Class size and college writing (another version of the same argument)

[Also co-authored by Reinhold Hill, and also from the early 2000s]

Introduction

Any Writing Program Administrator occasionally has the frustrating experience of failing to get administrators, colleagues, parents, and even students to understand the bases of our decisions–why classes must remain small, why instructors need training in rhetoric and composition, and so on. This kind of experience is frustrating because we often find ourselves talking to someone with different assumptions about teaching, writing, and research. For such an audience, position statements are often not helpful, as our interlocutors do not even know the organizations whose position statements we’re likely to cite.

This is not to say that such discussions are necessarily an impasse, nor that the different assumptions interlocutors have are incommensurable. It is simply that, often being from different disciplines, we all bring different assumptions that seem transparently obvious to each of us. We may know from experience that one gets better writing from students if they are required to revise, but an administrator with a different disciplinary background may be sincerely concerned that we are not assessing our classes and students on the extent to which students have retained the information we have given them in lectures and readings. For many people, that is learning. As far as they are concerned, if we are not lecturing and assigning reading, then we are not teaching; if we are not testing our students, then we are not assessing students objectively.

In addition, the articles and books that we are likely to cite to explain our practices look very strange to some people–it’s just argument, a colleague once complained. We can rely on argument because we teach argument, and we are comfortable assessing arguments. We can rely on anecdote and personal experience more than people in many fields because we share an experience–the teaching of writing. Thus, if an author narrates a specific incident, we are likely to find it a reasonable form of proof, if the incident is typical of our own experience. In some other fields, however, quantified, empirical evidence is the only credible sort of proof, or an assertion must be supported by a large number of studies (regardless of how problematic any individual study might be). This is particularly an issue with class size, as minor change in enrollment (from an administrator’s perspective) are strongly resisted by Writing Program Administrators. Our intention in this article is to try to help Writing Program Administrators argue for responsible and ethical class sizes in writing courses.

There are few topics about which Writing Program Administrators and upper administrators are likely to disagree quite so unproductively as class size. While Writing Program Administrators typically argue for keeping first year writing courses as small as possible, upper administrators are often focussed on the considerable savings that could be effected by even a small change in enrollment. WPAs can cite position statements and recommendations from NCTE and ADE, but upper administrators cite such passages as the following from Pascarella and Terenzini who summarize the “substantial amount of research over the last sixty years” on class size in college teaching:

The consensus of these reviews–and of our own synthesis of the existing evidence–is that class size is not a particularly important factor when the goal of instruction is the acquisition of of subject matter knowledge and academic skills. (87).

With the backing of such an authority, upper administrators are likely to be mystified at WPA’s resistance to first year writing classes of twenty-five to thirty.

This is not to say that WPAs have no research on the side of smaller classes. Despite what Pascarella and Terenzini say, there is considerable research which identifies benefits in smaller classes. The meta-analysis of Glass and Smith (not mentioned by Pascarella and Terenzini) concludes that reduced class size is beneficial at all grade levels; Slavin found small positive short-term benefit; and several studies found benefit if (and only if) teachers engaged in teaching strategies that took advantage of the smaller size (Chatman, Tomlinson). On the other hand, there is at least one study too recent to be cited by Pascarella and Terenzini that concludes no demonstrable benefit to reducing class size (e.g., David Williams). Thus, it may seem to be a case of warring research.

On the contrary,  we will argue that the apparently disparate results of research can be explained, in a comment made by Pascarella and Terenzini. After the passage quoted above, they say “It is probably the case, however, that smaller classes are somewhat more effective than larger ones when the goals of instruction are motivational, attitudinal, or higher-level cognitive processes” (87).

There are two points which we wish to make about Pascarella and Terenzini’s negative conclusion regarding class size. First, it is striking how dated the research is–although Pascarella and Terenzini’s book came out in 1991, the most recent study they cite is 1985. Of the eighteen studies they mention, three are from the twenties, one from 1945, two from the fifties, two from the sixties, seven from the seventies, and three from the eighties. This is particularly important for the teaching of writing, as there was a major reversal in the sixties in pedagogy, returning from the lecture-based presentation of models which students were expected to imitate to the classical method which put greater emphasis on the process of inventing and arranging an effective argument.

This issue of teaching model is crucial. The impact that varying class size has on the outcome in terms of student writing depends heavily on the goal and method of the writing courses in question. If the courses are lecture courses, in which only the teacher is expected to read the students’ writing, then the only limit on class size comes from the amount of time one expects the teacher to spend grading. While that is not a model we endorse (and we will discuss the reasons below), it can still be the basis of a useful discussion.

At a “Research I” institution, faculty members are usually assessed on the assumption that they spend forty per cent of their time teaching two courses, or, one day out of a five day work week (eight hours). At schools with more teaching responsibilities, the math works out in similar ways (with a fairly ugly exception for universities with Research I publishing expectations and a three or four course teaching load). Graduate students are usually assumed to have teaching responsibilities that account for half of their half-time appointment, or ten hours per course. With three hours per week in the classroom, and three hours of office hours, graduate students instructors are left with four hours per week of grading and course preparation.

One reason that administrators and WPAs often disagree about the amount of work involved in teaching writing courses is that administrators’ experience is with what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode of teaching. The first year is hellish, but then the instructor has prepared the presentations, and future years involve tinkering with prepared lectures. Hence, course preparation is presumed to be minimal. But, of course, most WPAs are not imagining instructors’ spending class time lecturing because the presentational mode has been demonstrated, conclusively, to be the least effective method of teaching writing.

Still and all, if one assumes that a course is supposed to take 150 hours of an instructor’s time over the course of a semester (not including pre-semester course preparation), and 45 hours of that time is spend in class, and another 45 hours is spent in office hours, there are 60 hours left for individual conferences, grading, and course preparation. If there are twenty students per class, then meeting twice with each student for a half hour conference uses up 20 hours. Even assuming an efficient teacher who is dusting off lecture notes for course preparation, one should expect an hour per week of course preparation (15), leaving 25 hours for grading. Advocates of minimal marking (a problematic issue to be discussed below) describe a process that takes only twenty minutes per paper. Obviously, then, the amount of time an instructor spends on grading depends upon the number of papers, but a course with only three papers would use up almost all of the time left. Since most programs require more than three papers (and most instructors spend more than twenty minutes per paper), more than twenty students per course puts instructors into unethical working conditions.[1]

But, as we said, the deeper issue concerns just what happens in a writing class. The issue is whether one sees writing instruction as the inculcation of subject matter knowledge or as the development of higher-level cognitive processes. To the extent that it is the latter, classes should be small; to the extent that it is the former, class size is limited only by instructor workload Or, in other words, what do we teach when we teach college writing?

Interestingly enough, this is one of those questions that is not a question for people outside of the field. It seems obvious enough to people unfamiliar with research in Linguistics, Rhetoric, and English Education who tend to give what appears a straightforward answer: we teach the rules of good writing. Behind that apparent consensus is an interesting disagreement. For some people, the “rules of good writing” describe formal characteristics in writing that all educated readers acknowledge is high quality (e.g., the thesis in the first paragraph, an interest-catching first sentence). For others, those rules describe procedures that all good writers follow when writing (e.g., keep notes on three by five cards, write a formal outline with at least two sub-points). As qualitative and quantitative research has shown, however, both of those perceptions regarding the rules of good writing–regardless of how widespread they are–are false.

In the first place, there is less consensus about what constitutes “good” writing than many people think. Writers have fallen in and out of fashion, so that there is not any author who has not had his or her detractors–critical reception of Henry David Thoreau’s Walden was so hostile that it was nearly turned into pulp; Addison and Steele, always included in composition textbooks until the 1960s, are now considered nearly unreadable; even Shakespeare has been severely criticized for his mixed metaphors, complicated language, and drops into purple prose. As research in reader response criticism demonstrated as long ago as the early part of this century (see I.A. Richards), students (and readers) do not immediately recognize the merits of canonical literature; there is considerable disagreement as to just what the best writing is, so that the “canon” of accepted great writing has constantly been in flux (see Ohmann, Fish, Graff).

To a large degree, this disagreement is disciplinary; that is, different disciplines have different requirements for writing. This divergence is most obvious in regard to format–such as citation methods and order of elements. It is equally present and more important in regard to style: in the experimental and social sciences, for instance, “good” writing uses passive voice, nominalization, long clusters of noun phrases, and various other qualities which are considered “bad” writing in journalism, literature, and various humanistic disciplines. Even the notion of what constitutes error varies–social science writing is rife with what most usage handbooks identify as mixed metaphors, predication errors, reference errors, non parallel structure, split infinitives, dangling modifiers, and agreement errors. Lab reports, resumes, and much business writing permit, if not require, fragment sentences. Meanwhile, people from some disciplines recoil at the use of first person in ethnographic writing, literary criticism, some journalism, and other humanistic courses.

Disciplines also disagree as to what constitutes good evidence (for more on this issue, see Miller, Bazerman). Some disciplines accept personal observation (e.g., cultural anthropology), while some do not (e.g., economics). There are similarly profound disagreements regarding the validity of textual analysis, quantitative experimentation, qualitative research, interviews, argument from authority, and so on. There is a tendency for people to be so convinced of the epistemological superiority of their form of research that, when confronted with the fact of differing opinions on what constitutes good writing, they dismiss the standards of some other discipline (thus, for instance, Richard Lanham’s popular textbook Revising Prose condemns all use of the passive voice, and Joseph Williams’ even more popular Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace prohibits clusters of nouns). Our goal is not to take a side in the issue of which discipline promotes the best writing, but to insist upon the important point out that there is disagreement. Thus, a writing course cannot teach “the” rules of good writing that will be accepted in all disciplines because no such rules exist (unless the rules are extremely abstract, as discussed below).

In the second place, as several studies have shown, the ‘”rules” of good writing which we give students for student writing do not describe published writing.  For instance, students are generally told to end their introductions with their ‘thesis statements,” to begin each paragraph with their topic sentences (which is assumed to be the main claim of the paragraph), and to focus on the use of correct grammar. Published writing, however, does not have those qualities. Thesis statements are usually in conclusions (Trail), and introductions most often end with a clear statement of the problem (Swale), or what classical rhetoricians called the “hypothesis” (meaning a statement that points toward the thesis). Textbook advice regarding topic sentences is simply false (Braddock), and, readers are much more oblivious about errors in published writing than much writing instruction would suggest (Williams). In fact, error may not have quite the role that many teachers think–while college instructors say that correctness is an important quality of good writing (Hairston), studies in which they rank actual papers shows a privileging of what compositionists call “higher order concerns”–appropriateness to assignment, quality of reasoning, and organization over format and correctness (see Huot’s review of research on this issue).

Finally, several meta-analyses of research conclude that teaching writing as rules has a harmful effect on student writing (see especially Knoblauch and Brannon, Hillocks, Rose). The common sense assumption is that students prone to writing blocks lack the knowledge of rules for writing that effective writers have; on the contrary, students prone to writing block may know too many rules. In contrast to more fluid writers, who tend to focus on what is called “the rhetorical situation” (explained below), student writers prone to writing blocks focus on rules they have been told (Flower and Hayes, Rose).  Students taught these rules of writing try to produce an error-free first draft  which they minimally revise (Emig, Sommers). Effective and accomplished writers, in contrast, have rich and recursive writing processes that depends heavily upon revision (Emig, Flower and Hayes, Berkenkotter, Faigley and Witte).

For many people unaware of research in linguistics and English education, the assumption is that the “rules” of good writing are the rules regarding usage (usually described as “grammar rules,” which is itself an instance of an error in usage). It is assumed that there is agreement regarding these rules, and they are to be found in any usage handbook. Further, it is assumed that one can improve students’ “grammar” (another interesting usage error–what people mean is “reduce usage error” or “improve correctness”) by getting them to memorize those universally agreed-upon usage rules.  These assumptions are wrong in almost every way.

Research in linguistics demonstrates that language has considerable variation over time and region. To put it simply, at any given moment, there are numerous dialects within a language which are each “correct” within their community of discourse (e.g., “impact” for “influence,” “thinking outside the box”). Some dialects are more privileged than others, and the uninformed often assume that facility with the more privileged dialect signifies greater intelligence; this is patently false (Chomsky, Labov and Smitherman, Baron). All dialects have a grammar, so students (and colleagues) who use a different dialect are not ignorant of “grammar;” they know the grammar of a dialect not considered appropriate in academic discourse, the dialect which linguists sometimes call “standard edited English.” It is easy to overstate agreement regarding “standard edited English,” as that dialect has varied substantially over time; the “shall” versus “will” distinction used to be considered extraordinarily important, “correct” comma usage differs in British and American English and even more from the nineteenth century to now, and usage handbooks disagree on numerous issues (such as agreement). The notion of a correct dialect upon which there is universal agreement is simply a fantasy.

In our experience, people respond to this research by objecting to the pedagogy they assume it necessarily implies. People assume that to note the reality–considerable regional and historical disagreement regarding linguistic correctness–necessarily implies a complete abandonment of attention to error. That is not the necessary conclusion, nor is it our point. Our point here is simply that one central assumption in this view of writing instruction is wrong–there is not universal agreement as to rules regarding “correct” language use.

In addition, this research does not necessarily imply a “whatever goes” pedagogy. While some have drawn that conclusion, others have used this research to argue for teaching grammar and usage as a community of discourse issue (e.g., Labov and Smitherman); that is, rather than denigrate some dialects, teachers should present “standard edited English” as a useful dialect which students should use under some circumstances and with some audiences (see, for instance, “Students’ Right to Their Own Language”). Others have argued that grammar and usage should be taught as a rhetorical issue, as a question of clarity and rhetorical effect (Williams, Kolln, Dawkins).

And this leads us to the second point–the assumption that one can reduce errors in student writing through making students learn the rules of standard edited English. On the contrary, in the nearly one hundred years that this issue has been studied, there has not been a single study which showed improvement in student writing resulting from formal instruction in the rules of grammar, while there are several studies which showed a mark deterioration (see Knoblauch and Brannon, Hartwell, Hillocks for more on the history of this research). That deterioration may be the consequence of increased anxiety leading to students’ mistrusting their implicit knowledge (Hartwell), or that the time taken for grammar instruction was time away from more productive forms of writing instruction (Knoblauch and Brannnon).

In our experience, this point too is misunderstood. We are not saying that instruction in grammar and usage is pointless, but that certain approaches to it demonstrably are. And those are precisely the pedagogies into which one is forced in large classes–lecturing, drilling, assigning worksheets, and testing students on usage rules.

Indeed, research suggests that there is probably not a pedagogy which can be applied to all students in the same way. Issues of linguistic correctness result from different causes, depending upon the students. Hence, the solution varies. For students whose native dialect is fairly close to standard edited English, for instance, errors in usage sometimes result from lack of clarity about their own argument; students make more usage errors, for instance, when they are writing about something they do not fully understand. For such students, clarifying the concepts will enable the students to correct the errors.

For other students, usage errors are a time management issue–they did not leave themselves time to proofread. What Haswell has somewhat misleadingly called “minimal marking” is generally the best strategy under those circumstances (it is misleading in that it depends upon students’ resubmitting their corrected papers, so it can be fairly time-consuming for the instructor, albeit far less time-consuming and more effective than copy-editing). What he advocates, however, is not a kind of marking that takes minimal time on the part of the instructor.

For students whose dialect is markedly different from standard edited English, there is the possibility of what linguists call “dialect interference”–instances of using their (academically inappropriate) dialect, engaging in hypercorrectness (“between you and I”), or  simply being unsure how to apply the rules. There are also students whose experience with written English is minimal, and who may have a tendency toward what are called “errors of transciption” (e.g., errors regarding the placement of commas and periods).  For these students, “minimal marking” is ineffective, but neither do they benefit from lectures and quizzes on grammar rules. Instead, they seem to benefit most from individual instruction. Several studies show strong short-term improvement from sentence embedding (Hillocks), but  many instructors moved away from it due to its inherently time-consuming nature.

In short, as Mina Shaughnessy pointed out long ago, improving students’ usage is not something one can do in the same way with all students. One must know exactly what specific problems exist with each student, why that student is having that problem, and what method will best work with that problem and that student.  In other words, effective instruction in grammar and usage necessitates classes small enough that the teacher can know students well enough to know the cause of the problem. If the students have major problems, as from dialect interference, then the classes have to be small enough for the teacher to be able to engage in the extremely time-consuming methods necessary for such students.

One might wonder, if writing teachers are not teaching rules of writing, what are we teaching?  And the answer seems to be that we are teaching rhetoric. That is, while one cannot present students with rules that apply to all circumstances–never use I, always begin with a personal anecdote, your thesis should have three reasons–there are principles which do seem effective in most circumstances. Those principles are encapsulated in the concept of the “rhetorical situation”–that the quality of a piece of discourse is determined by the extent to which its strategies are appropriate for effecting the author(s) particular intention on the specific audience. Thus, were one to examine prize-winning articles in philosophy, economics, literary criticism, engineering, behavioral psychology, and theoretical physics, one would see wide variation in terms of  format, style, organization, and nature of evidence, one would see that each piece was appropriate for its audience.

One advantage of this approach to the teaching of writing is that it is more effective. Lecturing and drilling are, as several studies have shown, ineffective methods of writing instruction (Hillocks). This method remains tremendously popular, however, especially among teachers whose own instruction followed that method, who are cynical regarding student achievement, and who are generally convinced that the teaching of writing is the transmission of information (Hillocks).  This point is important, as it showed up in our own experiment with reducing class size–students in classes with teachers who relied heavily on lecture did not show any benefit from a smaller class. The fact is that lectures are ineffective in writing classes; reducing the class size does not suddenly make lecturing an effective teaching strategy.

When we had the opportunity to look closely at class size at our previous institution, we made some surprising discoveries.  One of the major motivations for undertaking the experiment was a sense of frustration, among faculty and graduate students, with graduate student instructors’ progress toward their degrees. Prior to the change in program emphasis, a large number of our instructors used class time to present advice on writing papers as well as to present writing products which students used as models (what Hillocks calls the “presentational” mode, and which he identifies as the least effective method of writing instruction). Perhaps because this method of instruction did not work particularly well for so many students, instructors also relied heavily on individual conferences with students–conferences which took so much time that they necessitated long blocks of time outside normal office hours. The dominance of this mixing of presentational and individualized modes of instruction had fairly predictable consequences.

The accretion of assignments and expectations for the course meant that it was actually impossible to teach the course in the ten hours per week a graduate student was supposed to spend on it. While such a situation is far from uncommon–many programs pay writing teachers a salary that presumes that the course takes much less time than it actually does–it is unethical. It also means that instructors, especially ones with multiple commitments (e.g., graduate students who are also taking courses, part-time instructors with obligations at several campuses, tenure-track teachers facing publication pressures), are encouraged to adopt pedagogies which feel more efficient but which research strongly indicates are less effective (i.e., the presentational mode of teaching, discussed previously).

Graduate student instructors responded to this situation in various ways. According to a survey, as well as faculty observation, many let their own coursework suffer in favor of their teaching. Others simplified assignments, so that the papers were short and simple enough that they could be graded in ten to fifteen minutes a piece. Several instructors essentially abandoned assessing student work, and graded students purely on attendance. Many instructors reported spending long hours on teaching, something that, not surprisingly, resulted in frustration–the first year composition course was openly discussed as the least desirable teaching assignment. In this context, it should be clear why we were looking for a method that would reduce the amount of time that instructors spent on their first year composition courses, without simply shifting them to quick, but ineffective, methods such as lecturing, drilling, and superficial grading.

When we reduced class size to fifteen for many of the instructors, we found that those instructors generally spent less time on the course (instructors in control groups reported spending an average of ten to fourteen hours per week on their courses, instructors in the sections with reduced class size reported averages of between twelve and fifteen). We also found that many instructors took advantage of the reduced class size to create new assignments, to take more time to comment on papers, to meet more often with students, or to add another project. Such a consequence–instructors taking the opportunity to increase the amount of work in the course–is echoed in at least one other study on class size.  The San Juan Unified School District report on the results of the Morgan-Hart Class Size Reduction Act of 1989 concludes that

As a result of smaller classes, students were more actively involved in the instructional process.  This was demonstrated by an increase in the number of student reading and writing assignments, more oral presentations and frequent classroom discussions.  Students also received increased feedback on their English assignments and teachers had time to work with students individually.

One benefit of reducing class size, then, is that instructors appear more willing to experiment with and examine their teaching styles. Whether this is a bug or feature would depend on the program goals. Certainly, although they may not have spent less time on the courses, they reported much higher satisfaction. Teachers like smaller classes.

But, they did not always use the time well. We found that instructors heavily committed to the presentational mode did not effect much change in their students’ writing processes. Similarly, class size did not increase overall student satisfaction if the instructor engaged in the presentational mode.

In conclusion, our experience fits with Sheree Goettler-Sopko’s summary of research on class-size and reading achievement. She concludes that “The central theme which runs through the current research literature is that academic achievement does not necessarily improve with the reduction of student/teacher ratio unless appropriate learning styles and effective teaching styles are utilized” (5).

Class Size and Minimal Teaching

George Hillocks long ago showed the importance and superiority of constructivist approaches to the teaching of writing (Research in Written Composition, Teaching Writing as Reflective Practice, and more recently Ways of Thinking, Ways of Teaching).  This means that effective teaching requires an approach which does not set the task of teaching writing as getting students to memorize and understand certain objects of knowledge (the objectivist approach), but as setting students tasks during which they will learn and giving them appropriate feedback along the way.  The more that one engages in constructivist teaching, the more important is class size; the more that the goals and practices of a program are objectivist, the less class size matters. While reducing class size does not guarantee constructivist teaching, increasing class size does prevent it.

One can see this effect simply by thinking about the amount of time for which writing instructors are paid. The assumption at many universities is that each class is supposed to take 8-10 hours per week of instructor time. Instructors spend three hours each week in class, and it is optimistic, but not necessarily irrationally so, to assume that an efficient and highly experienced teacher can prepare for class on a one-to-one basis (that is, that it takes approximately one hour to prepare for one hour of class). A teacher therefore has two to four hours a week (almost precisely what is required by most universities for office hours). If an instructor has twenty students per class, s/he has, over the course of the semester 30-60 hours, which comes, at best, to three hours per student for conferences and grading. This situation necessitates cutting the students short on something–short papers which can be graded quickly, cursory grading of student work generally, discouraging students from using office hours. All in all, it means that one cannot do what Pascarelli and Terenzini say “effective teachers do” when “They signal their accessibility in and out of the classroom” (652).  Simply put, if instructors have to use office hours to grade student work, they cannot signal accessibility. Pascarelli and Terenzini say, “They give students formal and informal feedback on their performance” (652), but, if instructors are restricted to three hours of grading per semester per student, they have to minimize the amount of feedback given. In other words, large classes force instructors away from what “we know” to be good practice.

The larger the class, the more the teacher is forced into lecturing. Yet, according to Pascarelli and Terenzini,

            Our review indicates that individualized instructional approaches that accommodate variations in students’ learning styles and rates consistently appear to produce greater subject matter learning than do more conventional approaches, such as lecturing. These advantages are especially apparent with instructional approaches that rely on small, modularized content units, require a student to master one instructional unit before proceeding to the next, and elicit active student involvement in the learning process. Perhaps even more promising is the evidence suggesting that these learning advantages are the same for students of different aptitudes and different levels of subject area competence. Probably in no other realm is the evidence so clear and consistent. (646, emphasis added)

If we want instructors to be effective writing instructors, then we have to ensure that they are in a situation which will permit good practice. Reducing class size will not necessarily cause such practice, but it is a necessary condition thereof.

Works Cited

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—. Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace. Chicago: U. Chicago P., 1997.

[1] Unhappily, in our experience, the expectation is that instructors should spend more than forty hour per week on their jobs, or cut corners in various ways. For instance, it is often assumed that office hours can be used for course preparation or grading, but that amounts to an official policy that office hours are not times when students can expect the full attention of the instructor. Hence, when upper administrators say that office hours should not be counted separately from course preparation, the correct answer is, “Put that in writing.”

If Dems are elected, they’ll do what we’ve been doing!

In the last few days, a common claim (what scholars of rhetoric would call a topos) has emerged among Trump and GOP loyalists, and it’s that, if Democrats gain the House and Senate, they will force their political agenda on the country, block Trump at every point, and be vindictive toward Republicans. And, because they will be so awful to us, we are justified in amping up the aggression of rhetoric and actions against them. In other words, Democrats will treat Republicans as Republicans have treated Democrats, and therefore you must act aggressively toward them as a kind of self-defense.

This argument will work. It generally does. It worked when Democrats used it (and Democrats have used it several times). It also worked when Athenians, proslavery rhetors, and Germans did it.

To people good at logic, it seems like an incoherent argument, but to people who think entirely in terms of in-group/out-group domination, it looks good. It’s also appealing to abusers, but that’s a different point. It’s a kind of pre-emptive self-defense.

And it works because it’s a way of resolving the cognitive dissonance created by the wobbling of a previous argument—that God wants us to triumph over our enemies, and anyone not fanatically committed to the political agenda currently determined to be the in-group desiderata is an enemy. Because we are engaged in God’s will, normal ethical conditions don’t apply—we can do to others things we would be outraged were they done to us.

An ethics of in-group domination is, so it is claimed, God’s will. And God will reward us for our destroying our enemies. Giorgio Agamben calls it a “state of exception” in which we are excepted from normal rules about behavior—we honor the law by not obeying the specifics of the law. We are open that the powers of government will be used to favor one political party, but, while doing that, we’ll claim that that party is really the only legitimate one—all real Athenians, Germans, Americans vote this one way.

Members of that party believes themselves entirely entitled to something (such as political domination of various other countries, enslaving other people, exterminating various groups, political domination within a state or country). So, while that party is in power, it is shameless in its harnessing as much of the governmental power as it can to further its interests and crush any other parties. And, this is the important part: it is a party that believes there are no restrictions on what it is entitled to do in order to get its way. That’s why it has no shame—because it thinks of the world in zero-sum terms (we either eliminate or are eliminated).

And, when its power begins to wobble, it begins to reckon with how the groups it has oppressed might feel about their oppression. And it projects onto other groups how it thinks of the world—you either eliminate or are eliminated. Because it can’t imagine a world in which disparate groups coexist, it assumes everyone else behaves the same way. Because it is a group with an inchoate reptilian brain way of responding to situations that makes everything zero-sum (if something benefits the other group it must hurt you), it assumes that the “other” group getting any power will mean that group will respond in just as eliminationist as they have.

If you have a propaganda machine that has been cranking up in-group fanaticism by reducing all issues to in-group/out-group, and presenting politics as a zero-sum (any gain on their part must be a loss for us)—in other words, Fox, Limbaugh, Savage, and all sorts of other media and pundits (Mother Jones, Keith Olbermann, Michael Moore)—and your claim of eschatological determinism means that you have been excepted from normal rules of ethics, then you are rhetorically boxed in. You can’t just say “We were wrong about this policy.”

You either have to say that you were wrong, not about your claims about policies, but your claims about how politics and thinking about politics works. If your audience thinks about how, you lose them, since how you’ve argued is obviously wrong.

So, what you do is persuade them that the Other is just as awful as you are, and will behave just as badly as you have. That’s the argument Cleon used to persuade people to endorse genocide (he lost on the second vote), it’s how proslavery rhetors argued for violating the property rights of slaveholders (by prohibiting the manumission of slave contracts), and it’s how Nazis argued for continuing the war when it had obviously been lost.

It should, therefore, be troubling that McConnell is now using this argument, and that it’s become a right-wing talking point.
One of the logical problems with it is that the only way that the audience can be fearful or outraged at the possibility of Democrats’ forcing their political agenda on the country, blocking the sitting President at every point, and being vindictive toward Republicans is if they don’t object to that kind of behavior in principle. They think it’s fine to do that to the other party, but they would never stand for being treated that way. They are thereby admitting it’s bad behavior.

But, they say, it isn’t bad because their group is good and the other is bad. Or, in other words, they think they should treat others as they would not want to be treated. They are, quite explicitly, rejecting any ethics (or anyone who would promote an ethics) that says you should do unto others as you would have done unto you.

The people who argue that democracy is based in Judeo-Christian ethics are, as any history of the Enlightenment makes clear, right in that the notion of universal human rights and fairness across groups was grounded in the notion (not particular to Christians or Jews, but supposedly a foundational value of both) that a deeply religious ethical system treats all groups the same, regardless of their religious (or political) affiliation.

They’re wrong about most other things, but they’re right about that. So, it’s interesting that that is the rule they’re so unwilling to follow.

The current GOP/support Trump talking point is that the Democrats will behave as badly as the GOP has. And that’s taken as a reason to vote GOP. Isn’t it actually a reason to condemn the current GOP? It’s actually an admission that the current GOP is shameless, unethical, and an open rejection of what Christ calls us to do. The GOP has officially rejected Christ. Since they claim the moral highground, that’s more than a little problematic.

The GOP moral panic about false accusations of rape is appalling

What we have is a GOP trying to engage in moral panic in favor of a SCOTUS candidate who is claiming that he is a victim of false sexual assault accusations, a candidate who needs to be put in place so that he can protect a President who bragged that he assaulted women while advocating murdering men who didn’t assault women.

This isn’t about false accusations of sexual assault. The GOP has no problem with false accusations of sexual assault. Trump made them. If you want to protest what’s happening, make the Central Park Five your profile. THAT is the example that proves this moral panic is sheer white privilege.

Until Trump apologizes, we know this isn’t about concerns about innocence. It’s about privilege.

Apologia as incompetent as Kavanaugh’s

I was trying to think of an apologia as bad as the case being presented for Kavanaugh, and this one came to mind. It’s kind of an unfair comparison, though, since they’re amateurs. It also ends up being hilarious, which is kind of redeeming.

Rod Blagojevich‘s is up there as far as completely incompetent–instead of one apologia, he went to a whole bunch of outlets, played the victim, kept promising he would answer the charges, but didn’t do it in any of the interviews during which he insisted on his innocence. It isn’t clear that there was a good strategy for him, though, as the damning tape was easily available, his argument that what he did wasn’t so bad would seem like splitting hairs to most people, and, most important, even before that tape was released and he was accused he had an unbelievably low approval rating.

A lot of people make fun of Jimmy Swaggart’s weepy apologia for having been caught with a prostitute after having driven a stake through Jim Bakker, but it was actually quite effective. At that point, he was trying to persuade a pentecostal audience for whom weeping is a sign of sincerity, and he cited David (a really problematic citation), and many people were willing to accept his repentance. The larger organization was willing to accept his repentance, and, in fact, the resolution faltered over issues of money and authority. He was able to hang on to much of his sources of wealth and power, however, because his apologia made all the right moves, especially the comparison to David (at least until the second incident with a prostitute.)

Richard Nixon, Dan Harmon, Tiger Woods, and Mark Sanford all managed effective apologia, through a one-time deflection, an authentic act of restoration, a persuasive claim of rebirth and redemption, or an insistence on repentance and refusal to talk about it more.

Of course, for me the most obvious would be the defense of slavery, which was surprisingly lame, but those rhetors didn’t have the expert advice available to Kavanaugh et al.

But, really, the obvious comparison is every apologia Trump has made. Kavanaugh’s defense is incompetent in exactly the way that the GOP apologia have been since 2016. It’s a doubling down.

Trump’s response (and the GOP response since they decided to submit to Trump) has been pretty straightforward demagoguery: we don’t need to argue about whether what [anyone who criticizes us–Dem, GOP, Martian] says is true because we can show [anyone who criticizes us–Dem, GOP, wimmins, actual Vietnam Vets] have bad motives for making that argument. And their argument can be dismissed because they can be identified as out-group. And they’re out-group because they aren’t rabidly and irrationally loyal to the in-group. Duh.

What we’re saying is that they’re bad for being loyal to their group, but we’re good for doing that. So, for these people, political action isn’t about policy argumentation; it’s about performing loyalty to the in-group.

Let’s be clear: for many defenders of Kavanaigh, this argument isn’t about what is “true” in the sense of a reality that exists outside of group factionalism. And that’s crucial.

Imagine that someone makes a claim: A is/leads to B.

Kavanaugh is a person with poor judgment.

How do you determine if that claim is true?

One way, the demagogic way, is to ask whether he and/or his defenders are in-group or out-group. If you identify Kavanaugh as in-group, then his critics are out-group, and you condemn them by saying they have bad motives. That’s actually kind of weird: you’re saying that what they’re saying is false because they’re out-group. But that has a wobbly major premise: people with bad motives might still be truthful.

For people who find this way of arguing (you are wrong, because you have bad motives, and I know that because you are out-group) they think they can reason from group identity because, for them in-group/out-group is all that matters. In-group members tell the truth, and out-group membrers don’t. People who reason that way are stupid.

When you’re more concerned about the truth, and you think truth and in-group beliefs aren’t necessarily the same thing, then the important question is whether a way of arguing is a way you would think good if you made it. If you’re willing to be a reasonable person, then the important question is whether you are holding the in-group to the same standards as you hold the out-group. Or, in other words, whether you are following Christ.

And, in my experience, no argument for Kavanaugh can meet that standard.

So, let’s just say, none of these people get to claim they’re following Christ unless they want cats to laugh.

Let’s set aside their rejection of what Christ said (while many of them claim to be Christian [not that I’m angry about that, not at all]), and, they never identify Trump as Christian on the basis of his doing unto others as they would want done unto them. They claim he’s Christian because he’s getting them the political agenda that conservative Christians believe to be Christian.

To be blunt, conservative Christians have never been able to make that argument, since American conservative (especially Baptist) Christianity has, thus far, supported slavery, lynching, segregation, anti-miscegenation laws, prohibiting gays from teaching or adopting, dumb claims about race and evolution, “gay” marriage, and, if my math is right, marital rape. [If people want, I can provide the links, but this isn’t really news to any reasonably informed person.]

But, here’s the important point: Kavanaugh’s defenders  can make all sorts of arguments. None of them are very good. But the one argument they cannot make is that they are doing unto others as they would have done unto them.

So, let’s just stop pretending that supporting Kavanaugh has anything to do with supporting Christ.

 

They do it too!

It’s really common in a comment thread for someone to respond to a criticism of one group with a comment along the lines of, “The other group does it too.” So, for instance, if someone says, “Trump supporters are motivated by tribalism,” I’ll count comments till I get to the, “Liberals are tribalists too” or “Both sides engage in tribalism.” The unintentional irony of that response brings me a wicked pleasure.

It’s entertaining because it’s a response that only makes sense if you think of all political discourse as being about which of the two possible groups is better. In other words, it’s a response that assumes rabid factionalism.

Here’s what I mean: why is the person making that comment?

Imagine this exchange:

C: I’m going to vote for Clinton because Trump supporters are motivated only by rabid factionalism.

H: Clinton supporters are tribalist too.

That’s a discussion in which the “just as bad” response is relevant, because it’s showing that the major premise of C’s argument is inconsistent with his own actions—he’s claiming that his vote is motivated by a rejection of factionalism, so that he’s thinking of voting for someone who promotes factionalism is relevant. (I’m not saying the response is true, but it’s relevant to argue about whether they are just as bad.)

Imagine this one:

C: To win over Trump supporters, we need to show them how harmful his policies are to them.

E: That won’t work because Trump supporters are motivated only by rabid factionalism.

H: Clinton supporters are tribalist too.

H’s comment is completely irrelevant to the question of how to persuade Trump supporters. And it’s irrelevant twice over: 1) Clinton supporters could be carry pitchforks and torches and the most rabid factional supporters the world has ever known and it has no relevance for whether Trump supporters are too factional to be persuaded by argument, and 2) the world isn’t divided into Clinton supporters and Trump supporters.

For that comment to make sense, every single issue would be reducible to the relative goodness of the only two groups that constitute the American political realm. That’s how H sees it. H thinks he’s being “fair” and “objective” because he thinks he’s condemning both groups equally. He isn’t. He’s stuck within a limited and politically damaging ideology about purity and motives.

That is the attitude about politics–that all political disagreements can and should be about which of the two possible groups is better (and it’s a zero-sum relationship)—that fuels rabid factionalism.

Political discourse should be policy discourse. Displacing policy discourse with arguments about relative goodness doesn’t help.

 

On losing the Marquis de Lafayette

 

Elsewhere I described how the Marquis de Lafayette came to live with us.

He and George remained soul-mates, although Jacob was clearly part of their pack. When we first got him, he did NOT like affection of any kind. (It also turns out that he had bb pellets in him—we only found this out yesterday.) But everyone loved him, and loved loving on him. He was just too cute not to cuddle. Sometimes he tolerated the affection, and sometimes he enjoyed it.

He always adored Jacob, and I sometimes think that Jacob was his gateway to accepting affection.

He went from being grumpy about other beings to allowing a cat, Winston Churchill (who fawned on Marquis–they do say that Churchill was a bit of a Francophile), to eat out of his bowl and to snuggle with him.

Marquis had rules. He and George took turns in the living room at night—one would be in our bedroom, and the other in the living room, and they’d swap at various points. I think one of his biggest disappointments is that Ella wouldn’t do that. (Ella, who has good hearing, sleeps on our bed and leaps up barking if there is a weird noise in the house.)

Marquis was a worrier. He worried too much about smoke alarms, but his concerns about other things were usually justified. He was the first to figure out we were going on a trip. He told on the other dogs when they were doing something they shouldn’t.

He worried about me. A lot. When I would write at home, he would settle in under my desk, often resting his head on one of my feet. (Seriously, how do any of y’all get anything written without a cat you can scratch and a dog resting his head on your foot?) That was fine till I was having trouble with a passage, when I tend to talk to myself, trying them out loud. That really bothered him, and he’d go and get a dog toy, and then try to lure me away. He’d lure me to the porch or to an arbor outside.

[One of the signs of his aging was that it was uncomfortable to get under the desk. It broke my heart.]

Marquis and I spent a lot of time on the chaise in that arbor and on a couch on the porch (or on its predecessor, a screened-in porch). He was a BIG believer in naps, and I’m not saying he’s wrong, and he often persuaded me that I needed to stop working on that passage and take a nap, or lie with him in the backyard.

He was determined (or pig-headed, or stubborn, depending on how inconvenient his intransigence was). He sailed through obedience school, and was generally reliable but some things were too tempting. For instance, we have Gulf Coast toads in our yard, a relative of cane toads, and (supposedly) they exude something that gets dogs a little high. Marquis loved holding them in his mouth. I sometimes wonder if anyone was walking by when I was yelling things like, “STOP SUCKING TOADS!” or “LEAVE THE FUCKING TOADS ALONE!”

He was a ratter par excellence. George and Duke were basically rat archeologists, and they were fascinated by places rats had been, and so (more than once) frantically examined a rat place while the rat ran between their legs to get away. While Marquis fell for that a few times, in general, he could be counted on to get the rat. But he wasn’t a predator. He loved strange cats, most other dogs, and all people. But I really think he often pretended he didn’t. He didn’t leap on people or sniff crotches the way George did. He just let himself be scratched.

At one point, we were headed on vacation for a couple of weeks, just at the moment that a friend’s house (they were remodeling) had the main beam develop a crack. They stayed in our house—we told them they could board the dogs, but they didn’t. They had a little bitty munchkin, and George was not great with little bitty anythings (because he was exuberant). They decided the solution was to run George and Marquis every day for miles to exhaust them so they wouldn’t bug the munchkin. Every day, Marquis would suddenly charge across the path, so my friend still has a scar on one of his ankles from the leash burns. Marquis had rules.

 

I’m a big believer in the idea that you have to give dogs a job. And, so we tried to interest Marquis in fetching a tennis ball. We live near a set of tennis courts, and so picked up a bunch of tennis balls that ended up in the creek. Marquis had no interest in chasing tennis balls. But, there are tennis balls in every room in the house. I’ve sometimes found tennis balls in luggage when I’ve left a bag out for packing, and I’ve seen Marquis place a dog toy in my baggage. There is always a tennis ball in my closet. I’ve tried moving the tennis ball, and another appears.

For several years, Jacob was running with Marquis, and Marquis has never forgotten the joy of those days. Even to the last, when Marquis (who always insisted on a walk) could only walk two or three houses up the street, he would harumph and walk faster (or trot a bit) if a dog ran past, as though he was saying, “I could do that, you punk.”

Marquis had sensitive hearing, and smoke alarms were hell to him. The only thing that could comfort him was Jacob taking him on a walk. He was smart, and so he knew that my turning on the fan while I was cooking was potentially a problem. This all made cooking once Jacob went off to college a bit problematic.

I sometimes joke that Jim married me because Chester was such a great dog, since we had such wildly different politics, but I think there is something to our bonding over a rational love for cats and dogs—a love that is about the pets themselves and not about the satisfaction we get from pets loving us. And so, when a pet gets a certain level of illness, you have to stop thinking about how much you love the pet—you have to take that right out of the equation—and instead try to think entirely about how the dog or cat is feeling. But, of course, no one knows what it’s like to be a bat.

I don’t know why Marquis put a tennis ball in every room; I don’t know when he did it. But it warms my heart every time I see one. When we got the information from the vet, we knew that our love for him meant that we had to love him more than we loved his being with us.

And we made the decision we made. And we try not to think about a life that doesn’t involve finding a tennis ball in every room. But I do think about his getting to run with George again.

 

How trolls get played

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-8-prototypes-for-trumps-border-wall-photos

There are many ways in which working class people have the same political “interests” (the term used for goals, needs, policies). Concerns like good public schools, good roads, good police protection, affordable housing, affordable access to good healthcare, and so on aren’t limited to one kind of working class group. But they are necessarily class issues in two ways: first, rich people aren’t as dependent on the government to provide various services and so, if they only think in their short-term narrow self-interest, they can think that a strong social safety net isn’t a high priority. Rich people don’t need to care whether public schools are good, since they can send their kids to private schools. They can set up gated communities with good roads and private security forces. They don’t have to care whether there is low-income housing or affordable health insurance since they can pay for the expensive versions of both. Second, if all the working class got together—regardless of their membership in various sub-groups (religion, race, region)—it’s likely that they would advocate for stronger social safety nets, and it might end up with rich people and corporations having to pay higher taxes than either do now.

So, if rich people didn’t want to have to pay money to help working class people, what they would need to do would be to persuade working class people not to band together, not to think about their issues in policy terms. They would try to persuade some large part of the working class that their interests are the same as the rich.[1]

And the easiest way to do that (and the way it’s always been done) is to create an “out-group” (Those People) and persuade some large number of the working class that, as long as they’re doing something that harms Those People, they are winning. You can also tell them that their superiority over That Group would be threatened by [a policy that would actually benefit them]. It’s awful how well that works.

What a lot of people don’t realize about how slavery worked was that it enabled rich planters to exploit poorer whites. Proslavery rhetoric identified slaveholding with “being white,” as a wonderful life possibly available to every white man. Proslavery rhetoric also told poor whites that, no matter how poor they were, they were better than the richest or most successful non-white. Proslavery rhetoric guaranteed honor to every white man.[2] Conditions were pretty bad for poor whites in the South, with less access to public education, less industry, and various other issues, than people like them in some other areas, but proslavery rhetoric thwarted poor white political action by very rich people claiming solidarity with the poor whites they were underpaying, overworking, and often screwing over.

The same thing happened in prosegregation rhetoric (as the very Southern WB Cash pointed out in the 40s): rich whites could prevent any kind of labor action by pointing out that unions allowed non-whites to join. They created a kind of “herrenvolk democracy“–a race-based democracy that, instead of material gain, gave poor whites whiteness as a prize (a prize only meaningful if denied to others).  A lot of poor (and screwed-over) whites would rather get screwed over by rich whites than admit they had common cause with African Americans (a point Cash made). Segregation (white supremacist) rhetoric said that, no matter how poor you are, you are better than the richest or most successful non-white. In other words, pro-segregation rhetoric didn’t argue the really complicated policy issues about segregation (especially the significant harms for all working class people of the rejection of unions, hostility to support for public schools, aversion to good science education, and shoddy labor laws). It got assent by redirecting policy issues to simple zero-sum Us v. Them arguments.

In other words, white supremacist rhetoric (proslavery or prosegregation) meant that people voted on issues entirely on the basis of whether they were voting for something that would preserve their racial status. And, if the policy harmed the “other” race, that was good enough. Thus, they could often get tricked into voting for something that preserved their racial status, and harmed them in every other way—poor whites supported employment laws, laws about schools, restrictive laws about literacy that hurt them because they were happy that those laws hurt non-whites more. That’s the next step in this process of getting citizens in a democracy not to argue politics—reframe all policy issues into the question of whether the policy hurts (yay!) or helps (boo!) the out-group, regardless of what it does for the in-group.

It’s a really Machiavellian way to go about getting support for a policy, and it works far too often. If you persuade your base that every political issue is us v. them, and that the world is a zero-sum of us v. them, then you can persuade your base to support policies that hurt them as long as they believe it hurts “the other group” more.

The term for this is a “wedge” issue. You get a wedge into a group that really should be allied (such as the Irish and the freed African Americans in the early 19th century), and you separate them, and race is a great way to do that (so is religion). Poor people (regardless of race or religion) generally have the same policy goals; working class people have the same political needs regardless of race. It wasn’t just the South that did this. In the nineteenth century, Jacksonian Democrats gained the support of the poor Irish for policies that didn’t help them purely on the grounds that those policies hurt African Americans more.

Putting politics in terms of us v. them enables the screwing-over of people rests on first creating a lot of resentment of the out-group, and often scapegoating, including scapegoating the out-group for the consequences the in-group policy will have. Sources on every side of the American political spectrum agree that the American skilled working class has been hurt, and sensible sources agree that the causes are complicated. Mechanization, globalization, and union-busting have significantly hurt the skilled working class, and yet immigrants are scapegoated for unemployment (immigrants didn’t cause jobs to leave the US, and immigrants didn’t take union jobs). But, once that resentment against immigrants (or any other group) is created, and a base is persuaded to think that it’s a zero-sum between Us and Them, then all a party has to do is get its base to vote and behave in ways that hurt Them.

Under those conditions, it seems unnecessary to argue policies, and that may even be the intent. Slaveholders didn’t want slavery debated—at all. They wanted it to appear that you either fully supported slavery in every possible way or you were actively advocating race war against whites. Any restriction of slavery would hurt them after all, and any reasonable and thorough debate of the institution of slavery would lead to restriction. And so, slaveholders were so committed to prohibiting deliberation of slavery that they talked themselves into unnecessarily aggressive policies that alienated people who didn’t really care about slavery (through things like the Gag Rule, Bleeding Kansas, assaulting a Senator in the Senate, the Fugitive Slave Law, the war with Mexico, the Dred Scott decision, pushing “black codes” on “free” states, the open advocacy of forcing “free” states to allow slavery). The South would have done better to have allowed open debate about slavery. But even people who didn’t own slaves were persuaded that it was either “us” (advocating unrestricted slavery) or “them” (rabid abolitionists who wanted race war). So, any violence against “them,” any policy they hated—that was good enough.

There are lots of examples in history when communities were dominated by this kind of “as long as it makes Them unhappy, I’m good with this policy” thinking. That’s worth considering—if this is a good way for people to make decisions, we should be able to point to times it worked out well. And I yet to find an example of a time it did work well for any length of time as a way of a large group making policy decisions. I can think of lots of examples of times it was disastrous—it’s what motivated Athenians to send troops on campaigns that were guaranteed failures, or support campaigns that were failing (as in the Sicilian Expedition). The whole philosophy is captured in the saying, “cutting off your nose to spite your face.”

But, in the short run, it can seem like a good idea. It’s a great way for a TV channel, organization, radio show, politician, or political party to build a base (after all, you probably said to yourself, “THEY DO IT TOO!”), and it’s more fun to engage in the two-minute hate about the other group than get into the weeds of the various political options available. In the long run, though, if you make decisions purely on the basis of whether it pisses someone you hate off, you’re making bad decisions, often ones that hurt you.

And, if all you try to do in social media is piss off the other side, you were persuaded to do that by someone who knows how useful it is for them. Trolls think they’re just doing it for the lulz. They aren’t. They think they aren’t earnest. Their refusal to think very clearly about their actions is carefully and earnestly encouraged by media, political parties, and interests that find their mindless resentment of Them very profitable. Trolls might think they’re in it for the lulz, but someone is into their activity for the bucks. Bucks the trolls aren’t getting.

Trolls think they’re playing earnest people earnestly involved in political deliberation; on the contrary, they’re getting earnestly played.

 

 

[1] What’s interesting about the current attempt to keep working class people from seeing their concerns as shared with others in their economic system is that it’s only in the short-term narrow self-interest of corporations and rich people to thwart discussion about what would help the working class. After all, it benefits everyone in a nation if the populace is well-educated, scientifically literate, if they have access to good healthcare, a strong infrastructure, low crime, and public servants (teachers, fire fighters, police, public defenders, social workers) who are well-paid, well-trained, selectively hired, and enjoy helping the public regardless of class, race, religion, and so on. That’s a good world for everyone.

[2] Another thing a lot of people who admire the institution of slavery and the CSA don’t realize is that whiteness was actually not what we now imagine it to be—for instance, neither eastern Europeans nor Italians were considered white, and Catholics also had a shaky claim on the term.

What I have to say about civility (selections from Fanatical Schemes)

[Selections from Fanatical Schemes: Proslavery Rhetoric and the Tragedy of Consensus]

[The argument that the Civil War was caused by the extremism of “both sides”] typifies one conventional way of understanding conflict, exemplified in the saying that “it takes two to make a fight.” According to this view, if there is a violent conflict, it is the result of at least two parties who refuse to compromise, so both parties are to be equally blamed for their intransigence. This sense of a public sphere of compromise and concession is often connected to privileging civility, a powerful, but very vague, concept. “Civility” tends to be defined through negation: it is not emotional or abusive; it does not involve personal attack; it is not offensive. Offending one’s audience, it is argued, alienates them, and persuading them necessitates moving them to one’s side, not pushing them away:

When the ebullitions of passion burst in peevish crimination of the audience themselves, when a speaker sallies forth, armed with insult and outrage for his instruments of persuasion, you may be assured, that this Quixotism of rhetoric must eventually terminate like all other modern knight errantry and that the fury must always be succeeded by the impotence of the passions.  (John Quincy Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory I: 365.)

The hope is that a rhetor can find a civil way to make any argument–including dissent. Yet, dissent is inherently disruptive, and necessarily upsetting to anyone who identifies with the current system. Hence, as various scholars have noted, privileging discourse that is not upsetting necessarily furthers the disenfranchisement of the already marginalized (see especially Darsey).

This notion of the power of civil discourse is wonderfully optimistic, as it suggests that there might be a discursive solution to every conflict, that violence happens when only rhetors make their arguments badly. In its most extreme form, this theory of rhetoric makes an absolute distinction between the content and form of an argument, so that abolitionists were not wrong to want slavery abolished, but in how they made their case. Had abolitionists tempered their rhetoric, had they not armed themselves with insult and outrage, they might have persuaded slavers to free their slaves; this was the argument that Channing made in Slavery. Condemning abolitionists for their vehemence, Channing promises a different kind of criticism of slavery: “I propose to show that slavery is a great wrong, but I do not intend to pass sentence on the character of the slave-holder” (16). As demonstrated by the reaction to Channing’s book, his readers did not see the distinction; his book was characterized as “pouring oil on a conflagration” (Austin 11), and, despite Channing’s claims to reject violence, “it is insurrection that he preaches” (Austin 14). The 1836 anonymous response insists that, although Channing may not have intended “to excite the blacks to take ‘vengeance,’ and free themselves,” “no work has appeared (so far as I know) so well adapted to produce precisely that attempt” (11). Proslavery readers saw no difference between his rhetoric and the rhetoric of the people he condemned.

As will be discussed in the seventh chapter, the issue of civil language came up continually in regard to the anti-slavery petitions presented to Congress. When a Representative from Massachusetts, George Briggs, pointed out that the language was respectful, James Bouldin (from Virginia) responded that the very nature of the petitions–their criticizing slaveowners–meant that they were inherently disrespectful (40). If “civility” and “respectful” are seen as synonymous, there is no such thing as civil criticism of people higher in any hierarchy. Criticism is only permitted when it is superiors criticizing inferiors, which means, necessarily, the hierarchy itself cannot be criticized; substantive social change is impossible. It is equally impossible if “civility” is defined by the reaction of the audience–that is, if it is assumed that “uncivil” and “upsetting” are synonymous, then civil disagreement on central issues is impossible. Under such limitations, rhetoric cannot solve political conflicts.

I do not mean to suggest that the narrative of proslavery forces provoked by abolitionists is obviously false; it is clear that anti-abolitionism significantly increased in the mid-1830s, and proslavery rhetors certainly blamed abolitionists for their actions. Although I will argue that seeing abolitionist rhetorical stridency as the catalyst for anti-abolitionism is a mistake, it occurs naturally from the sensible project of looking at what participants in a debate say about their motives in getting uglier. In addition, our habit of imagining issues as binaries, coupled with how difficult it is to articulate the relation between rhetoric and reality, means that there is a tendency to assume that discourse either really is or really is not about the purported issue. To suggest that proslavery rhetors were not really provoked by abolitionist rhetoric seems to imply that that rhetoric did not really bother them, and that’s an absurd proposition. People argued about slavery because they genuinely (and vehemently) disagreed about it.

[….]

If “civility” and “respectful” are seen as synonymous, there is no such thing as civil criticism of people higher in any hierarchy. Criticism is only permitted when it is superiors criticizing inferiors, which means, necessarily, the hierarchy itself cannot be criticized; substantive social change is impossible. It is equally impossible if “civility” is defined by the reaction of the audience–that is, if it is assumed that “uncivil” and “upsetting” are synonymous, then civil disagreement on central issues is impossible. Under such limitations, rhetoric cannot solve political conflicts.

[….]

Abolitionist rhetors were no more emotional than proslavery ones, and they were far more rational. Emotionalism and rationality are not at opposite ends of a spectrum; they are only tangentially related (unless one has the circular, and useless, definition of each as the absence of the other). William Lloyd Garrison, whose writing style I personally find irritating, engaged in rational argumentation insofar as he accurately represented his oppositions’ arguments and engaged them. He strove for internal consistency, his paper presented multiple sides of various arguments, he published arguments with which he disagreed. Harriet Beecher Stowe, another author often condemned for polemicism, demonstrates deep knowledge of proslavery rhetoric in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Passionate, sentimental, committed, and assertive, these authors still managed to represent proslavery arguments clearly and accurately. Abolitionists were not more histrionic than proslavery rhetors, but they did have more uteruses among them, and I would suggest that the extremely sexist tendency to perceive women as more emotional, coupled with a desire to shift the stasis away from slavery, facilitated the creation of a political, and then scholarly, consensus about the fanaticism of abolitionists. Women were excluded from public discourse because they would be emotional and irrational; they would, in other words, behave the same way proslavery rhetors already did. Whether we are to understand histrionic outbursts as a point of white male privilege, or to see proslavery rhetors’ condemning abolitionists for doing what they themselves do as yet another instance of cunning projection, is unclear to me. But it is clear they did it.

A famous exponent of an extreme version of this tendency is Frank Owsley, who blamed “egocentric sectionalism” for the war, a flaw practiced more by the North than the South: “The people in one section failed in their language and conduct to respect the dignity and self-respect of the people in the other section” (Stampp, Causes, 56). It is striking the extent to which this echoes proslavery rhetoric. By “the people” of the south Owsley means slavers–if anything, abolitionists had far more respect for the dignity and self-respect of slaves and African Americans than did slavers–and the war was caused by not respecting their feelings. Owsley does not condemn the south for failing to respect the feelings of the north; this is not, despite his concluding sentence (that unity is in danger when “one section fails to respect the self-respect of the people of another section” 58), an image of mutual respect.[i] Less extreme versions of this explanation arise in Tise and Faust, both of whom still accept that there was something provoking in abolitionists’ rhetoric. What one wonders is just what Owsley, Tise, and Faust think abolitionists should have done instead–there was, as made clear in the gag rule, no way to criticize slavery that was not provocative; slavers took any criticism as a personal attack.

To blame abolitionists for incivility is to preclude abolition. My grievance is not with the notion that public discourse ought to have certain standards, and that billingsgate should be avoided–I hope it’s been clear that I consider proslavery rhetors’ reliance on smear tactics was juvenile, hypocritical, and destructive. The problem is that conventional notions of civility, which tend to emphasize whether the audience is offended, inevitably put an impossible burden on dissenters. That latter point cannot be emphasized enough. While calls for social change might themselves call for more or less violence, they always necessarily involve criticism, and no one likes to be criticized. To prohibit anything other than “civil” political discourse, as long as “civil” is defined as discourse that does not upset anyone, is to prohibit social change.

 

[i] It is also interesting that Owsley asserts that “The language of insult which the so-called fire-eaters employed, however, was not usually coarse of obscene in comparison with the abolitionists; it was urbane and restrained in a degree–but insulting” (58). This is simply not the case.

Advice for graduate students and junior faculty about writing

For years, I’ve been intrigued by the paradox that people who have written well enough to get to graduate school (or to finish, or to write a first book) at some point find themselves unable to write. I fell deep into the research on that issue, and I thought I would write a book about it. Well, actually, I did, but I’m not sure about trying to get it published. Today I found out that the place I published it still exists, and so here it is.

[Some of] These People Are Animals

[From this article]

From Understanding Genocide

“We cannot expect bystanders to sacrifice their lives for others. But we can expect individuals, groups, and nations to act early along a continuum of destruction, when the danger to themselves is limited, and the potential exists for inhibiting the evolution of increasing destructiveness. This will only happen if people–children, adults, whole societies–develop an awareness of their common humanity with other people, as well as of the psychological processes in themselves that turn them against others. Institutions and modes of functioning can develop that embody a shared humanity and make exclusion from the moral realm more difficult.” (Staub 35)

“Similarly, the philosopher Beryl Land has written about how very often, before the Nazis exterminated Jews, they first reduced them to a ‘subhuman state’ through ‘systematic brutality and degradation.’ This, he argued, made killing them more ‘palatable,’ because it is easier to kill a person once he or she no longer resembles a human being. [….] [P]erpetrators could have focused on the degraded and pathetic state of their victims as justification for both their past and future victimization, even though the perpetrators were actually responsible for their wretched state.” (Newman 59)

I know that people defending our President’s characterizing people trying to come to America as “animals” by saying that he just meant some Mexicans–members of a dangerous gang. And that’s a common move. He didn’t mean everyone; he only meant one part of that group, and it is a justifiable and accurate way to characterize that one part. Thus, Trump’s use of the term “animals” for some people trying to come into the country is nothing like Nazi rhetoric.

Nope, that makes it exactly like Nazi rhetoric about Jews. It’s also exactly like pro-internment rhetoric about Japanese Americans, anti-immigration rhetoric directed at Italians, eastern Europeans, the Irish, the Germans, Muslims, red-baiting, and, well, every argument for disenfranchising, expelling, or exterminating some group.

Nazis regularly acknowledged that not all Jews were bad. What they argued is that some part of that group was so dangerous that none of them should be treated as full citizens (the same argument about all the groups mentioned above), and all should be treated with extreme suspicion.

That kind of move–allowing the worst members to stand for the entire group–is only something that happens with an out-group. But it does happen. And Trump’s rhetoric is vague; he does seem to be talking about all Mexicans, and he is heard as doing exactly that.

Trump’s rhetoric won’t necessarily hurt his chances with Latinx–it’s fairly common for recent immigrants to band together against this set of immigrants (my own family history demonstrates that), and so they are likely to hear him as criticizing some immigrants. It’s easy for people to acknowledge exceptions within the in-group. But non-Latinx aren’t.

But Trump’s way of talking about parts of some immigrant group is vague. A friendly reading says he’s talking about a small group and just failing to make clear that he doesn’t think that subset represents the whole group. A less friendly reading wonders why he keeps making that mistake.

Another friendly reading says he doesn’t make the group/sub-group distinction because the sub-group is a synecdoche for the group as a whole. After all, that’s how thinking about the out-group works–any member can be taken as representative of the whole. And, clearly, that is how many supporters of Trump hear him, especially the non-trivial number of his supporters whose racism motivated their support for him.

More important, that is how exclusionary rhetoric works, including Hitler’s, by allowing or encouraging the public to think that a group is dangerous because its representative members are. What Trump is doing, and has been doing for a long time, is encouraging people to fear immigrants because some of them might be bad. And it’s working.