oxford UP, 1976.

Pascarella, E.T. And Terenzini, P.T. How College Affects Students: Findings and Insights from Twenty Years of Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991.

Richards, I.A. The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon

 Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. 8th ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace

& World, 1946.

Rose, Mike. Lives on the Boundary. New York: Penguin, 1990.

Sommers, Nancy. “Revision Strategies of Student Writers and Experienced Adult Writers.” CCC 31 (December 1980): 378–88.

San Juan Unified School District. “Class Size Reduction Evaluation: Freshman English, Spring 1991.” Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1992.

Shaughnessy, Mina. Errors and Expectations. New York: Oxford UP, 1979.

Slavin, Robert, “Class Size and Student Achievement: Is Smaller Better?” Contemporary Education 62 (Fall 1990): 6-12.

Smitherman, Geneva. “‘Students’ Right to Their Own Language’: A Retrospective.” English Journal 84.1 (l995): 21-27.

Swales, John, and Hazem Najjar.  “The Writing of Research Article Introductions”  Writtten Communication 4.2 (April 1987): 175-91.

Tomlinson, T. M. “Class Size and Public Policy: Politics and Panaceas.” Educational Policy 3 (1989): 261-273.

Trail, George Y. Rhetorical Terms and Concepts: A Contemporary Glossary. New York: Harcourt, 2000.

Williams, David D., et al.  “University Class Size: Is Smaller Better?” Research in Higher Education 23.3: 307-318.

Williams, Joseph.  “The Phenomenology of Error.”  CCC 32 (May 1981): 152-68.

—. Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace. Chicago: U. Chicago P., 1997.

[1] Unhappily, in our experience, the expectation is that instructors should spend more than forty hour per week on their jobs, or cut corners in various ways. For instance, it is often assumed that office hours can be used for course preparation or grading, but that amounts to an official policy that office hours are not times when students can expect the full attention of the instructor. Hence, when upper administrators say that office hours should not be counted separately from course preparation, the correct answer is, “Put that in writing.”

Class size in college writing (an old paper)

[This was co-authored with Reinhold Hill in 2007, based on research done in the late 90s at our then-institution. People have sometimes cited it, although it wasn’t published, so I’m posting it.]

The issue of class size in first year college writing courses is of considerable importance to writing program administrators.  While instructors and program administrators generally want to keep classes as small as possible, keeping class size low takes a financial and administrative commitment which administrators are loath to make in the absence of clear research.  While the ADE and NCTE recommendations of fifteen students are persuasive to anyone who has taught first-year writing courses, they often fail to persuade administrators who are looking for research-based recommendations.  And, in actual fact, class sizes at major institutions ranges from ten to twenty five students.

Unfortunately, anyone looking to the available research on class size in college writing courses is likely to come away agnostic.  While there is considerable research on class size and college courses in general, there are several important reasons that one should doubt its specific applicability to college writing courses.  First, much of the general research on class size includes students of all ages.  Second, the research often involves the distinction between huge and simply large courses, such as between forty and two hundred students,  whereas most writing program administrators are concerned about the difference between fifteen and twenty-five students. Third, the courses involved in the studies often have very different instructional goals from first year writing courses.  Finally, the assessment mechanisms are often inappropriate for evaluating effectiveness and student satisfaction in writing courses.

In other words, the NCTE recommendations for writing courses are not based on research, and the research on class size in general cannot yield recommendations.        At the University of Missouri, we were given the opportunity to engage in some informal experimentation regarding class size.  While the limitations of our own research mean that we have not resolved the class size question, our results do have thought-provoking indications for class size and program administration.  In brief, our work suggests that reducing class size, while very popular among instructors, appears not to result in marked improvement in student attitudes about writing unless the instructors use that reduction in class size as an opportunity to change their teaching strategies.  In other words, we seem to have confirmed what Daniel Thoren has concluded about class size research: “Reducing class size is important but that alone will not produce the desired results if faculty do not alter their teaching styles.  The idea is not to lecture to 15 students rather than 35” (5).  If, however, instructors are able to take advantage of the smaller class size, then even a small reduction can result in students perceiving considerable improvement in their paper writing abilities.  We do not wish to imply that reducing class size should not be a goal for writing program administrators, but as a goal in and of itself it is not enough – we need to be aware that pedagogical changes must be initiated together with reductions in class size.

1. Institutional Background

Our study, largely funded by the Committee on Undergraduate Education, was the result of recommendations made by a Continuous Quality Improvement team on our first year composition course (English 20).  That team was itself part of increased campus, college, and departmental attention to student writing.  As a result of that attention, the English 20 program underwent philosophical and practical changes.

The most important change was probably the shift in program philosophy. While there remains some variation among sections, the philosophy of the program as a whole is to provide an intellectually challenging course in which students write several versions of researched papers on subjects of scholarly interest about which experts disagree.  Students write and substantially revise at least three papers, each of which is four to five pages long.  There are four separate but connected goals in these changes.  First, for instructors, our goal is to provide a teaching experience which will make the teaching of first-year composition appropriate preparation for teaching writing intensive courses in their area.  Hence, instructors need to develop their own assignments.

Second, for students, one goal of the course is to enable students to master the delicate negotiation of self and community necessary for effective academic writing.  As Brian Huot has noted, research in writing assessment indicates that students tend to be fairly competent at expressive writing, but have greater difficulty with “referential/participant writing” (241).  Our sense was that this assessment is especially true of students entering the University of Missouri.  They are quite competent at many aspects of writing, but they have considerable difficulty enfolding research into an interpretive argument.  Thus, we did not need to teach The Research Paper that Richard Larson has so aptly criticized; nor do students need instruction in personal narrative.  Instead, students needed practice with assignments which called for placing oneself in a community of experts who are themselves disagreeing with one another.  Achieving this goal was nearly indistinguishable from achieving the goal described above for instructors–assisting instructors to write assignments which called for an intelligent interweaving of research and interpretation into a college-level argument would necessarily result in students’ getting experience with that kind of assignment.

Our third goal was to teach students the importance of a rich and recursive writing process, one which involves considerable self-reflection, attention to the course and research material, and substantial revision in the light of audience and discipline expectations.  Research in composition indicates over the last thirty years suggests that such an attention toward the writing process is the most important component to success in writing, especially academic papers (Flowers and Hayes, Berkenkotter, Emig).

It should be briefly explained that this is not to say that the program endorses what is sometimes called a “natural process” mode of instruction–that term is usually used to describe a program which is explicitly non-directional, in which students write almost exclusively for peers and on topics of their own choosing, and which endorses an expressivist view of writing.  In fact, attention to the writing process does not necessarily preclude the instructor taking a “skills” approach to writing instruction (that is, providing exercises or instruction in what are presumed to be separable aptitudes in composition) but it does necessitate course design with careful attention to paper topics.

And this issue of modes of instruction raises our fourth goal–to enable instructors to use what George Hillocks calls the “environmental” mode of instruction.  When we began making changes to the first year composition program, it was our impression that the dominant mode of instruction was what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode, which

is characterized by (1) relatively clear and specific objectives…(2) lecture and teacher-led discussion dealing with concepts to be learned and applied; (3) the study of models and other material which explain and illustrate the concept; (4) specific assignments or exercises which generally involve imitating a pattern or following rules which have been previously discussed; and (5) feedback following the writing, coming primarily from teachers.  (116-117)

It is important to emphasize that this mode does not depend exclusively on lecture.  A class “discussion” in which the instruction guides students through material by asking questions intended to elicit specific responses is also presentational mode.  Insofar as we can tell, a large number of instructors used class time to present advice on writing papers as well as to present writing products which students might use as models.  Instructors then used individual conferences in order to discuss strategies for revising papers.

The dominance of this mixing of presentational and individualized modes of instructions in our program had two obvious consequences.  First, it was exhausting for instructors.  An instructor’s time was generally split between the equally demanding tasks of preparing the information to be presented in class and engaging in individual conferences with students. The standardized syllabus recommended four papers; each class has eighteen to twenty students; many of our instructors teach two classes per semester.  Instructors were forced to choose between not providing individual instruction for students on each paper or spending a minimum of eighty hours per semester in conference with students.  If instructors are also spending six hours per week preparing class material, and three hours per week in class, they are spending one hundred and seventy five hours per semester per class on their teaching–not including the time spent grading and commenting on papers.  Standards for good standing and recommendations regarding course load assume that such students are spending only one hundred fifty hours per semester on each course.

It should be emphasized that shifting instructional mode and changing the syllabus to only three papers cannot solve the problem of overworking instructors.  Class preparation and time in class account for one hundred thirty five hours per semester; if instructors spend forty-five minutes grading a first submission and only fifteen minutes grading a second submission, an enrollment of twenty students brings their commitment to one hundred ninety five hours per semester per course, and this amount of time does not include any conferences.

An informal survey of our instructors indicated the consequences of these conflicting expectations: some instructors did minimal commenting on papers, some instructors permitted their own status as students to suffer, while others encouraged students to write inappropriately short papers, and all were over-worked.

The second consequences of the programatic tendency to alternate between presentational and individualized modes of instruction has to do with Hillocks’ own summary of research on modes of instruction.  Hillocks concludes that the presentational mode of instruction is not as effective as what he calls the “environmental mode”: “On pre-to-post measures, the environmental mode is over four times more effective than the traditional presentational mode” (247). In other words, our instructors were working very hard in ways that may not have been the most effective for helping students write better papers.

So, we wanted instructors to use the “environmental” mode of instruction, which

“is characterized by (1) clear and specific objectives…(2) materials and problems selected to engage students with each other in specifiable processes important to some particular aspect of writing; and (3) activities, such as small-group problem-centered discussions, conducive to high levels of peer interaction concerning specific tasks….Although principles are taught, they are not simply announced and illustrated as in the presentational mode.  Rather, they are approached through concrete materials and problems, the working through of which not only illustrates the principle but engages students in its use.”  (122)

In the environmental mode, one neither lectures to students, nor does one simply let class go wherever the students want.  Instead, the instructor has carefully prepared the tasks for the students–thinking through very carefully exactly what the writing assignments will be and why.

2. Other Research on Class Size and College Writing

The relevance of the considerable body of research on class size is largely irrelevant to first-year composition.  Glass et al’s 1979 meta-analysis of 725 previous studies, for instance,  remains one of the fundamental studies on the subject.  Yet, it includes a large number of studies on primary and secondary students; hence, there is reason to wonder what role age plays in the preference for smaller class size.  A more recent, and frequently quoted, meta-analysis of college courses which claims, as measured by student achievement by final examination scores, that class size has no effect on student achievement begins with classes as small as 30 to 40(Williams et al 1985).  But, this study does not appear to have included a writing course.  Considering that the study was restricted to courses with “one or more common tests across sections” (1985 311) it is unlikely to have been a composition course; if it was, then it was one which presumed that improvement in writing results from learning information which can be tested–a problematic assumption.

A more fundamental problem–because it is shared with numerous other studies of class size–is the measurement mechanism.  That is, examinations are not appropriate measures of student achievement in courses whose goal is to teach the writing of research papers (see Huot, 1990, CCCC Committee on Assessment, 1995, White, 1985, White and Polin, 1986); hence, any study which relies on examination grades is largely irrelevant in terms of its measurement mechanism.

Finally, there are good reasons to doubt the implicit assumption that course goals and instructional method are universal across a curriculum.  Feldman’s 1984 meta-analysis of 52 studies does not list any study which definitely involved a writing class; most of the studies, on the contrary, definitely did not include any such course.  Smith and Cranton’s 1992 study of variation of student perception of the value of course characteristics (including class size) concludes that those perceptions “differ significantly across levels of instruction, class sizes, and across those variables within departments” (760).  They conclude that the relationships between student evaluations and course characteristics “are not general, but rather specific to the instructional setting” (762).

This skepticism regarding the ability to universalize from research is echoed in Chatman who argues that class size research indicates that “instructional method should probably be the most important variable in determining class size and should exceed disciplinary content, type and size of institution, student level, and all other relevant descriptive information in creating logical, pedagogical ceilings” (8).  And, indeed, common sense would suggest that there is no reason to assume that research on courses whose major goal is the transmission of information applies very effectively to writing courses.

3. Methods and Results of Our Research

We had two main assessment methods.  Because we were concerned about reducing the time commitment of teaching English 20, we asked instructors to keep time logs.  The mainstay of our initial method of assessment was a set of questionairres given to students at the beginning and end the semesters.  While questionnaires are a perfectly legitimate method of program assessment, they do not provide as complete a picture of a program as a more thorough method would (for more on advantages and disadvantages of questionnaires in program assessment, see Davis et al 100-107).  Given the budget and time constraints, however, we were unable to engage in those methods usually favored by writing program administrators for accuracy, validity, and reliability such as portfolio assessment.  We are relying to a large degree on self-assessment, which, while not invalid, has obvious limitations.  Nonetheless, the results of the questionairres were informative.

Because the program goals emphasize the students’ understanding of the writing process, the questionnaires were intended to elicit any changes in student attitude toward the writing process.  We were looking for confirmation of three different hypotheses.

First, there should be a change in their writing process.  Scholarship in composition suggests that we will find that students begin with a linear and very brief composing process (writing one version of the paper which is revised, if at all, at the lexical level).  If English 20 is fulfilling its mission, that second set of answers will indicate that the majority of students end the course with a richer sense of the writing process–they will revise their papers more, their writing processes will lengthen, and they will revise at more levels than the lexical.

Second, their hierarchy of writing concerns should change.  According to Brian Huot, composition research indicates that raters of college level writing are most concerned with content and organization (1990, 210-254). In various studies which he reviews, he concludes that readers, while concerned with mechanics and sentence structure, consider them important only when the organization is strong (1990, 251).  That is, readers of college papers have a hierarchy of concerns, in that they expect writers to be concerned with mechanics, correctness, and format (sometimes called “lower order concerns”), but that they expect writers to spend less time on those issues than on effectiveness of organization, quality of argument, appropriateness to task, depth and breadth of research, and other “higher order concerns.”

Beginning college students, however, often have that hierarchy exactly reversed: they are often under the impression that mechanics, format, and sentence level correctness are the most important to their readers, and deserve much less attention than the argument (or substance of the paper).  Hence, if English 20 is succeeding, there should be a shift in student ranking of audience concerns.  That is, their beginning questionnaire answers will indicate that they pay the most attention to lower order concerns and least attention to higher order considerations (whether or not the paper fulfills the assignment; if the paper is well-researched; if the evidence is well-presented; if the organization is effective).  At the end of the semester, they should demonstrate a more accurate understanding of audience expectations–not that they have dropped lexical or format concerns, but that they understand those concerns to be less important for success than the higher order concerns.

Third, there should be variation in student and teacher satisfaction with the courses.  This shift is more difficult to predict than the other hypotheses, but it does make sense to expect that the sections in which students receive greater personal attention would be more satisfying for both instructors and students.  In this regard, we expected to confirm what a report from the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems has identified as “an overwhelming finding”: that students believe they learn more in smaller classes, and that they are far more satisfied with such courses.

As with many studies, our results are most useful for suggesting further areas of research.  One area should be mentioned here.  The very constraints of the assessment method–a quantitative and easily administered method–meant that we were asking students to use language other than what they might have.  Open-ended interviews with students would almost certainly elicit much richer results.  One advantage of our study of class size was that it was part of experimenting with various changes in our program; thus, a large number of sections participated in the study as a whole.  Each semester, we had about twenty sections participating in the study in some form or another, and each semester at least four were held to an enrollment of 15 students.[i]  We also designated at least four sections “control” groups, meaning that we did not reduce class size, or consciously make any of the other modifications to English 20 we were contemplating.

An important limitation of our experiment should be mentioned before discussing the results. We ran the experiment over three semesters (WS97, FS97, and WS98), but were only able to use the survey results from the second and third semesters (because we changed the survey between the first and second semester).  In the first semester that we did the experiment, we made a conscious attempt to balance each group in terms of instructor experience and subjective judgments regarding the quality of their teaching.  Given the intricacies of scheduling, however, we were unable to maintain the balances over the next two semesters of the experiment.  This imbalance obviously affected the experimental results in ways that will be noted.

In terms of reducing the time that instructors spent on the course, reducing class size did not have markedly good results.  In FS97, instructors teaching the smaller sections averaged just under twelve hours per week, but they averaged just under fifteen hours per week in WS98.  The control groups reported spending an average of ten and fourteen hours respectively.  Thus, reducing class size did not reduce the amount of time that instructors spent on their courses.

The instructor surveys indicate some reasons that their time commitment might not have reduced.  In FS97, for instance, the teachers mentioned that having a smaller class size inspired them to make changes to their teaching–creating new assignments, taking longer to comment on papers, conferring with students for longer periods of time or more often, adding in an extra paper.  In other words, the instructors took the opportunity to try something that a class size of twenty had previously dissuaded them from trying.

Obviously, this experimentation on the part of the instructors would have had some kind of impact on our own experiment, but it is impossible to predict what it would have been.  It may well be that we would have had very different results with the same instructors had they continued with a reduced class size for a second semester.  Working with that class size for the second time, they might have made different decisions about how to spend their time.  It’s also possible that this experimentation accounts for some of the unpredicted results in regard to student satisfaction and writing process, but, again, it is impossible to know.  Thus, one conclusion which we can draw from our own experiment is that one is likely to get better results by having the same instructors work with a reduced class size for several semesters in a row.

As was mentioned earlier, students were given a survey at the beginning and the end of the semester, eliciting their views of the relative importance of various aspects of the writing process, the amount of revision (and kind) in which they typically engaged, and their understanding of the expectations of college teachers. Most of them were comparison questions, asking the same question about the students’ high school experiences at the beginning of the semester that were then asked about their English 20 experience at the end.  For instance, students were asked: “What aspects of a paper were most emphasized in your high school English course?” at the beginning of the course and “What aspects of a paper were most emphasized in your English 20 course?” at the end of the course. Students were asked to select five aspects of writing a paper most emphasized in high school and five most emphasized in their English 20 classes.  The results from FS97 are shown in the table below.  The area of emphasis is listed in order, and the number is the percentage of students who listed that area among their five.  One term which should be explained is “Thesis statement,” which we take to mean, because of the emphasis of our program, revising the central argument, and not simply rewriting the last sentence fo the introduction.

WS97

HS

CONTROL

CLASS SIZE

Organization

71.66

Drafting 67.4

Peer Review 86.5

Grammar 61.92

Logic 65.3

Revising TS 71.2

Logic and Reasoning 57.38

Peer Review 65.3

Logic 61.5

Format 54.8

Organization 57.1

Revising Organization 53.9

Revising one’s TS 51.78

Revising TS 51

Organization 48.1

WS98

HS

CTRL

CLASS SIZE

Grammar 73.7

Peer review 87.5

Organization 85.7

Organization 67.7

Organization 75

Peer review 85.7

Logic 60

Logic 65.9

Logic 66.7

Research 55.9

Revising ts 59.1

Research 61.9

Format 54.4

Revising one’s organization 48.9

Revising ts 59.1

The results only partially confirmed our hypotheses.  We had predicted that the students would indicate that their high school writing courses put the most emphasis on grammar, format, and outlining and the least emphasis on revision.  We discovered, however, that high school instructors, while putting much emphasis on lower order concerns (e.g., format and grammar) do also emphasize some higher order concerns (e.g., organization and reasoning).   We also discovered more variation between semesters than expected.  While the WS98 results were much the same, with the five areas of most emphasis in high school being (in order) grammar, organization, logic and reasoning, research, format, and outlining, revising one’s thesis was second from last (with only 33.6% of students noting it as an area of emphasis in high school).

Our hypotheses were partially confirmed in that, in both semesters, the high school courses put the least emphasis on any form of revision: revising one’s grammar, revising one’s organization, or engaging in  peer review.  There was consistently a shift from high school in terms of greater emphasis on revision–it is interesting to note, for instance, that students perceive their high school courses putting considerable emphasis on organization (71.66 and 61.7), but almost none on revising organization (18.9).  Similarly, while students noted that grammar was emphasized in high school (73.7), revising one’s grammar was not (36.5).  In contrast, while English 20 is perceived as putting much less emphasis on grammar and usage (24.9), that number is much closer to the number of students who perceived an emphasis on revising one’s grammar and usage (25).  We infer that there is considerable variation among high schools–more than we had predicted–but that most high schools emphasize grammar and format more than English 20, and that English 20 emphasizes revision more than most high schools.

It is also interesting to note that students tend to report considerable experience with group work in high school courses.  Yet, students consistently reported little high school emphasis on peer review.  This discrepancy suggests that high school groups are not being used for peer review, or that–despite being put in these groups consistently–students do not perceive the peer reviews as important.

Students were also asked what aspects of a paper college teachers think most important by selecting four out of eight possibilities.  We had expected that this question would show a shift from lower order to higher order concerns–that, for instance, the method of library research would be rated high at the beginning of the semester, but would be replaced by the sources and relevance of evidence.  As with the previous table, the results from FS97 are presented in order, with the number representing the percentage of students who selected that aspect among their four.

FS97

HS

CONTROL

CLASS SIZE

Clarity of org

65.8

Clarity 71.4

Method 80.8

Correct grammar and usage 57.28

Logic 65.3

Persuasiveness 80.8

Logic and reasoning 57.38

Persuasiveness 55.1

Clarity 71.2

Persuasiveness of argument 55.12

Grammar 36.7

Logic 61.5

Mastery of subject 54.7

Mastery 36.7

Sources 50

WS98

HS

CTRL

CLASS SIZE

Clarity of org 69.5

Clarity of org 78.4

Clarity of org 76.2

Logic 60

Persuasiveness 71.6

Logic 66.7

persuasiveness 58.5

Logic 65.9

Persuasiveness 61.9

Mastery 54.8

Grammar/format/sources 34.1

Mastery 50

Grammar  50.5

Grammar 47.6

What is possibly most interesting about these charts is what is indicated about the high school preparation.  Students are relatively well informed about college instructors’ expectations before they begin the course; what little change there is in the control group in the first semester (and the almost complete lack of change in the second semester) suggests that simply being in college for one semester will inform students’ audience expectations.

The second most interesting result is that the reduced class size was a distinct failure in the first semester by our own program goals.  We did not want instructors emphasizing the method of library research; it was positively dismaying to see that listed as the greatest area of emphasis.  This result is typical of what Faigley and Witte have called unexpected results, and it is one consequence of how instructors were selected for the study.

Because scheduling of graduate students is often a last minute scramble, there were not specific criteria for participating in the reduced class size experiment.  In FS97, one instructor had participated in considerable training (Adams), one was still using a version of the old standardized syllabus and had participated in no training after her entry into the graduate program several years previous (Chapman), one was taking comprehensive exams and had engaged in only the required training (Brown), and one had participated in some training above what was required (Desser).  Adams generally engaged in the environmental mode; Chapman and Brown almost exclusively in presentational mode; Desser largely in environmental mode, but with some reliance on presentational.  Similarly, the instructors had a variety of years of experience–ranging from two to nine years.  As will be discussed below, the number of years of experience had no effect on the results, but the extent to which a person participated in training did.  In regard to the question discussed above, for instance, one can see the range of training reflected in the range of answers: Adams had only 9 per cent of students list method of library research as important; Brown had 37.5; Chapman had 41.6; Desser had 30.77.  In other words, the amount that a person participated in departmental training was reflected in the amount that their course reflected departmental goals.

As mentioned above, the exigencies of scheduling prevented our being able to balance the study groups.  Thus, what we generally called the control group was not necessarily analogous to the other sections in terms of instructor quality, experience, or preparation.  We have, therefore, also included the average number for each question–that is, the average number for all eighteen sections included in the study.

Students were asked about their perception of any change in the quality of their papers.  In asking this question, we did not assume that students were necessarily accurate judges of the quality of their papers, but we did think that their answer would provide a more specific way of evaluating the course than our course evaluations provided.  That is, whether or not they think their papers are better seems to us a useful way for thinking about student satisfaction.  The number represents the percentage of students who checked that item.  “Average” means the average number for all eighteen sections participating in the study.

Substantially better

Somewhat better

same

Somewhat worse

Substantially worse

control

40.1

44.9

4.1

0

0

size

21.2

55.8

15.4

3.9

0

average

34

WS98

Sub better

Some better

same

Some worse

Sub worse

ctrl

23.9

53.4

15.9

2.3

0

size

16.7

61.9

11.9

4.8

0

Here again one sees the results of how instructors were selected to participate.  If one looks at this same table for FS97 in regard to individual instructors, one sees a wide variation in student reaction.

Sub better

Some better

same

Some worse

Sub worse

adams

0

54.5

36.3

0

0

brown

0

50

37.5

12.5

0

chapman

25

50

25

0

0

desser

38.4

46.1

15.3

0

0

It is striking that the different sections had very nearly the same percentage of students who reported some improvement–where one sees the greatest difference is in the number of students who reported substantial improvement.  At least with these four instructors, the more training the instructor had, the more likely students were to report substantial gains.

Only one of these instructors participated in the study the next semester–Desser.  In WS98, Desser was in the control group, and the results were as follows:

No answer

Sub better

Some better

same

Some worse

Sub worse

11.1

5.5

55.5

22.2

5.5

0

Another instructor, Ellison, participated both semesters.  He was in another kind of experimental group fall semester (he met regularly with a faculty member and a group of instructors to discuss assignments, teaching videos, and so on) and reduced class size WS98.  One sees a similar pattern in the difference between the two semesters for his students–when he had a reduced class size, more students reported substantial and some improvement:

Sub better

Some better

same

Some worse

Sub worse

fs97

15.7

57.8

21

0

0

ws98

20

70

0

10

0

Granted, it is dangerous to speculate on the basis of two instructors, but it is intriguing that these instructors received very different results with a reduced class size.  If these instructors are typical, then one can conclude that the same person will get better results with a reduced class size.

There was not always a correlation between amount of training and survey results. For instance, students were asked whether their enjoyment of the paper writing process had changed.  This question was intended as a slightly different way to investigate student satisfaction–ideally, the course would improve both the students’ ability to write college-level papers at the same time that it increased their enjoyment of writing. We were unsure whether or not the question would elicit useful information, however, as we predicted it might be nothing more than an indication of the rigor of the instructors’ grading standards–that students might enjoy writing more in courses with higher GPAs.

Substantially more

Somewhat more

same

Somewhat less

Substantially less

Adams

0

27.2

63.6

0

0

Brown

0

28.7

62.5

12.5

6.25

Chapman

0

41.6

41.6

16.6

0

Desser

15.3

46.1

38.4

0

0

average

7.35

There is not quite as close a correlation between training and results as there was in regard to improved ability, but it is interesting that instructors with more training did not have any students reporting a decrease in enjoyment.  Similarly, the instructor with the least training–an instructor who tends to rely on the presentational mode–had no students report that their papers were substantially better after taking English 20, and the lowest number of students reporting that they received substantially more (12.5) or somewhat more (12.5) attention in English 20 than they had thought they would get.

We had assumed that students in the sections with fewer students would report more individual attention, but this was not necessarily the case.  The table below shows the results for FS97 and the results for Desser and Ellison for both semesters.

Sub more

Some more

same

Some less

Sub less

ctrl

38.8

38.8

14.3

0

0

average

Class size

34.6

19.2

32.7

9.6

1.9

adams

27.2

45.4

18.1

0

0

brown

12.5

12.5

56.2

18.7

0

chapman

33.3

16.6

25

16.6

8.3

Desser fs97

69.2

7.6

23

0

0

Desser ws98

22.2

38.8

33.3

5.5

0

Ellison fs97

31.5

40

30

0

0

Ellison ws98 (red)

31.5

36.8

26.3

0

0

Here one sees no striking correlation to amount of training, nor to instructional method.  We speculate that this lack of correlation results from the more important factor being the amount that the instructor engages in individual conferences with students.  While one does see a striking difference for Desser, there is no change for Ellison (the apparent change is simply the result of 5.2% of his WS98 students not answering that question).  The (highly tentative) inference is that reducing class size will not necessarily result in any group of instructors giving students more individual attention than any other group of instructors might do, but it may result in particular instructors doing so.

This range of results in regard to instructors with lower class size indicates our most important result:  that reducing class size does not increase overall student satisfaction if the instructor uses the presentational mode.  Reducing class size might, however, increase the student satisfaction and confidence on an instructor by instructor basis.

The final table that has provocative results is in response to the question: “If your writing process has changed, in what areas have you seen the greatest change?” Students were asked to select five.  The table is arranged by descending order of frequency in the control group.  The number represents the percentage of students who selected that area among their four.

CTRL

PLA

Class size

Close

Wkshp

Organization

57.1

Library research

51

Revise TS

44.9

Logic

42.9

drafting

30.6

27.1

28.9

45.6

27.1

Peer review

30.6

Revise org

30.6

Time management

26.5

Knowledge of format

24.5

18.6

26.9

29.4

20.8

Write elegant sentences

20.4

Computer use

14.3

Internet research

14.3

Knowledge of grammar

12.2

Reading course material

4.1

reading

2

outlining

2

WS98

ctrl

Close sup

size

wrkshp

Org 48.9

Logic 48.9

Rev org 45.2

Org 41.7

Rev ts 42.1

org46.8

Logic 42.9

Peer rev 41.7

Peer rev 40.9

Rev ts

Org 38.1

Revise org 41.7

Rev org 36.4

Rev org

Rev ts 35.7

Logic 40

Lib 28.4

Computers 27.7

Peer rev 28.6

Rev ts 36.7

The survey results as a whole did not indicate important gains in the reduced class size sections.  For instance, on average, the students in FS97 did not feel that they received more individual attention than the students in the control group did.  They showed slightly more shifting from lower order to higher order concerns on the whole than did students in the control sections, but a fewer number rated their paper writing as “substantially better.” At the beginning and end of the semester, we asked students how much of a paper they typically revised; we expected that students in the smaller class sizes would report engaging in greater revision than in the control groups.  But, that was not the case.  At the beginning of the semester, 22.4% of students in the reduced class size sections reported changing under 10% of a paper between drafts compared to 16.1% of students in the control groups.  At the end of the semester the results were 9.6 and 4.1 respectively.  The largest gain for the reduced class size group was in the 11-25% range (from 41.4 to 51.9) and in the 26-50% group for the control (28.6-40.8%).  Similarly, the control group had a larger number of students who reported that they revised “substantially” than did the instructors whose class sizes were reduced (22.5 compared to 17.3).

Students perceived the greatest emphasis in the course was on peer review; revising the thesis; logic and reasoning; revising organization; organization; format; drafting.  They saw the greatest change in their writing processes in regard to: peer review; organization; thesis revision; organization revision; library research.  In other words, the students saw the greatest changes in at least one area that they did not think that the instructors had especially emphasized (library research).  Most discouraging, 3.9% of the students thought that the papers they were writing after taking English 20 were somewhat worse, and 15.4% thought they were the same.  (None of the students in the control group thought their papers were somewhat worse, and only 4.1% of students thought their papers had remained the same.)

Looking at the results for individual instructors, however, has very different implications.  Instructors teaching the reduced class size sections did not necessarily have any training, and they were not required (or even encouraged) to change their teaching practices to take advantage of the reduced class size.  Instructors who taught reduced class size who did have some kind of previous training did have markedly different results. If an instructor engages in presentational mode, as some of our instructors did, then there is not an obvious improvement for the students in being in a smaller class.

There is, however, some reason to doubt that assumption.  For instance, according to Hillocks, research on grammar, usage, and correctness in student writing indicates that knowledge of grammatical rules has little or no effect on correctness in student performance.  That is, the transferring of information about writing does not improve writing itself.

While lecturing has repeatedly been demonstrated to be of little use in teaching writing, there is no reason to conclude that it is useless in other sorts of courses.  Common sense suggests that a good lecturer can lecture equally well to 15 students or 50 students–indeed, the research on class size indicates that the ability to present and communicate material in an interesting way may well be more important than class size for lecture courses (see, for instance, Feldman 1984).  The environmental mode of instruction, on the contrary, is almost certainly affected by class size.  As McKeachie has said, “The larger the class, the less the sense of personal responsibility and activity, and the less the likelihood that the teacher can know each student personally and adapt instruction to the individual student” (1990, 190).

[i]. The other kinds of sections were: ones with an attached peer-learning assistant; ones whose instructors met regularly with a faculty member to discuss the course; ones in which students met exclusively in small groups with fewer required contact hours per semester.

If Dems are elected, they’ll do what we’ve been doing!

In the last few days, a common claim (what scholars of rhetoric would call a topos) has emerged among Trump and GOP loyalists, and it’s that, if Democrats gain the House and Senate, they will force their political agenda on the country, block Trump at every point, and be vindictive toward Republicans. And, because they will be so awful to us, we are justified in amping up the aggression of rhetoric and actions against them. In other words, Democrats will treat Republicans as Republicans have treated Democrats, and therefore you must act aggressively toward them as a kind of self-defense.

This argument will work. It generally does. It worked when Democrats used it (and Democrats have used it several times). It also worked when Athenians, proslavery rhetors, and Germans did it.

To people good at logic, it seems like an incoherent argument, but to people who think entirely in terms of in-group/out-group domination, it looks good. It’s also appealing to abusers, but that’s a different point. It’s a kind of pre-emptive self-defense.

And it works because it’s a way of resolving the cognitive dissonance created by the wobbling of a previous argument—that God wants us to triumph over our enemies, and anyone not fanatically committed to the political agenda currently determined to be the in-group desiderata is an enemy. Because we are engaged in God’s will, normal ethical conditions don’t apply—we can do to others things we would be outraged were they done to us.

An ethics of in-group domination is, so it is claimed, God’s will. And God will reward us for our destroying our enemies. Giorgio Agamben calls it a “state of exception” in which we are excepted from normal rules about behavior—we honor the law by not obeying the specifics of the law. We are open that the powers of government will be used to favor one political party, but, while doing that, we’ll claim that that party is really the only legitimate one—all real Athenians, Germans, Americans vote this one way.

Members of that party believes themselves entirely entitled to something (such as political domination of various other countries, enslaving other people, exterminating various groups, political domination within a state or country). So, while that party is in power, it is shameless in its harnessing as much of the governmental power as it can to further its interests and crush any other parties. And, this is the important part: it is a party that believes there are no restrictions on what it is entitled to do in order to get its way. That’s why it has no shame—because it thinks of the world in zero-sum terms (we either eliminate or are eliminated).

And, when its power begins to wobble, it begins to reckon with how the groups it has oppressed might feel about their oppression. And it projects onto other groups how it thinks of the world—you either eliminate or are eliminated. Because it can’t imagine a world in which disparate groups coexist, it assumes everyone else behaves the same way. Because it is a group with an inchoate reptilian brain way of responding to situations that makes everything zero-sum (if something benefits the other group it must hurt you), it assumes that the “other” group getting any power will mean that group will respond in just as eliminationist as they have.

If you have a propaganda machine that has been cranking up in-group fanaticism by reducing all issues to in-group/out-group, and presenting politics as a zero-sum (any gain on their part must be a loss for us)—in other words, Fox, Limbaugh, Savage, and all sorts of other media and pundits (Mother Jones, Keith Olbermann, Michael Moore)—and your claim of eschatological determinism means that you have been excepted from normal rules of ethics, then you are rhetorically boxed in. You can’t just say “We were wrong about this policy.”

You either have to say that you were wrong, not about your claims about policies, but your claims about how politics and thinking about politics works. If your audience thinks about how, you lose them, since how you’ve argued is obviously wrong.

So, what you do is persuade them that the Other is just as awful as you are, and will behave just as badly as you have. That’s the argument Cleon used to persuade people to endorse genocide (he lost on the second vote), it’s how proslavery rhetors argued for violating the property rights of slaveholders (by prohibiting the manumission of slave contracts), and it’s how Nazis argued for continuing the war when it had obviously been lost.

It should, therefore, be troubling that McConnell is now using this argument, and that it’s become a right-wing talking point.
One of the logical problems with it is that the only way that the audience can be fearful or outraged at the possibility of Democrats’ forcing their political agenda on the country, blocking the sitting President at every point, and being vindictive toward Republicans is if they don’t object to that kind of behavior in principle. They think it’s fine to do that to the other party, but they would never stand for being treated that way. They are thereby admitting it’s bad behavior.

But, they say, it isn’t bad because their group is good and the other is bad. Or, in other words, they think they should treat others as they would not want to be treated. They are, quite explicitly, rejecting any ethics (or anyone who would promote an ethics) that says you should do unto others as you would have done unto you.

The people who argue that democracy is based in Judeo-Christian ethics are, as any history of the Enlightenment makes clear, right in that the notion of universal human rights and fairness across groups was grounded in the notion (not particular to Christians or Jews, but supposedly a foundational value of both) that a deeply religious ethical system treats all groups the same, regardless of their religious (or political) affiliation.

They’re wrong about most other things, but they’re right about that. So, it’s interesting that that is the rule they’re so unwilling to follow.

The current GOP/support Trump talking point is that the Democrats will behave as badly as the GOP has. And that’s taken as a reason to vote GOP. Isn’t it actually a reason to condemn the current GOP? It’s actually an admission that the current GOP is shameless, unethical, and an open rejection of what Christ calls us to do. The GOP has officially rejected Christ. Since they claim the moral highground, that’s more than a little problematic.

Right-wing rhetoric as pre-emptive self-defense

The right has shifted to a very old kind of rhetoric—our political situation is one in which a war has been declared on us and our values.  Our attempts at self-defense have just riled THEM that much more, and they are now determined to exterminate us. They have moved from symbolic violence and political oppression to actual violence. Therefore, we are justified in trying to exterminate them from the political scene, because that is a controlled and measured response to their actually trying to kill us—no system of ethics, no sense of fairness, no concerns about legality or process should limit what political actions we take against THEM.

This never ends well.

It’s also never literally true. It’s only ever used by people in positions of power whose “existential threat” isn’t that they’ll be exterminated, but that they will lose their current political power (usually hegemony).

After all, a genuinely minority group, whose existence (as opposed to political hegemony) was threatened wouldn’t have as one of their responses the extermination of some other group. They wouldn’t have the power to make that happen. Only a group that has the ability to exterminate an out-group—that is, the group with the greatest political power–can make this threat a plausible basis for large-scale political action.

There isn’t a war on Christmas, or a war on Christians; Aryans weren’t threatened with extermination; slaveholders didn’t have to worry about a race war that would enslave them; the GOP doesn’t have to worry that “liberals” will storm gated communities. In all these cases, media worked their base into political violence against an out-group on the fallacious grounds that it was justifiable self-defense (the out-group intended to exterminate them). It wasn’t, and they weren’t. And we’re there again.

Currently, the right-wing propaganda machine is doing two things: preparing its base for a factional state of exception against any non-Trump supporters, and setting up the talking points to rationalize political and judicial violence against non-Trump supporters.

There’s a lot of talk right now about Nazis, and the right-wing talk about Nazis (and a non-trivial amount of left-wing rhetoric) gets it completely wrong.

Here’s what happened with Hitler: he said things a lot of people were saying, but he said it in a way that made many believe that he completely understood them, that he was a reliable ally against Marxism, that he would break the logjam of current politics, that he would cleanse the Agean stables of current politics by getting rid of all the bad people. In other words, he told people that politics isn’t a question of politics—that is, political discourse isn’t about argumentation regarding our policy options, but a question of identity. There are good people, and there are bad people, and politics is a question of getting good people (meaning Hitler) in place, and everyone having faith in his ability to get things done.

Politics, in this world, isn’t about policy argumentation, but about pure commitment to the person who seems to have good judgment about everything, including all political issues.

Hitler came across as a person with fanatical commitment to values a lot of Germans thought were good values—German hegemony, a revitalized military, economic autarky, crushing the left. He never supported his policy agenda with policy argumentation (he couldn’t). But, he persuaded a minority of people that he had a good plan; he persuaded a larger number of people that he was better than communists. Once he got into power, because the conservatives refused to acknowledge that democratic socialists are not communists, he enacted policies that made things better for a lot of people in the short-term.

And, because a lot of people liked the short-term what, they didn’t look into the how. Hitler improved the lives of many people in Germany, and granted the “Christian” right and the military a lot of what they wanted, so they went along with the politicization of the judiciary, the demonization of dissent, and the criminalizing of opposition political parties. They did so because, in the moment, they were getting what they wanted. They liked the outcome, but they were all eventually pulverized in the maw of the how to which they acquiesced.

It’s never about the what; it’s always about the how.

And one important part of Hitler’s how was his use of exterminationist policies justified as a kind of pre-emptive self-defense. Union leaders, communists, and democratic socialists were the first people rounded up by the Nazis, on the grounds that their beliefs constituted a threat to Nazis. The assertion was that they intended to exterminate Nazis, and therefore Nazis were justified in suspending constitutional rights in self-defense for a war that hadn’t yet happened. A lot of people don’t realize that the Holocaust and other serial genocides were justified as self-defense, against a group that, it was claimed, had been at war with Aryans already. Hitler and the Nazis insisted on calling the attack on Czechoslovakia a counter-attack. And many Germans, including the ones who might have been able to mount the kinds of protests to slow things down, didn’t protest because they liked their better financial situation, they liked the rollback of lefty policies (they liked the bans on homosexuality, birth control, and women’s rights), and they liked the sense that Germany didn’t have to apologize anymore. They liked being proud of being German. They liked winning.

For a long time, large groups of Americans have been mobilized to support any political figure who advocates banning abortion, regardless of anything else about that figure. If, that person also insists that gun ownership should be unregulated, and politics is about expelling or exterminating the out-group, they can count on a fanatical base. None of those slogans (they aren’t really policies) is defended through policy argumentation (the gun issue gets the closest, but it’s still pretty far away).

And they aren’t argued via policy argumentation because they can’t be—they’re incoherent. The argument is that abortion should be banned because it is bad, and so banning it will end abortion but banning guns will not reduce shootings and the constitution says gun ownership for militia members should be protected but that means that no one can restrict gun ownership at all but the first amendment doesn’t protect all speech so the theory underlying the NRA reading of the second amendment doesn’t apply to any other amendment but it’s a good argument and banning immigration will reduce immigration so banning works with abortion and immigration but with guns it just criminalizes the activity but that argument doesn’t apply to abortion or immigration because. Just because.

The NRAGOP (that is, the part of the GOP that dutifully repeats and acts on NRA slogans) insists that the second amendment be read as though any restriction on individual gun ownership in any public space is prohibited. But they don’t read the first amendment as providing the same protection for speech (see, for instance, their attempt to prohibit doctors from talking about guns in the household, the restriction of what the CDC can say about guns, or the contradictions about teachers’ first versus second amendment rights). So, yeah, the NRAGOP argument about the second amendment is not grounded in a consistent principle about how to read the constitution because the NRAGOP doesn’t read the first and second amendment the same way.

And anyone who says that banning guns is useless but banning abortion and immigration would be helpful doesn’t understand how major premises work.

When you can’t defend your policy agenda rationally, and the GOP can’t, because it can’t explain why it’s the party that tried to hang Clinton is not only supporting Trump, but Kavanaugh, and is enacting policies that increase the debt (while having gotten its panties into a bunch about the debt), can’t defend its contradictory readings of the first and second amendments, doesn’t support policies that would actually reduce abortion, and, well, the GOP can’t defend its policies rationally.

So, what it does is claim that the possibility that white fundagelical men might lose some of their power means that everything that matters about the US will be exterminated, and so people who support their political agenda should react in panic.

That’s proslavery rhetoric. That’s prosegregationist rhetoric. It’s hyperbolic and destructive.

If the GOP has a good policy agenda, then it can defend that policy agenda through policy argumentation. It doesn’t because it can’t.

And that’s important. The GOP can mobilize its base on all sorts of grounds, and can give talking points to your family and friends, in which they shift the stasis to which group is better, or who supports abortion, or whether HRC laughed about a rape, but what it can’t do is give them the means to engage in policy argumentation. Because their policy agenda is indefensible on those grounds.