Another way that American coverage of political issues sucks

A bunch of people are posting a USAToday article that makes it seem McCaskill dissed on Ocasio-Cortez, and they’re expressing an appropriate amount of outrage about McCaskill doing that. The thing is, I’m not sure she did.

I don’t have a dog in this fight. I don’t know either politician at all. But I do know outrage bait, and both the USAToday and CNN articles reek of it. First, they smell like cropped quotes. For instance, the CNN article says,

“I don’t know her,” McCaskill said when asked if she’d consider Ocasio-Cortez a “crazy Democrat” like the ones she decried on the campaign trail. “I’m a little confused why she’s the thing. But it’s a good example of what I’m talking about, a bright shiny new object, came out of nowhere and surprised people when she beat a very experienced congressman.”

Had CNN presented the whole interview, there would have been an exchange like, “Do you consider OC a crazy Democrat like the ones you decried on the campaign trail?” And McCaskill would have answered, “I don’t know her.”

In other words, no, she was not talking about Ocasio-Cortez.

The next part of her quote might have been praise, and might have been criticism. We can’t tell because CNN didn’t give us the context. But we do know this—that this is the photo CNN chose of Ocasio-Cortez.


Meanwhile, this is the photo they chose for Kamala Harris.

So, and that’s my second point, who knows what McCaskill actually said—CNN didn’t give us the interview, but an abridged version that skews against Ocasio-Cortez. Harris has nothing to do with this interview.

[Edited to add: why is Harris here? My crank theory is that CNN wants to play Harris against AOC. In other words: clickbaity CATFIGHT!]

The USAToday version is the classic CATFIGHT version that always gets clicks—women fighting is such fun. It’s the depoliticized, hyperpersonalized coverage of political events that has made me loathe USAToday since it was started.

There might be reasons to criticize Ocasio-Cortez’s policies; McCaskill might have made them. But neither CNN nor USAToday went in that direction because policy argumentation doesn’t get clicks.

So, did McCaskill diss Ocasio-Cortez? Maybe. Maybe not. That isn’t my point. My point is that we don’t know from either the USAToday or the CNN article because neither of them is oriented toward giving voters useful information about anyone involved. CNN is part of the outrage machine, and USAToday is the founder of clickbait journalism. I think lefties sometimes forget that CNN is more interested in getting committed viewers than it is in furthering democratic deliberation, and USAToday is an insult to parrots who might find it in their cages.

Trump and the long con

One of the paradoxes of con artists is that cons always depend on appealing to the mark’s desire for a quick and easy solution but the most profitable cons last a long time. How do you keep people engaged in the scam if you’re siphoning off their money?  

There are several ways, but one of the most common is to ensure that they’re getting a quick outcome that they like. They’ll often wine and dine their marks, thereby coming across as too successful to need the mark’s money, and also increasing the mark’s confidence (and attachment). They might be supporting that high living through bad checks, but more often with credit cards and money from previous marks, or by getting the mark to pay for the high living without knowing. One serial confidence artist who specialized in picking up divorced middle-aged women on the Internet was particularly adept at stealing a rarely-used credit card from the women while they were showering. He then simply hid the bills when they arrived.

Because he seemed to have so much money, the women assumed he wouldn’t be scamming them, and would then hand over their life’s savings for him to invest.

They do this despite there being all sorts of good signs that the guy is a con artist–his life story seems a little odd, he doesn’t seem to have a lot of friends who’ve known him very long, there’s always some reason he can’t write checks (or own a home or sign a loan). There are three reasons that the con works, and that people ignore the counter-evidence.

First, cons flatter their marks, arguing that the marks deserve so much more than they’re getting, and persuade the marks to have confidence in them. They will tell the marks that those people (the ones who are pointing to the disconfirming data) look down on them, think they’re stupid, and think they know better. The con thereby gets the mark’s ego associated with his being a good person and not a con artist—admitting that he is a con means the mark will have to admit that those people were right.[1] The con artist will spin the evidence in ways that show he’s willing to admit to some minor flaws, ones that make the mark feel that she can really see through him. She knows him.[2]

Second, the con works because we don’t like ambiguity, and we tend to privilege direct experience and our own perception. The reasons to wonder about whether a man really is that wealthy are ambiguous, and it’s second order thinking (thinking about what isn’t there, about the absence of friends, family, connections, bank statements). That ambiguous data will seem less vivid, less salient, less compelling than the direct experience we have of his buying us expensive gifts. The family thing is vague and complicated; the jewelry is something we can touch.

Third, people who dislike complexity, who believe that most things have simple solutions, and that they are good at seeing those simple solutions are easy marks because those are precisely the beliefs to which cons appeal. Admitting that the guy is a con artist means admitting that the mark’s whole view of life—that the world has simple solutions, that people are what they seem to be, that you can trust your gut about whether someone is good or bad, that things you can touch (like jewelry) matter.

And it works because the marks don’t realize that they are the ones who’ve actually paid for that jewelry.

There are all the signs of his being a con artist—all the lawsuits, all the lies, the lack of transparency about his actual wealth, the reports that show a long history of dodgy (if not actively criminal) tax practices, the evidence that shows his wealth was inherited and not earned—but those are complicated to think about. Trump tells people that he cares about them; he (and his supportive media) tell their marks that all the substantive criticism is made by libruls who look down on them, who think they know better. The media admits to a few flaws, and spins them as minor.

Trump is a con artist, and his election was part of a con game about improving his brand. But, once he won the election, he had to shift to a different con game, one that involved getting as much money for him and his corporations as possible, reducing accountability for con artists, holding off investigations into his financial and campaign dealings, and skimming.

 And Trump gives his marks jewelry. If you have Trump supporters in your informational world, then you know that they respond to any criticism of Trump with, “I don’t care about collusion; I care about my lower taxes.” (Or “I care about the economy” or “I care that someone is finally doing something about illegal immigrants.”) They have been primed to frame concerns about Trump as complicated, ambiguous, and more or less personal opinion, but the benefit of Trump (to them) as clear, unambiguous, and tangible.

 They can touch the jewelry.

And they don’t realize that he isn’t paying for it; he never paid for it, and he never will. They’re paying for it. They bought themselves that jewelry.

There are, loosely, three ways to try to get people to see the con. First, I think it’s useful not to come across as saying that people are stupid for falling for Trump’s cons (although it can be useful to point out that current defenses of Trump are that he’s too stupid to have violated the law). It can be helpful to say that you understand why he and his policies would seem so attractive, but point out that he’s greatly increased the deficit (that his kind of tax cuts always increase the deficit). It’s helpful to have on hand the data about how much “entitlement”programs cost. Point out that they will be paying for his tax cuts for a long, long time.

Another strategy is to refuse to engage and just keep piling on the evidence. People get persuaded that they’ve been taken in by a con artist incident by incident. It isn’t any particular one, but that there are so many, and they reject each one as it comes along. So, I think that sharing story after story about how corrupt Trump is, how bad his policies are,and what damage he is doing—even if (especially if) people complain about your doing so—is effective in the long run.

Third, when people object or defend Trump, ask them if they’re getting their information from sources that would tell them if Trump were a con artist. They’ll respond with, “Oh, so I should watch MSNBC” (or something along those lines) and the answer is: “Yes, you should watch that too.” Or, “No, you shouldn’t get your news from TV.” Or a variety of other answers, but the point is that you aren’t telling them to switch to “librul” sources as much as getting more varied information. 

Con artists create a bond with their marks—their stock in trade is creating confidence. They lose power when their marks lose confidence, and that happens bit by bit. And sometimes it happens when people notice the jewelry is pretty shitty, actually.


[1]This is why it’s so common for marks to start covering for the con when the con gets exposed. They fear the “I told you so” more than the consequences of getting conned.

[2] In other words, con artists try to separate people from the sources of information that would undermine the confidence the mark has in the con.

For Stephanie

If memory serves, Stephanie Odom came to UT as a literature student, and she was a gifted reader and teacher of literature. But, as often happens, her experience teaching first year writing caused her to change course to rhetoric. She loved it. She loved what happens to students as they become better writers—more confident, more intellectually curious, better at research.

And she really enjoyed reading scholarship in rhetoric, as it was a “conversation” she wanted to join, asking questions that intrigued her,and to which she wanted answers.

But her love of literature, and her wide reading in it, meant that she was puzzled and sometimes irritated by what she saw as an unnecessary antagonism between literature and rhetoric. While it was long past the culture wars of the 80s and 90s that had led to the banning of literature from composition classes, literature was still banned. And, certainly, she saw the reasons for keeping first and second year writing courses from being intro to lit crit or literature appreciation classes—not that she saw such approaches to literature as bad, but simply as out of place–but she didn’t see why banning literary texts (still a common practice) was the necessary outcome of ways of teaching literature being not particularly useful to the goals of introductory writing classes.

Behind these arguments about literature, she thought, there was an argument about the purpose of humanistic studies. Initially, she imagined that she would write a dissertation that would focus on the term“humanism,” and its post-Matthew Arnold permutations. And she was well-trained and well-equipped for exactly that dissertation—one that would require close textual analysis, capacious reading, and precisely her kind of intellectual generosity. She could have written that dissertation about as easily as anyone writes a dissertation. She, however, did something that required more courage.

The problem for her, and this is typical of Stephanie, was that she wasn’t just interested in the theoretical disagreements or intellectual genealogy of the place of literature in writing classes: she wanted to do scholarship that would help teachers teach better. She wanted to know if bringing in literature did actually inhibit writing instruction. And that meant a whole set of other questions—how many people are bringing in literature? What are they doing with it? How do we assess the effectiveness of any teaching practice?

So, partway into her dissertation, she developed a set of questions that required that she learn entirely new methods—survey writing, qualitative analysis of data. She was brilliant, and so certainly smart enough to learn new material, new skills, and even new ways of conducting research. But it took more than intelligence to make that cognitive shift. It took a kind of bravery, and she did it. She was intellectually fierce.

She was also kind and funny, who inspired love, admiration, and respect everywhere she went. She was an Assistant Director in the Department of Rhetoric and Writing, meaning that she helped prepare others to teach writing, who was always kind and helpful to fellow graduate students as they were trying to learn the thing at which she was so skilled.

She was active in a graduate writing group for years, a kind, clear, generous, and usefully critical reader of fellow graduate students’ work. Perhaps more important, at times when other members were slacking off—or even thinking about slacking off—she was cheerfully fierce at holding everyone accountable, partially through her breathtakingly practical approach to solving whatever problems people were presenting as obstacles.

She worked in what was then the Undergraduate Writing Center, and was a respected and talented writing consultant, with whom everyone loved to work. When the Writing Center shifted to the University Writing Center, and moved to a new space, there were two major new opportunities. One was the opportunity to work with graduate students, something that would require establishing a cultural practice of accountable writing groups. The other was to have rooms which would be quieter and less distracting than the hectic and often noisy common space—rooms crucial for being able to resolve the problems faced by students whose hearing, cognitive processes, writing project,or previous experiences meant being in the midst of a crowded and very public consulting space wasn’t practical. 

Thus, when there was the possibility of naming one of those rooms, it was obvious that it should be named for Stephanie. Her commitment to writing—at both the graduate and undergraduate level—and her skill as a teacher and facilitator of writing meant that she was a model of what the UWC was trying to be. That the rooms were also a practical solution to a vexing problem of exclusion made it perfect.

When Stephanie was diagnosed with cancer, all those qualities—her brilliance, ferocity, pragmatism, and ability to inspire love—were tested. And still, she persisted.

And she got a really good job—Assistant Professor at UT-Tyler—where she branched into yet another area of research, working with a criminal justice professor on pragmatic ways of improving student writing. The smart and beautifully-written co-authored article ended up published in a journal on criminal justice education, another intellectually brave venture.

At UT-Tyler, she met a smart, kind, funny, and loving man, and it was wonderful to see her so happy. She also got an adorable dog, whom she loved even after the dog broke a sliding glass door multiple times (because squirrels).

Stephanie died yesterday. She was loved, admired, respected, and needed. I will miss her so very much. She was fierce.

How reading Hitler’s deliberations with his generals might make you lose it with sociopathic scammers

When we moved into this neighborhood, an older man stopped by to welcome us, and we thought that was sweet. But, pretty quickly, it became clear that his agenda was warning us against the lesbian couple who lived across from him. He told us that “some people around here” were doing things “forbidden by the Bible.” I became very animated about my need to unpack this box in exactly the right way and said something about being really busy. But he went on spouting fundagelical (and false) talking points about homosexuality and Christianity, and put the cherry on the top by telling me, condescendingly, that he was an expert on the Bible, and willing to help me with it. That happened to be a point in my life when my ancient Greek was crappy, but manageable for the work I was doing (I couldn’t sit down and read Scripture in Greek because both my vocabulary and grammar sucked, but I could follow the arguments about translation in interesting ways), but I was furious. I said something along the lines of, “Oh, really, do you read Hebrew and Greek?” And he said, “No.” And I said something like, “Oh, well, I read Greek, but I’m always looking for someone who reads Hebrew.” He left. Chagrined.

I considered it a win.

As it happens, our son became really good friends with the son of the couple he hated, and so we learned that that bigot harassed that couple a lot.

He shares one of our last names, and lately we’ve been getting a lot of calls for him. We checked, and they’re scams. We don’t really know where he is (he might have moved, since the house seems to have had some remodelling), and we don’t really care. We had three choices: ignore the calls (it’s landline, so we can’t block), tell them they have the wrong people, or, what I did, since I spent much of today reading Hitler’s deliberations with his generals. I spent a day reading about how a guy who believed that what he wanted for himself and people like him merited the killing of 355 million people, so I was pretty much done with sociopaths who think they can make a buck this way.

I lost it, and called back one of the numbers and told the guy who answered the phone that I hope he spends every day of his life dealing with people like him, and that, when he’s old and vulnerable, he is the prey of people like him.

I was so enraged that I was completely incoherent and almost certainly ineffectual, and it was all in service of a bigot, but I’m still proud about it.

And, fyi, the numbers all seem to be 844 area code.

Binary (either/or) thinking

Binary thinking is when a person assumes that the situation can be broken into only two options. You either stop or go. You’re with us or against us. You’re loyal or disloyal. You’re us or them. Fight or flight.

It’s pretty rare that a situation is actually a binary, although there are times. But, in general, when people make bad decisions it’s because they thought it was a binary situation and it wasn’t.

For instance, imagine that you’re trying to get somewhere, and your normal route has terrible traffic. If you say, “Maybe this route isn’t working,” and the other person in the car says, “Oh, so you’re saying we should just go home,” they’re engaged in binary thinking. Or imagine that you’re trying fix a lawn mower, and what you’re doing just isn’t working, and you say, “This method isn’t working,” and the other person says, “So, you’re saying we should just give up.”

Humans are comfortable with binaries,[1] and so skeezy salespeople will always try to get you to reduce your choices to a binary. The fundamental binary is us or them.

Sometimes people think they aren’t engaged in binary thinking because they think there is a continuum between the two extremes. But, that’s still deeply fallacious, in that it’s rare that there are two options between which one must choose, especially in politics (there is not a continuum of furthest “left” to furthest “right”–political affiliations, at least as far as policy, are more usefully described in matrices), and the continuum model makes the situation a zero-sum. If there is a binary between black and white, then the more black something is, the less white it is. The less white something is, the more black it must be. Binary thinking contributes to zero-sum thinking, in which people approach a situation as though any gain for them is a loss for us. While business discourse long ago abandoned that way of thinking, it’s heavily promoted by tribal media.

[1] The research on the attractions and fallacies of binary thinking are usefully summarized in Mistakes Were Made, Superforecasting, and Thinking, Fast and Slow.

Class size and college writing (another version of the same argument)

[Also co-authored by Reinhold Hill, and also from the early 2000s]

Introduction

Any Writing Program Administrator occasionally has the frustrating experience of failing to get administrators, colleagues, parents, and even students to understand the bases of our decisions–why classes must remain small, why instructors need training in rhetoric and composition, and so on. This kind of experience is frustrating because we often find ourselves talking to someone with different assumptions about teaching, writing, and research. For such an audience, position statements are often not helpful, as our interlocutors do not even know the organizations whose position statements we’re likely to cite.

This is not to say that such discussions are necessarily an impasse, nor that the different assumptions interlocutors have are incommensurable. It is simply that, often being from different disciplines, we all bring different assumptions that seem transparently obvious to each of us. We may know from experience that one gets better writing from students if they are required to revise, but an administrator with a different disciplinary background may be sincerely concerned that we are not assessing our classes and students on the extent to which students have retained the information we have given them in lectures and readings. For many people, that is learning. As far as they are concerned, if we are not lecturing and assigning reading, then we are not teaching; if we are not testing our students, then we are not assessing students objectively.

In addition, the articles and books that we are likely to cite to explain our practices look very strange to some people–it’s just argument, a colleague once complained. We can rely on argument because we teach argument, and we are comfortable assessing arguments. We can rely on anecdote and personal experience more than people in many fields because we share an experience–the teaching of writing. Thus, if an author narrates a specific incident, we are likely to find it a reasonable form of proof, if the incident is typical of our own experience. In some other fields, however, quantified, empirical evidence is the only credible sort of proof, or an assertion must be supported by a large number of studies (regardless of how problematic any individual study might be). This is particularly an issue with class size, as minor change in enrollment (from an administrator’s perspective) are strongly resisted by Writing Program Administrators. Our intention in this article is to try to help Writing Program Administrators argue for responsible and ethical class sizes in writing courses.

There are few topics about which Writing Program Administrators and upper administrators are likely to disagree quite so unproductively as class size. While Writing Program Administrators typically argue for keeping first year writing courses as small as possible, upper administrators are often focussed on the considerable savings that could be effected by even a small change in enrollment. WPAs can cite position statements and recommendations from NCTE and ADE, but upper administrators cite such passages as the following from Pascarella and Terenzini who summarize the “substantial amount of research over the last sixty years” on class size in college teaching:

The consensus of these reviews–and of our own synthesis of the existing evidence–is that class size is not a particularly important factor when the goal of instruction is the acquisition of of subject matter knowledge and academic skills. (87).

With the backing of such an authority, upper administrators are likely to be mystified at WPA’s resistance to first year writing classes of twenty-five to thirty.

This is not to say that WPAs have no research on the side of smaller classes. Despite what Pascarella and Terenzini say, there is considerable research which identifies benefits in smaller classes. The meta-analysis of Glass and Smith (not mentioned by Pascarella and Terenzini) concludes that reduced class size is beneficial at all grade levels; Slavin found small positive short-term benefit; and several studies found benefit if (and only if) teachers engaged in teaching strategies that took advantage of the smaller size (Chatman, Tomlinson). On the other hand, there is at least one study too recent to be cited by Pascarella and Terenzini that concludes no demonstrable benefit to reducing class size (e.g., David Williams). Thus, it may seem to be a case of warring research.

On the contrary,  we will argue that the apparently disparate results of research can be explained, in a comment made by Pascarella and Terenzini. After the passage quoted above, they say “It is probably the case, however, that smaller classes are somewhat more effective than larger ones when the goals of instruction are motivational, attitudinal, or higher-level cognitive processes” (87).

There are two points which we wish to make about Pascarella and Terenzini’s negative conclusion regarding class size. First, it is striking how dated the research is–although Pascarella and Terenzini’s book came out in 1991, the most recent study they cite is 1985. Of the eighteen studies they mention, three are from the twenties, one from 1945, two from the fifties, two from the sixties, seven from the seventies, and three from the eighties. This is particularly important for the teaching of writing, as there was a major reversal in the sixties in pedagogy, returning from the lecture-based presentation of models which students were expected to imitate to the classical method which put greater emphasis on the process of inventing and arranging an effective argument.

This issue of teaching model is crucial. The impact that varying class size has on the outcome in terms of student writing depends heavily on the goal and method of the writing courses in question. If the courses are lecture courses, in which only the teacher is expected to read the students’ writing, then the only limit on class size comes from the amount of time one expects the teacher to spend grading. While that is not a model we endorse (and we will discuss the reasons below), it can still be the basis of a useful discussion.

At a “Research I” institution, faculty members are usually assessed on the assumption that they spend forty per cent of their time teaching two courses, or, one day out of a five day work week (eight hours). At schools with more teaching responsibilities, the math works out in similar ways (with a fairly ugly exception for universities with Research I publishing expectations and a three or four course teaching load). Graduate students are usually assumed to have teaching responsibilities that account for half of their half-time appointment, or ten hours per course. With three hours per week in the classroom, and three hours of office hours, graduate students instructors are left with four hours per week of grading and course preparation.

One reason that administrators and WPAs often disagree about the amount of work involved in teaching writing courses is that administrators’ experience is with what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode of teaching. The first year is hellish, but then the instructor has prepared the presentations, and future years involve tinkering with prepared lectures. Hence, course preparation is presumed to be minimal. But, of course, most WPAs are not imagining instructors’ spending class time lecturing because the presentational mode has been demonstrated, conclusively, to be the least effective method of teaching writing.

Still and all, if one assumes that a course is supposed to take 150 hours of an instructor’s time over the course of a semester (not including pre-semester course preparation), and 45 hours of that time is spend in class, and another 45 hours is spent in office hours, there are 60 hours left for individual conferences, grading, and course preparation. If there are twenty students per class, then meeting twice with each student for a half hour conference uses up 20 hours. Even assuming an efficient teacher who is dusting off lecture notes for course preparation, one should expect an hour per week of course preparation (15), leaving 25 hours for grading. Advocates of minimal marking (a problematic issue to be discussed below) describe a process that takes only twenty minutes per paper. Obviously, then, the amount of time an instructor spends on grading depends upon the number of papers, but a course with only three papers would use up almost all of the time left. Since most programs require more than three papers (and most instructors spend more than twenty minutes per paper), more than twenty students per course puts instructors into unethical working conditions.[1]

But, as we said, the deeper issue concerns just what happens in a writing class. The issue is whether one sees writing instruction as the inculcation of subject matter knowledge or as the development of higher-level cognitive processes. To the extent that it is the latter, classes should be small; to the extent that it is the former, class size is limited only by instructor workload Or, in other words, what do we teach when we teach college writing?

Interestingly enough, this is one of those questions that is not a question for people outside of the field. It seems obvious enough to people unfamiliar with research in Linguistics, Rhetoric, and English Education who tend to give what appears a straightforward answer: we teach the rules of good writing. Behind that apparent consensus is an interesting disagreement. For some people, the “rules of good writing” describe formal characteristics in writing that all educated readers acknowledge is high quality (e.g., the thesis in the first paragraph, an interest-catching first sentence). For others, those rules describe procedures that all good writers follow when writing (e.g., keep notes on three by five cards, write a formal outline with at least two sub-points). As qualitative and quantitative research has shown, however, both of those perceptions regarding the rules of good writing–regardless of how widespread they are–are false.

In the first place, there is less consensus about what constitutes “good” writing than many people think. Writers have fallen in and out of fashion, so that there is not any author who has not had his or her detractors–critical reception of Henry David Thoreau’s Walden was so hostile that it was nearly turned into pulp; Addison and Steele, always included in composition textbooks until the 1960s, are now considered nearly unreadable; even Shakespeare has been severely criticized for his mixed metaphors, complicated language, and drops into purple prose. As research in reader response criticism demonstrated as long ago as the early part of this century (see I.A. Richards), students (and readers) do not immediately recognize the merits of canonical literature; there is considerable disagreement as to just what the best writing is, so that the “canon” of accepted great writing has constantly been in flux (see Ohmann, Fish, Graff).

To a large degree, this disagreement is disciplinary; that is, different disciplines have different requirements for writing. This divergence is most obvious in regard to format–such as citation methods and order of elements. It is equally present and more important in regard to style: in the experimental and social sciences, for instance, “good” writing uses passive voice, nominalization, long clusters of noun phrases, and various other qualities which are considered “bad” writing in journalism, literature, and various humanistic disciplines. Even the notion of what constitutes error varies–social science writing is rife with what most usage handbooks identify as mixed metaphors, predication errors, reference errors, non parallel structure, split infinitives, dangling modifiers, and agreement errors. Lab reports, resumes, and much business writing permit, if not require, fragment sentences. Meanwhile, people from some disciplines recoil at the use of first person in ethnographic writing, literary criticism, some journalism, and other humanistic courses.

Disciplines also disagree as to what constitutes good evidence (for more on this issue, see Miller, Bazerman). Some disciplines accept personal observation (e.g., cultural anthropology), while some do not (e.g., economics). There are similarly profound disagreements regarding the validity of textual analysis, quantitative experimentation, qualitative research, interviews, argument from authority, and so on. There is a tendency for people to be so convinced of the epistemological superiority of their form of research that, when confronted with the fact of differing opinions on what constitutes good writing, they dismiss the standards of some other discipline (thus, for instance, Richard Lanham’s popular textbook Revising Prose condemns all use of the passive voice, and Joseph Williams’ even more popular Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace prohibits clusters of nouns). Our goal is not to take a side in the issue of which discipline promotes the best writing, but to insist upon the important point out that there is disagreement. Thus, a writing course cannot teach “the” rules of good writing that will be accepted in all disciplines because no such rules exist (unless the rules are extremely abstract, as discussed below).

In the second place, as several studies have shown, the ‘”rules” of good writing which we give students for student writing do not describe published writing.  For instance, students are generally told to end their introductions with their ‘thesis statements,” to begin each paragraph with their topic sentences (which is assumed to be the main claim of the paragraph), and to focus on the use of correct grammar. Published writing, however, does not have those qualities. Thesis statements are usually in conclusions (Trail), and introductions most often end with a clear statement of the problem (Swale), or what classical rhetoricians called the “hypothesis” (meaning a statement that points toward the thesis). Textbook advice regarding topic sentences is simply false (Braddock), and, readers are much more oblivious about errors in published writing than much writing instruction would suggest (Williams). In fact, error may not have quite the role that many teachers think–while college instructors say that correctness is an important quality of good writing (Hairston), studies in which they rank actual papers shows a privileging of what compositionists call “higher order concerns”–appropriateness to assignment, quality of reasoning, and organization over format and correctness (see Huot’s review of research on this issue).

Finally, several meta-analyses of research conclude that teaching writing as rules has a harmful effect on student writing (see especially Knoblauch and Brannon, Hillocks, Rose). The common sense assumption is that students prone to writing blocks lack the knowledge of rules for writing that effective writers have; on the contrary, students prone to writing block may know too many rules. In contrast to more fluid writers, who tend to focus on what is called “the rhetorical situation” (explained below), student writers prone to writing blocks focus on rules they have been told (Flower and Hayes, Rose).  Students taught these rules of writing try to produce an error-free first draft  which they minimally revise (Emig, Sommers). Effective and accomplished writers, in contrast, have rich and recursive writing processes that depends heavily upon revision (Emig, Flower and Hayes, Berkenkotter, Faigley and Witte).

For many people unaware of research in linguistics and English education, the assumption is that the “rules” of good writing are the rules regarding usage (usually described as “grammar rules,” which is itself an instance of an error in usage). It is assumed that there is agreement regarding these rules, and they are to be found in any usage handbook. Further, it is assumed that one can improve students’ “grammar” (another interesting usage error–what people mean is “reduce usage error” or “improve correctness”) by getting them to memorize those universally agreed-upon usage rules.  These assumptions are wrong in almost every way.

Research in linguistics demonstrates that language has considerable variation over time and region. To put it simply, at any given moment, there are numerous dialects within a language which are each “correct” within their community of discourse (e.g., “impact” for “influence,” “thinking outside the box”). Some dialects are more privileged than others, and the uninformed often assume that facility with the more privileged dialect signifies greater intelligence; this is patently false (Chomsky, Labov and Smitherman, Baron). All dialects have a grammar, so students (and colleagues) who use a different dialect are not ignorant of “grammar;” they know the grammar of a dialect not considered appropriate in academic discourse, the dialect which linguists sometimes call “standard edited English.” It is easy to overstate agreement regarding “standard edited English,” as that dialect has varied substantially over time; the “shall” versus “will” distinction used to be considered extraordinarily important, “correct” comma usage differs in British and American English and even more from the nineteenth century to now, and usage handbooks disagree on numerous issues (such as agreement). The notion of a correct dialect upon which there is universal agreement is simply a fantasy.

In our experience, people respond to this research by objecting to the pedagogy they assume it necessarily implies. People assume that to note the reality–considerable regional and historical disagreement regarding linguistic correctness–necessarily implies a complete abandonment of attention to error. That is not the necessary conclusion, nor is it our point. Our point here is simply that one central assumption in this view of writing instruction is wrong–there is not universal agreement as to rules regarding “correct” language use.

In addition, this research does not necessarily imply a “whatever goes” pedagogy. While some have drawn that conclusion, others have used this research to argue for teaching grammar and usage as a community of discourse issue (e.g., Labov and Smitherman); that is, rather than denigrate some dialects, teachers should present “standard edited English” as a useful dialect which students should use under some circumstances and with some audiences (see, for instance, “Students’ Right to Their Own Language”). Others have argued that grammar and usage should be taught as a rhetorical issue, as a question of clarity and rhetorical effect (Williams, Kolln, Dawkins).

And this leads us to the second point–the assumption that one can reduce errors in student writing through making students learn the rules of standard edited English. On the contrary, in the nearly one hundred years that this issue has been studied, there has not been a single study which showed improvement in student writing resulting from formal instruction in the rules of grammar, while there are several studies which showed a mark deterioration (see Knoblauch and Brannon, Hartwell, Hillocks for more on the history of this research). That deterioration may be the consequence of increased anxiety leading to students’ mistrusting their implicit knowledge (Hartwell), or that the time taken for grammar instruction was time away from more productive forms of writing instruction (Knoblauch and Brannnon).

In our experience, this point too is misunderstood. We are not saying that instruction in grammar and usage is pointless, but that certain approaches to it demonstrably are. And those are precisely the pedagogies into which one is forced in large classes–lecturing, drilling, assigning worksheets, and testing students on usage rules.

Indeed, research suggests that there is probably not a pedagogy which can be applied to all students in the same way. Issues of linguistic correctness result from different causes, depending upon the students. Hence, the solution varies. For students whose native dialect is fairly close to standard edited English, for instance, errors in usage sometimes result from lack of clarity about their own argument; students make more usage errors, for instance, when they are writing about something they do not fully understand. For such students, clarifying the concepts will enable the students to correct the errors.

For other students, usage errors are a time management issue–they did not leave themselves time to proofread. What Haswell has somewhat misleadingly called “minimal marking” is generally the best strategy under those circumstances (it is misleading in that it depends upon students’ resubmitting their corrected papers, so it can be fairly time-consuming for the instructor, albeit far less time-consuming and more effective than copy-editing). What he advocates, however, is not a kind of marking that takes minimal time on the part of the instructor.

For students whose dialect is markedly different from standard edited English, there is the possibility of what linguists call “dialect interference”–instances of using their (academically inappropriate) dialect, engaging in hypercorrectness (“between you and I”), or  simply being unsure how to apply the rules. There are also students whose experience with written English is minimal, and who may have a tendency toward what are called “errors of transciption” (e.g., errors regarding the placement of commas and periods).  For these students, “minimal marking” is ineffective, but neither do they benefit from lectures and quizzes on grammar rules. Instead, they seem to benefit most from individual instruction. Several studies show strong short-term improvement from sentence embedding (Hillocks), but  many instructors moved away from it due to its inherently time-consuming nature.

In short, as Mina Shaughnessy pointed out long ago, improving students’ usage is not something one can do in the same way with all students. One must know exactly what specific problems exist with each student, why that student is having that problem, and what method will best work with that problem and that student.  In other words, effective instruction in grammar and usage necessitates classes small enough that the teacher can know students well enough to know the cause of the problem. If the students have major problems, as from dialect interference, then the classes have to be small enough for the teacher to be able to engage in the extremely time-consuming methods necessary for such students.

One might wonder, if writing teachers are not teaching rules of writing, what are we teaching?  And the answer seems to be that we are teaching rhetoric. That is, while one cannot present students with rules that apply to all circumstances–never use I, always begin with a personal anecdote, your thesis should have three reasons–there are principles which do seem effective in most circumstances. Those principles are encapsulated in the concept of the “rhetorical situation”–that the quality of a piece of discourse is determined by the extent to which its strategies are appropriate for effecting the author(s) particular intention on the specific audience. Thus, were one to examine prize-winning articles in philosophy, economics, literary criticism, engineering, behavioral psychology, and theoretical physics, one would see wide variation in terms of  format, style, organization, and nature of evidence, one would see that each piece was appropriate for its audience.

One advantage of this approach to the teaching of writing is that it is more effective. Lecturing and drilling are, as several studies have shown, ineffective methods of writing instruction (Hillocks). This method remains tremendously popular, however, especially among teachers whose own instruction followed that method, who are cynical regarding student achievement, and who are generally convinced that the teaching of writing is the transmission of information (Hillocks).  This point is important, as it showed up in our own experiment with reducing class size–students in classes with teachers who relied heavily on lecture did not show any benefit from a smaller class. The fact is that lectures are ineffective in writing classes; reducing the class size does not suddenly make lecturing an effective teaching strategy.

When we had the opportunity to look closely at class size at our previous institution, we made some surprising discoveries.  One of the major motivations for undertaking the experiment was a sense of frustration, among faculty and graduate students, with graduate student instructors’ progress toward their degrees. Prior to the change in program emphasis, a large number of our instructors used class time to present advice on writing papers as well as to present writing products which students used as models (what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode, and which he identifies as the least effective method of writing instruction). Perhaps because this method of instruction did not work particularly well for so many students, instructors also relied heavily on individual conferences with students–conferences which took so much time that they necessitated long blocks of time outside normal office hours. The dominance of this mixing of presentational and individualized modes of instruction had fairly predictable consequences.

The accretion of assignments and expectations for the course meant that it was actually impossible to teach the course in the ten hours per week a graduate student was supposed to spend on it. While such a situation is far from uncommon–many programs pay writing teachers a salary that presumes that the course takes much less time than it actually does–it is unethical. It also means that instructors, especially ones with multiple commitments (e.g., graduate students who are also taking courses, part-time instructors with obligations at several campuses, tenure-track teachers facing publication pressures), are encouraged to adopt pedagogies which feel more efficient but which research strongly indicates are less effective (i.e., the presentational mode of teaching, discussed previously).

Graduate student instructors responded to this situation in various ways. According to a survey, as well as faculty observation, many let their own coursework suffer in favor of their teaching. Others simplified assignments, so that the papers were short and simple enough that they could be graded in ten to fifteen minutes a piece. Several instructors essentially abandoned assessing student work, and graded students purely on attendance. Many instructors reported spending long hours on teaching, something that, not surprisingly, resulted in frustration–the first year composition course was openly discussed as the least desirable teaching assignment. In this context, it should be clear why we were looking for a method that would reduce the amount of time that instructors spent on their first year composition courses, without simply shifting them to quick, but ineffective, methods such as lecturing, drilling, and superficial grading.

When we reduced class size to fifteen for many of the instructors, we found that those instructors generally spent less time on the course (instructors in control groups reported spending an average of ten to fourteen hours per week on their courses, instructors in the sections with reduced class size reported averages of between twelve and fifteen). We also found that many instructors took advantage of the reduced class size to create new assignments, to take more time to comment on papers, to meet more often with students, or to add another project. Such a consequence–instructors taking the opportunity to increase the amount of work in the course–is echoed in at least one other study on class size.  The San Juan Unified School District report on the results of the Morgan-Hart Class Size Reduction Act of 1989 concludes that

As a result of smaller classes, students were more actively involved in the instructional process.  This was demonstrated by an increase in the number of student reading and writing assignments, more oral presentations and frequent classroom discussions.  Students also received increased feedback on their English assignments and teachers had time to work with students individually.

One benefit of reducing class size, then, is that instructors appear more willing to experiment with and examine their teaching styles. Whether this is a bug or feature would depend on the program goals. Certainly, although they may not have spent less time on the courses, they reported much higher satisfaction. Teachers like smaller classes.

But, they did not always use the time well. We found that instructors heavily committed to the presentational mode did not effect much change in their students’ writing processes. Similarly, class size did not increase overall student satisfaction if the instructor engaged in the presentational mode.

In conclusion, our experience fits with Sheree Goettler-Sopko’s summary of research on class-size and reading achievement. She concludes that “The central theme which runs through the current research literature is that academic achievement does not necessarily improve with the reduction of student/teacher ratio unless appropriate learning styles and effective teaching styles are utilized” (5).

Class Size and Minimal Teaching

George Hillocks long ago showed the importance and superiority of constructivist approaches to the teaching of writing (Research in Written Composition, Teaching Writing as Reflective Practice, and more recently Ways of Thinking, Ways of Teaching).  This means that effective teaching requires an approach which does not set the task of teaching writing as getting students to memorize and understand certain objects of knowledge (the objectivist approach), but as setting students tasks during which they will learn and giving them appropriate feedback along the way.  The more that one engages in constructivist teaching, the more important is class size; the more that the goals and practices of a program are objectivist, the less class size matters. While reducing class size does not guarantee constructivist teaching, increasing class size does prevent it.

One can see this effect simply by thinking about the amount of time for which writing instructors are paid. The assumption at many universities is that each class is supposed to take 8-10 hours per week of instructor time. Instructors spend three hours each week in class, and it is optimistic, but not necessarily irrationally so, to assume that an efficient and highly experienced teacher can prepare for class on a one-to-one basis (that is, that it takes approximately one hour to prepare for one hour of class). A teacher therefore has two to four hours a week (almost precisely what is required by most universities for office hours). If an instructor has twenty students per class, s/he has, over the course of the semester 30-60 hours, which comes, at best, to three hours per student for conferences and grading. This situation necessitates cutting the students short on something–short papers which can be graded quickly, cursory grading of student work generally, discouraging students from using office hours. All in all, it means that one cannot do what Pascarelli and Terenzini say “effective teachers do” when “They signal their accessibility in and out of the classroom” (652).  Simply put, if instructors have to use office hours to grade student work, they cannot signal accessibility. Pascarelli and Terenzini say, “They give students formal and informal feedback on their performance” (652), but, if instructors are restricted to three hours of grading per semester per student, they have to minimize the amount of feedback given. In other words, large classes force instructors away from what “we know” to be good practice.

The larger the class, the more the teacher is forced into lecturing. Yet, according to Pascarelli and Terenzini,

            Our review indicates that individualized instructional approaches that accommodate variations in students’ learning styles and rates consistently appear to produce greater subject matter learning than do more conventional approaches, such as lecturing. These advantages are especially apparent with instructional approaches that rely on small, modularized content units, require a student to master one instructional unit before proceeding to the next, and elicit active student involvement in the learning process. Perhaps even more promising is the evidence suggesting that these learning advantages are the same for students of different aptitudes and different levels of subject area competence. Probably in no other realm is the evidence so clear and consistent. (646, emphasis added)

If we want instructors to be effective writing instructors, then we have to ensure that they are in a situation which will permit good practice. Reducing class size will not necessarily cause such practice, but it is a necessary condition thereof.

Works Cited

ADE.  “ADE Guidelines for Class Size and Workload for College and University Teachers of English: A Statement of Policy.” Online. http://www.ade.org/policy/policy_guidelines.htm. 1998.

Baron, Dennis E. Grammar and Good Taste : Reforming the American Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

Bazerman, Charles. Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999.

Berkentotter, Carol. “Decisions and Revisions: The Planning Strategies of a Publishing Writer.”  Landmark Essays on Writing Process.  Sondra Perl, ed. Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1994. 127-40.

Braddock, Richard.  “The Frequency and Placement of Topic Sentences in Expository Prose.” On Writing Research: The Braddock Essays, 1975-1998.  Ed. Lisa Ede. New York:  Bedford, St. Martin’s, 1999. 29-42.

Chatman, Steve.  “Lower Division Class Size at U.S. Postsecondary Institutions.”  Paper presented at the Annual Forum of the Association for Institutional Research. Albuquerque: 1996.

Chomsky, Noam. N. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge:

MIT P, 1965.

Davis, Barbara Gross, Michael Scriven, and Susan Thomas.  The Evaluation of Composition Instruction. 2nd. Ed. New York: Teachers College Press. 1987.

Dawkins, John. “Teaching Punctuation as a Rhetorical Tool.” CCC (Dec. 1995): 533-548.

Emig, Janet.  The Composing Processes of Twelfth Graders. Urbana: NCTE, 1971.

Faigley, Lester, and Stephen Witte. Evaluating College Writing Programs. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983.

Fish, Stanley. Is There a Text in this Class? Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982.

Flower, Linda, and John R. Hayes. “The Cognition of Discovery: Defining a Rhetorical Problem.” Landmark Essays on Writing Process. Sondra Perl, ed. Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1994. 63-74.

Glass, Gene V., and Mary Lee Smith.Meta-Analysis of Research on the Relationship of Class-Size and Achievement.  The Class Size and Instruction Project.”  Washington D.C.: National Institute of Education, 1978.

Goettler-Sopko, Sheree. “The Effect of Class Size on Reading Achievement.” Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1990.

Graff, Gerald. Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education. New York: WW Norton, 1993.

Hairston, Maxine. “Working with Advanced Writers.” CCC 35(1984): 196–208.

Hartwell, Patrick. “Grammar, Grammars, and the Teaching of Grammar.” College English 47 (February 1985): 105–27.

Haswell, Richard H.  “Minimal Marking.” College English 45.6 (1983): 166-70.

Hillocks, George.  Research in Written Composition: New Directions for Teaching.  Urbana: NCTE, 1986.

– – -. Teaching Writing as Reflective Practice: Integrating Theories. New York: Teachers College P., 1995.

– – -. Ways of Thinking, Ways of Teaching. New York: Teachers College P., 1999.

Huot, Brian.  “Toward a New Theory of Writing Assessment.” CCC 47.4 (1996): 549-66.

Knoblauch, C.H. and Lil Brannon. “On Students’ Rights to Their Own Texts: A Model of Teacher Response”, College Composition and Communication, 33 (1982): 157-66.

Kolln, Martha. Rhetorical Grammar: Grammatical Choices, Rhetorical Effects. 4th Ed. New York: Pearson, 2002.

Labov, William. The Logic of Non-Standard English. Champaign: National Council of Teachers of English, 1970.

Lanham, Richard. Revising Prose. 4th ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 1999.

Miller, Susan. Textual Carnivals: The Politics of Composition. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1991.

NCTE College Section Steering Committee. “Guidelines for the Workload of the College English Teacher.” Online. http://www.ncte.org/positions/workload-col.html. 1998.

Ohman, Richard. English in America: A Radical View of Profession. New York: Oxford UP, 1976.

Pascarella, E.T. And Terenzini, P.T. How College Affects Students: Findings and Insights from Twenty Years of Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991.

Richards, I.A. The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon

 Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. 8th ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace

& World, 1946.

Rose, Mike. Lives on the Boundary. New York: Penguin, 1990.

Sommers, Nancy. “Revision Strategies of Student Writers and Experienced Adult Writers.” CCC 31 (December 1980): 378–88.

San Juan Unified School District. “Class Size Reduction Evaluation: Freshman English, Spring 1991.” Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1992.

Shaughnessy, Mina. Errors and Expectations. New York: Oxford UP, 1979.

Slavin, Robert, “Class Size and Student Achievement: Is Smaller Better?” Contemporary Education 62 (Fall 1990): 6-12.

Smitherman, Geneva. “‘Students’ Right to Their Own Language’: A Retrospective.” English Journal 84.1 (l995): 21-27.

Swales, John, and Hazem Najjar.  “The Writing of Research Article Introductions”  Writtten Communication 4.2 (April 1987): 175-91.

Tomlinson, T. M. “Class Size and Public Policy: Politics and Panaceas.” Educational Policy 3 (1989): 261-273.

Trail, George Y. Rhetorical Terms and Concepts: A Contemporary Glossary. New York: Harcourt, 2000.

Williams, David D., et al.  “University Class Size: Is Smaller Better?” Research in Higher Education 23.3: 307-318.

Williams, Joseph.  “The Phenomenology of Error.”  CCC 32 (May 1981): 152-68.

—. Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace. Chicago: U. Chicago P., 1997.

[1] Unhappily, in our experience, the expectation is that instructors should spend more than forty hour per week on their jobs, or cut corners in various ways. For instance, it is often assumed that office hours can be used for course preparation or grading, but that amounts to an official policy that office hours are not times when students can expect the full attention of the instructor. Hence, when upper administrators say that office hours should not be counted separately from course preparation, the correct answer is, “Put that in writing.”

If Dems are elected, they’ll do what we’ve been doing!

In the last few days, a common claim (what scholars of rhetoric would call a topos) has emerged among Trump and GOP loyalists, and it’s that, if Democrats gain the House and Senate, they will force their political agenda on the country, block Trump at every point, and be vindictive toward Republicans. And, because they will be so awful to us, we are justified in amping up the aggression of rhetoric and actions against them. In other words, Democrats will treat Republicans as Republicans have treated Democrats, and therefore you must act aggressively toward them as a kind of self-defense.

This argument will work. It generally does. It worked when Democrats used it (and Democrats have used it several times). It also worked when Athenians, proslavery rhetors, and Germans did it.

To people good at logic, it seems like an incoherent argument, but to people who think entirely in terms of in-group/out-group domination, it looks good. It’s also appealing to abusers, but that’s a different point. It’s a kind of pre-emptive self-defense.

And it works because it’s a way of resolving the cognitive dissonance created by the wobbling of a previous argument—that God wants us to triumph over our enemies, and anyone not fanatically committed to the political agenda currently determined to be the in-group desiderata is an enemy. Because we are engaged in God’s will, normal ethical conditions don’t apply—we can do to others things we would be outraged were they done to us.

An ethics of in-group domination is, so it is claimed, God’s will. And God will reward us for our destroying our enemies. Giorgio Agamben calls it a “state of exception” in which we are excepted from normal rules about behavior—we honor the law by not obeying the specifics of the law. We are open that the powers of government will be used to favor one political party, but, while doing that, we’ll claim that that party is really the only legitimate one—all real Athenians, Germans, Americans vote this one way.

Members of that party believes themselves entirely entitled to something (such as political domination of various other countries, enslaving other people, exterminating various groups, political domination within a state or country). So, while that party is in power, it is shameless in its harnessing as much of the governmental power as it can to further its interests and crush any other parties. And, this is the important part: it is a party that believes there are no restrictions on what it is entitled to do in order to get its way. That’s why it has no shame—because it thinks of the world in zero-sum terms (we either eliminate or are eliminated).

And, when its power begins to wobble, it begins to reckon with how the groups it has oppressed might feel about their oppression. And it projects onto other groups how it thinks of the world—you either eliminate or are eliminated. Because it can’t imagine a world in which disparate groups coexist, it assumes everyone else behaves the same way. Because it is a group with an inchoate reptilian brain way of responding to situations that makes everything zero-sum (if something benefits the other group it must hurt you), it assumes that the “other” group getting any power will mean that group will respond in just as eliminationist as they have.

If you have a propaganda machine that has been cranking up in-group fanaticism by reducing all issues to in-group/out-group, and presenting politics as a zero-sum (any gain on their part must be a loss for us)—in other words, Fox, Limbaugh, Savage, and all sorts of other media and pundits (Mother Jones, Keith Olbermann, Michael Moore)—and your claim of eschatological determinism means that you have been excepted from normal rules of ethics, then you are rhetorically boxed in. You can’t just say “We were wrong about this policy.”

You either have to say that you were wrong, not about your claims about policies, but your claims about how politics and thinking about politics works. If your audience thinks about how, you lose them, since how you’ve argued is obviously wrong.

So, what you do is persuade them that the Other is just as awful as you are, and will behave just as badly as you have. That’s the argument Cleon used to persuade people to endorse genocide (he lost on the second vote), it’s how proslavery rhetors argued for violating the property rights of slaveholders (by prohibiting the manumission of slave contracts), and it’s how Nazis argued for continuing the war when it had obviously been lost.

It should, therefore, be troubling that McConnell is now using this argument, and that it’s become a right-wing talking point.
One of the logical problems with it is that the only way that the audience can be fearful or outraged at the possibility of Democrats’ forcing their political agenda on the country, blocking the sitting President at every point, and being vindictive toward Republicans is if they don’t object to that kind of behavior in principle. They think it’s fine to do that to the other party, but they would never stand for being treated that way. They are thereby admitting it’s bad behavior.

But, they say, it isn’t bad because their group is good and the other is bad. Or, in other words, they think they should treat others as they would not want to be treated. They are, quite explicitly, rejecting any ethics (or anyone who would promote an ethics) that says you should do unto others as you would have done unto you.

The people who argue that democracy is based in Judeo-Christian ethics are, as any history of the Enlightenment makes clear, right in that the notion of universal human rights and fairness across groups was grounded in the notion (not particular to Christians or Jews, but supposedly a foundational value of both) that a deeply religious ethical system treats all groups the same, regardless of their religious (or political) affiliation.

They’re wrong about most other things, but they’re right about that. So, it’s interesting that that is the rule they’re so unwilling to follow.

The current GOP/support Trump talking point is that the Democrats will behave as badly as the GOP has. And that’s taken as a reason to vote GOP. Isn’t it actually a reason to condemn the current GOP? It’s actually an admission that the current GOP is shameless, unethical, and an open rejection of what Christ calls us to do. The GOP has officially rejected Christ. Since they claim the moral highground, that’s more than a little problematic.

The GOP moral panic about false accusations of rape is appalling

What we have is a GOP trying to engage in moral panic in favor of a SCOTUS candidate who is claiming that he is a victim of false sexual assault accusations, a candidate who needs to be put in place so that he can protect a President who bragged that he assaulted women while advocating murdering men who didn’t assault women.

This isn’t about false accusations of sexual assault. The GOP has no problem with false accusations of sexual assault. Trump made them. If you want to protest what’s happening, make the Central Park Five your profile. THAT is the example that proves this moral panic is sheer white privilege.

Until Trump apologizes, we know this isn’t about concerns about innocence. It’s about privilege.

Apologia as incompetent as Kavanaugh’s

I was trying to think of an apologia as bad as the case being presented for Kavanaugh, and this one came to mind. It’s kind of an unfair comparison, though, since they’re amateurs. It also ends up being hilarious, which is kind of redeeming.

Rod Blagojevich‘s is up there as far as completely incompetent–instead of one apologia, he went to a whole bunch of outlets, played the victim, kept promising he would answer the charges, but didn’t do it in any of the interviews during which he insisted on his innocence. It isn’t clear that there was a good strategy for him, though, as the damning tape was easily available, his argument that what he did wasn’t so bad would seem like splitting hairs to most people, and, most important, even before that tape was released and he was accused he had an unbelievably low approval rating.

A lot of people make fun of Jimmy Swaggart’s weepy apologia for having been caught with a prostitute after having driven a stake through Jim Bakker, but it was actually quite effective. At that point, he was trying to persuade a pentecostal audience for whom weeping is a sign of sincerity, and he cited David (a really problematic citation), and many people were willing to accept his repentance. The larger organization was willing to accept his repentance, and, in fact, the resolution faltered over issues of money and authority. He was able to hang on to much of his sources of wealth and power, however, because his apologia made all the right moves, especially the comparison to David (at least until the second incident with a prostitute.)

Richard Nixon, Dan Harmon, Tiger Woods, and Mark Sanford all managed effective apologia, through a one-time deflection, an authentic act of restoration, a persuasive claim of rebirth and redemption, or an insistence on repentance and refusal to talk about it more.

Of course, for me the most obvious would be the defense of slavery, which was surprisingly lame, but those rhetors didn’t have the expert advice available to Kavanaugh et al.

But, really, the obvious comparison is every apologia Trump has made. Kavanaugh’s defense is incompetent in exactly the way that the GOP apologia have been since 2016. It’s a doubling down.

Trump’s response (and the GOP response since they decided to submit to Trump) has been pretty straightforward demagoguery: we don’t need to argue about whether what [anyone who criticizes us–Dem, GOP, Martian] says is true because we can show [anyone who criticizes us–Dem, GOP, wimmins, actual Vietnam Vets] have bad motives for making that argument. And their argument can be dismissed because they can be identified as out-group. And they’re out-group because they aren’t rabidly and irrationally loyal to the in-group. Duh.

What we’re saying is that they’re bad for being loyal to their group, but we’re good for doing that. So, for these people, political action isn’t about policy argumentation; it’s about performing loyalty to the in-group.

Let’s be clear: for many defenders of Kavanaigh, this argument isn’t about what is “true” in the sense of a reality that exists outside of group factionalism. And that’s crucial.

Imagine that someone makes a claim: A is/leads to B.

Kavanaugh is a person with poor judgment.

How do you determine if that claim is true?

One way, the demagogic way, is to ask whether he and/or his defenders are in-group or out-group. If you identify Kavanaugh as in-group, then his critics are out-group, and you condemn them by saying they have bad motives. That’s actually kind of weird: you’re saying that what they’re saying is false because they’re out-group. But that has a wobbly major premise: people with bad motives might still be truthful.

For people who find this way of arguing (you are wrong, because you have bad motives, and I know that because you are out-group) they think they can reason from group identity because, for them in-group/out-group is all that matters. In-group members tell the truth, and out-group membrers don’t. People who reason that way are stupid.

When you’re more concerned about the truth, and you think truth and in-group beliefs aren’t necessarily the same thing, then the important question is whether a way of arguing is a way you would think good if you made it. If you’re willing to be a reasonable person, then the important question is whether you are holding the in-group to the same standards as you hold the out-group. Or, in other words, whether you are following Christ.

And, in my experience, no argument for Kavanaugh can meet that standard.

So, let’s just say, none of these people get to claim they’re following Christ unless they want cats to laugh.

Let’s set aside their rejection of what Christ said (while many of them claim to be Christian [not that I’m angry about that, not at all]), and, they never identify Trump as Christian on the basis of his doing unto others as they would want done unto them. They claim he’s Christian because he’s getting them the political agenda that conservative Christians believe to be Christian.

To be blunt, conservative Christians have never been able to make that argument, since American conservative (especially Baptist) Christianity has, thus far, supported slavery, lynching, segregation, anti-miscegenation laws, prohibiting gays from teaching or adopting, dumb claims about race and evolution, “gay” marriage, and, if my math is right, marital rape. [If people want, I can provide the links, but this isn’t really news to any reasonably informed person.]

But, here’s the important point: Kavanaugh’s defenders  can make all sorts of arguments. None of them are very good. But the one argument they cannot make is that they are doing unto others as they would have done unto them.

So, let’s just stop pretending that supporting Kavanaugh has anything to do with supporting Christ.

 

They do it too!

It’s really common in a comment thread for someone to respond to a criticism of one group with a comment along the lines of, “The other group does it too.” So, for instance, if someone says, “Trump supporters are motivated by tribalism,” I’ll count comments till I get to the, “Liberals are tribalists too” or “Both sides engage in tribalism.” The unintentional irony of that response brings me a wicked pleasure.

It’s entertaining because it’s a response that only makes sense if you think of all political discourse as being about which of the two possible groups is better. In other words, it’s a response that assumes rabid factionalism.

Here’s what I mean: why is the person making that comment?

Imagine this exchange:

C: I’m going to vote for Clinton because Trump supporters are motivated only by rabid factionalism.

H: Clinton supporters are tribalist too.

That’s a discussion in which the “just as bad” response is relevant, because it’s showing that the major premise of C’s argument is inconsistent with his own actions—he’s claiming that his vote is motivated by a rejection of factionalism, so that he’s thinking of voting for someone who promotes factionalism is relevant. (I’m not saying the response is true, but it’s relevant to argue about whether they are just as bad.)

Imagine this one:

C: To win over Trump supporters, we need to show them how harmful his policies are to them.

E: That won’t work because Trump supporters are motivated only by rabid factionalism.

H: Clinton supporters are tribalist too.

H’s comment is completely irrelevant to the question of how to persuade Trump supporters. And it’s irrelevant twice over: 1) Clinton supporters could be carry pitchforks and torches and the most rabid factional supporters the world has ever known and it has no relevance for whether Trump supporters are too factional to be persuaded by argument, and 2) the world isn’t divided into Clinton supporters and Trump supporters.

For that comment to make sense, every single issue would be reducible to the relative goodness of the only two groups that constitute the American political realm. That’s how H sees it. H thinks he’s being “fair” and “objective” because he thinks he’s condemning both groups equally. He isn’t. He’s stuck within a limited and politically damaging ideology about purity and motives.

That is the attitude about politics–that all political disagreements can and should be about which of the two possible groups is better (and it’s a zero-sum relationship)—that fuels rabid factionalism.

Political discourse should be policy discourse. Displacing policy discourse with arguments about relative goodness doesn’t help.