On the notion that the problem is how anti-racists make their arguments

protests from Memphis "I am a man"

During the Black Lives Matter protests, there were a lot of arguments about the rhetorical effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the protests, and one recurrent argument was that the aggression and militancy of the protesters alienated potential allies. This particular argument went along these lines: “I’m not racist, and I’m very opposed to racism, but these protestors have alienated me through how they’re making their argument. If they want the support of people like me, they have to stop being so aggressive.” Let’s call the sort of person who makes this argument Chester.

[As an aside, Chester Burnette is the best dog that has ever lived, and so I always name the interlocutor Chester. Chester was male, so I’ll use “he,” but, of course, Chesters are not always male.]

I have an AB, MA, and PhD in Rhetoric. I am a professor in a Department of Rhetoric and Writing. So, I get rhetoric. I know that how you make your argument is tremendously important. My whole career has been spent trying to teach students that smacking your opposition over the head with your thesis, even if you repeat it five times, is not a great way to change anyone’s minds. What might seem compelling reasons to you won’t seem important to anyone else unless those reasons connect with a value your audience has (what, because of Aristotle, is often called “enthymematic reasoning”). So, it makes me happy that so many people expressed concern about how people argue.

Here’s what I understand Chester to believe. Chester’s opposition to racism is important to his sense of identity, and it is sincere. Some of the Chesters with whom I interacted, for instance, could talk about specific times they personally shut down someone who was racist. Still and all, it was interesting that, if the interaction went on, at some point Chester would express skepticism about whether there is really a problem of POC men (especially African– and Native-American) getting abused and even murdered by the police. Chester would almost always end up saying that there may be faults on both sides.

And he’d often appeal to his own experience to support the claim. He’s been pulled over, he’d say, sometimes for some bullshit reasons, but he kept his hands in view, answered the officer’s questions politely, and it all worked out fine. And he brings up his experience as an important piece of evidence in arguments about the police. Chester, by the way, is white. And, of course, the argument is about whether POC and especially POC men are treated badly by the police. It’s interesting that Chester doesn’t see the irrelevance of his experience.

At this moment, some Chesters will think I just made the issue about race, since I brought up Chester’s race. Some people believe that an issue is not about race until someone mentions race.

Here’s one way to think about that. We spend a lot of time at dog parks. Some people look away when their dog assumes the position, and then they try to walk away without picking it up. If I offer to pick up their dog’s shit, some people are nice about it, and some people act as though I’m the problem. I didn’t create the shit by naming it.

Does a doctor create cancer by naming it? Does a spouse only become abusive when someone calls that behavior abusive? Is a colleague’s bullying okay until the moment someone names it as bullying?

The answer, weirdly enough, for many people is yes. As long as it isn’t named, we don’t have to think about it, and we don’t have to do something about it. And so they are more angry with the person who names it than they are with the cancer, the abusive spouse, the bullying colleague.

Some Chesters were just made very uncomfortable by my using the word shit, and talking about dog shit. They think I should have found a different analogy, one that was more comfortable.

These Chesters are very nice people. Let’s call them Nice Chesters. They are people who bring you casseroles when something bad has happened, who arrange meal banks, who maintain the community garden, whose social media have lots of memes about positive thinking, who are kind to everyone. I like these people. The problem is that they want a world in which we only talk about positive things, and we don’t say anything offensive or uncomfortable (in rhetoric, we say, they are uncomfortable with violations of norms of decorum or civility).

But the dog did shit, and the person responsible for the dog shitting either picked it up or didn’t. Wanting a world in which we don’t talk about how some dog owners let their dogs shit and don’t pick it up is a world with a lot of dog shit. And if we want to solve the problem of dog shit, we have to name it. The problem doesn’t arise when we name it. That shit is there. Whether the dog owner saw it or not doesn’t matter—that shit is there. The problem gets worse when, because people don’t want to talk about shit, because it makes them uncomfortable, they don’t want to talk about people who don’t deal with their dog’s shit.

And we can only solve the problem of dog shit in dog parks (or lawns, or whatever) if we name it, and we name it as something lots of people allow to happen.

Racism is the dog shit of our world.

If we aren’t willing to have uncomfortable conversations about racism, conversations that make people as uncomfortable as my using the word shit, then we’re all looking away from the dog shit. We can’t talk about racism in our culture without being really uncomfortable.

The Nice Chesters believe that we don’t need to talk about those uncomfortable things in uncomfortable ways. They believe that, if we’re all nice to each other, everything will be fine. And that’s absolutely true. If we were all kind and loving and compassionate, then there wouldn’t be riots. There also wouldn’t be any need for riots because there wouldn’t be police officers protected from accountability. The problem is that a lot of the people who let their dogs shit and don’t pick it up aren’t nice, and there is no nice way to get that sort of person to pick it up. They just get angry.

I spent a lot of time looking at the rhetoric about slavery. Abolitionists said that slavers (many of whom liked to call themselves slaveowners or slaveholders) abused their slaves, and violated the very clear rules in Scripture about how to treat slaves. Slavers said those criticisms hurt their feelings. Many people said that the problem was that the abolitionists were too extreme in their rhetoric, and, if they were nicer, their message could get across. And so they tried to write nice criticisms of slavery—the slavers banned those writings too. It didn’t matter how nicely people said slavery was a sin; slavers didn’t want to hear it. There was no nice way.

Frederick Douglass remarked on the desire for niceness in the abolition movement—the fantasy that, if African Americans were nice enough, if abolitionists asked nicely enough, supporters of slavery would change their minds. He said, “The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims have been born of earnest struggle. […] If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate agitation are men who want crops without plowing up the ground; they want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will.” (“West India Emancipation“)

Right now the kind of people who would have been fighting MLK every step of the way are trying to claim that he is an example for their “if you’re nice, people will hear you” argument. That wasn’t King’s argument, he wasn’t nice, and he didn’t persuade the James Kilpatrick’s or Bull Connors of the world at all, let alone by being nice.

King’s argument was that non-violence is disruptive, controversial, and conflictual, but he also argued that what his critics thought of as “peaceful” was simply conflict of which they could be unaware. King argued that nonviolence is effective in the long run because the means and ends are aligned.

On the whole, I’m in favor of non-violent protests, partially because I’m persuaded by the research that says non-violence is more effective. But even I have to say that I don’t know of any time that non-violence worked when it came to issues of racialized police brutality. The closest I can think of is when the Nazis tried to deport Jewish men married to non-Jewish women, but it isn’t a great fit.

If there are times that non-violent protests of police brutality worked, I’d love to hear about them. It’s important to think about how changes in policing have actually been effected because, as far as I can tell, Nice Chesters are calling on protesters to engage in a kind of protest that has never worked. But what I’m certain they’re doing is shifting the conversation from the issue of racialized policing and lack of accountability to the rhetoric of protesters.

Imagine that we are room-mates, and you are angry that I never do the dishes, and you want me to do the dishes. But, every time you bring up the issue, I say that you’re criticizing me in a way that makes me uncomfortable, and so we can’t continue the conversation. I insist that I’m open to thinking about the dishes, but only if you make the argument the right way. As long as I can keep us arguing about whether you’re arguing the right way, I can keep leaving dirty dishes in the sink.

If there is no right way for you to get me to think about what I’m doing with the dishes, then I’m I’m pretending I’m open to solving the problem, but I’m not.

So, how do we know if I’m arguing in bad faith?

First, can I set standards for how you’re supposed to argue that you can actually achieve? Second, if I set the standards, do I stick to them? (That is, do I keep moving the goalposts?) Third, can I name the conditions under which I would change my mind about what I’m doing with the dishes? Fourth, am I holding us both to the same standards in regard to how we argue? (That is, am I treating us as equals–or am I allowed to argue any way I want, but you have to be careful about your tone?)

I think Chester’s argument generally violates all four rules, especially the last.

After all, what if someone said to Chester, “I’d be open to your argument that we need to make our argument differently if you made it a different way”? Would Chester feel the need to change how he is making his argument? And yet that’s just as reasonable a request as Chester’s.

When I pointed this out to Chester—that Chester is saying others need to work to persuade him, but he doesn’t need to work to persuade them—he’d say something like, “Well, if you want to win the argument, you need white people on your side.”

That just gave away the argument. Chester is saying that our culture is racist. To say that POC have to please white people rhetorically is to say that political change only happens when white people care. It’s saying that white people are in power, that white people don’t experience the police this way, that white people don’t care about the experiences of POC. And that is the BLM argument.

So, if you argue that POC who are saying that a lot of white people just aren’t willing to acknowledge the racism of our culture need to defer to the feelings of white people for anything to change, you’re proving them right.

“History is written by the winners” is exactly the wrong thing to say

Bill Barr recently said, when asked about whether history will judge him badly, “Well, history is written by the winners, so it largely depends on who’s writing the history.” A lot of people were surprised at Barr’s saying that, since it’s most famously attributed to Hermann Goering, and his lack of concern during the Nuremburg Trials. It’s often taken to mean that Goering thought there is no truth, and truth is socially constructed, so it would seem that Barr was taking that stand.

I’ve come to think that probably isn’t what Goering meant, and it probably isn’t exactly what Barr means either.

Barr was invoking a version of what, in argumentation scholarship, is called “the appeal to Galileo.” Barr was saying that he might be condemned by future historians, if his side didn’t win, just as Galileo was condemned at the time. That’s probably what Goering was saying. That doesn’t necessarily mean that he thought future historians would be defining truth. I think it’s more likely that both Barr and Goering were claiming the position of a truth-teller who, if their side lost, would be demonized.

And here I just have to pause and say that there has not been a political group as prone to whining about being victimized as the current concatenation of fanatical GOP/fundagelical/white men committed to toxic masculinity since the slavers whined that abolitionists made them feel sad.

(One thing I never got to explore in the book about proslavery rhetoric or the books on demagoguery was the role of toxic masculinity.)

Barr and Goering are (were) implicitly claiming to be Galileo, Socrates, Ignaz Semmelweis. And, in that comparison, they inadvertently showed how the comparison was wrong. Barr recognizes that the Trump Administration might (let’s be honest, will) go down in history as the most corrupt, disorganized, damaging, short-sighted, and incompetent Administration in the history of the United States.

I don’t think he’s saying that he believes he is part of such an incompetent and corrupt administration. The problem with working for a narcissist, as (oddly enough) Albert Speer observed, is that first-rate people won’t work for them, so you’re surrounded by third-raters. And third-rate thinkers like Barr are particularly prone to the Dunning-Kruger phenomenon, and over-estimate their competence and expertise. They aren’t smart enough to see that they aren’t that smart.

[As an aside, I have to say that I think it’s funny that Speer didn’t realize how his observations about the Hitler system preventing the hiring of really good people applied to him as well. But it did.]

I think Barr is saying that he believe that if he and Trump fail to create a political system in which the most anti-intellectual, authoritarian, partisan, racist, short-sighted, and greedy parts of the GOP are in control of every part of a government that operates without accountability or constraints (so much for wanting small government), then “the libs” will write histories that represent the Trump Administration badly.

This is projection.

While I think that researchers in media and political science rely on the false binary (or equally false continuum) of left (Dem) v. right (GOP) means that they misrepresent our ideological map, it’s very clear that “both sides” do not engage in misrepresentation of the other side to equal degrees. People and media who self-identify as conservative are more likely to promote lies, fail to check sources, engage in motivism, and privilege loyalty to group over any other values. When presented with that research, an awful lot of people who self-identify as conservative say the research must be biased because it doesn’t show both sides are equally bad.

They don’t realize that, by having that reaction, they’ve confirmed the research.

Were the research better, I think, it would show that not all people who self-identify as conservative are irrationally factional, that there are places all over the political spectrum (not continuum) where people are equally unwilling to believe that there might be intelligent and good-willed disagreement. If we could have research grounded in that understanding of political affiliation as a spectrum rather than a binary, then we could have a good discussion about how people think about politics that doesn’t reproduce our demagogic culture (in which every issue is reduced to which group is better).

But, back to Barr. Barr is more concerned about his side winning than about having a justice system that is blind to identity (the whole point of Justice’s blindfolds is that she doesn’t know who she’s judging—it’s the original position). Barr doesn’t want a system in which all people are treated the same; he’s rabidly and irrationally partisan. If he succeeds, then he’ll make sure that all histories treat him and Trump as heroes. He is the one who will write history to celebrate the winners.

But that isn’t how “winning” history works. Galileo’s persecution was much more complicated than people think, and the main problem was that his argument for heliocentrism was more accessible than others. Socrates was ordered to drink hemlock, not because the Athenians wanted to silence someone who spoke the truth, but because many (not all) Athenians believed him to be involved with the Thirty Tyrants. What made him a martyr wasn’t that he pissed everyone off with the questions he asked, but his refusal to escape the death sentence—his insistence that the law applies to everyone (which is pretty nearly the opposite of what Barr has argued, since he has argued that Trump is above accountability or any laws). The other case that gets invoked in the “I am speaking the truth but They will silence me” is Semmelweis. But Semmelweis also doesn’t show that the winners write the history. Semmelweis lost in his lifetime. And we know about him because people reconsidered.

For a hundred years, the slaver version of the Civil War was the dominant narrative. It lost the war, and won the history. Now it’s losing the history.

The most uncharitable version of what Barr said is that he is an amoral social constructivist of the worst kind, Machiavellian to the core. In my experience, that kind of person is rare. Machiavellians do claim foundational truths–they end up insisting that Machiavellianism is true.

More common is the sociopathic Machiavellian who is incapable of perspective-shifting; they just don’t think there are other perspectives. [Every once in a while, I run across people, all over the political spectrum, who think perspective shifting is bad—that’s a different post.] I think Barr is in that category of not really understanding that, not only are there other points of view, but that they might be right.

The charitable reading of Barr is that he believes that he is a victim (that is, criticized) for speaking the truth, but, he thinks, if he fails in his endeavor to substitute a one-party state for a democracy, then his opponents will treat him as he has been treating them.

[That’s another post—people who feel justified in oppressing the other side because, if the other side got into power, they would do the same –but it’s logically, empirically, and ethically indefensible. It’s never been associated with sensible policies.]

What Barr said is open, I think, to two interpretations, and neither of them makes him look like an ethical or reflective person. One is that he’s the worst kind of power politics shoddy-Nietzschean epistemological constructivist—might not only makes right, but it makes truth.

The second is that he feels a victim because he thinks he’s Galileo. But he isn’t. Galileo had a lot of evidence for his arguments, as even his opponents acknowledged he did, and Barr knows about Galileo because history isn’t written by the winners in power politics.

In other words, Barr’s saying “History is written by the winners” (most famously attributed to Goering) shows why he’s really not someone who should be head of the DOJ. Either he’s someone who thinks the Nazis were right in their power politics, or he’s someone who hasn’t really thought about his own argument.

He might be both.

Invitation to the Bores (Hitler’s “Table Talk”–RSA talk)

Hitler looking at a map with generals

To the extent that scholars in rhetoric are interested in Hitler (and that isn’t much) the attention is paid to his big rallies and major speeches, but, for purposes of thinking about our current problems with political deliberation, his smaller rhetorical situations are more instructive, specifically, his deliberations with his immediate circle.

The very effective Nazi propaganda machine promoted the “Hitler Myth:” that he (and he alone) had the sincerity, will, stamina, and judgment to lead Germany to the greatness it once had and was entitled to have again (Kershaw, Hitler Myth). His superior judgment enabled him to have brilliant insights—better than supposed “experts”—on topics ranging from interior design to economics. He was particularly prone to showing off this “universal genius” at meals, during which he delivered monologues for the benefit of his inner circle, his most devoted followers—the people most deeply committed to him, and most committed to promoting the myth of him as a universal genius. The paradox I want to pursue in this talk is that those were the people who, because of so much exposure to his opinions and processes of judgment, must have known that he wasn’t a universal genius at all. Yet, they seem to have believed and not believed in his perfect judgment.

Albert Speer, who maintained in his mendacious post-war writings that he avoided the mealtime monologues, describes an illustrative moment, when Hitler lied to his dining companions about having chosen all the marble personally for various buildings. Speer comments:”Hadn’t he noticed that I was sitting at an adjoining table? What so took me aback was and is the fact that he was still clutching at glory in such ridiculously trivial questions” (Spandau 118).

Speer says, “How intense and uncontrollable this man’s desire to show off must have been!” (Spandau 119). It wasn’t just Speer who must have noticed that quality. He mentions that “Hitler quite often presented as the fruit of his own reflections” information that Speer knew had been given him by other experts, and that all of the inner circle knew that Hitler lied when he claimed to read all of a treatise, since he also bragged about only reading the ends of books.

Speer, describing an evening that devolved into Hitler’s “lengthy expatiations on the role of the individual in history” (Spandau 58), says that Hitler’s “relationship to history was sheer romanticism and centered around the concept of the hero. He might well mention Napoleon or Old Shatterhand in one sentence” (Spandau 59). ‘Old Shatterhand’ was the hero of the German author Karl May’s Western novels, which Hitler loved, and which informed Hitler’s understanding of American history and culture (although May hadn’t been to the US prior to writing most of the Shatterhand series). Speer says that “Hitler would rely on Karl May as proof for everything imaginable” including what constitutes the ideal company commander (in the form of May’s fictional Winnetou, Spandau 347; see also Kershaw, Hitler 7, Hubris 15, ). Someone whose assessment of a major foe is grounded in popular novels is hardly a genius, let alone a universal one.

Many of Hitler’s lunch and dinner monologues were later published as a book called Hitler’s Table Talk (an obvious reference to The Table Talk of Martin Luther), or, more accurately, some version of those monologues was. The history of their publication is fraught, and there are reasons to doubt many of the passages (especially regarding religion). There is also reason to think that the published version is more coherent than what listening to them was actually like. Speer says of the published version that it “more or less filtered [Hitler’s] torrent of speech and subsequently smoothed and styled it” (Spandau 345). The book, Speer says, reduced Hitler’s repetition, “the slow, painful process of gestation which could be felt in the way phrases were formed [….] Vivid monologues have been produced out of agonizing long-windedness” (Spandau 346). It’s hard to imagine that the actual talk would have been even more long-winded and incoherent, since reading Hitler’s Table Talk is like reading the transcript of what a narcissistic sophomore in college who thinks he has smoked good weed would say to a room of people who have passed out long ago or are already getting at it on the bunk bed above. It’s hard to read them and not come to the conclusion that Hitler is a bloviating, self-deluded, thin-skinned blowhard.

It’s equally hard to believe that the people at the tables with him didn’t come to that conclusion as well.

There are similar problems with the transcripts of Hitler’s meetings with his generals (Hitler and His Generals). While the post-war narrative promoted by many of Hitler’s generals (that he continually got in their way, that they could have won the war if left to make their own decisions, that they didn’t know about the serial genocides, and that they continually resisted him, and so on) was simply untrue, the deliberations do show a leader not very good at deliberating. Like the meal-time monologues, they have passages of Hitler browbeating, rambling, and being more concerned with being right than with finding the right course of action. As his generals are pressuring him to make a decision, he might suddenly veer off into a windy digression about medals, the racial characteristics of troops, how right he was in some previous disagreement with generals, why his experience as a private means he understands strategy better than any general.

My point is that the people exposed to this blathering and bullshitting would have known Hitler was not a stable genius with universally valid insight. Yet they were the ones who most enabled him and enabled the Hitler myth. Why support him, why support the lie that Germans should trust him? What persuaded them to support him publicly? And the answer is: the way that the power relations inherent to charismatic leadership can inhibit not only deliberation, but doubt of any kind.

Charismatic authority is most famously described by Max Weber, who described it as one of three ways that a ruler can be perceived as legitimate. Charismatic authority comes from the beliefs of the followers, “how followers see things” (Economy and Society page 374). In the relationship of charismatic authority, “supernatural, superhuman, or at least exceptional powers or properties are attributed to the individual” (374). Ian Kershaw summarizes how charismatic authority relies on continually good outcomes for the followers: the power of the charismatic leader is “sustained by great deeds, resounding successes, and notable achievements, which provide the repeated ‘proof’ of the leader’s ‘calling’” (Hitler Myth 9). The charismatic leader must continually surprise his followers with his “universal genius”—that’s why Hitler would grasp at petty successes (like claiming to have picked the marble personally), and refuse to admit errors.

The question is why those obvious moves would work.

And they would work partially because they had to work. The power of the charismatic leader comes from self-confidence, which is necessary for the risk-taking. Thus, the dynamic of charismatic—the need for fawning followers, the need to impress those followers, the need for self-confidence—mean that the charismatic leader him (or her) self has to be the first and most fooled about their own supernatural abilities. And, it’s hard to maintain that level of self-delusion if the people immediately surrounding the leader are even dubious, let alone critical, of the leader. Thus, dissent is treated as disloyalty, and the consequence is that the leader has to be surrounded by people who are, or who believe themselves to be, not as insightful and charismatic.

Oddly enough, it was Speer (who was not and never had been as good at his job as his post-war autohagiographies would claim) who identified the problem with Hitler’s regime: that it put and kept in place people who were weak, corrupt, and just not very good (“inferior” is the term Speer used). Hitler’s “joy” at hearing “news which suited his course of action” and “anger at news which crossed him” (Overy Interrogations 226) meant that people didn’t give him the information, insights, and suggestions that would have led to better decisions (an important theme in Kershaw’s Fateful Choices). Hitler’s emphasis on loyalty, his need to be a universal genius, his faith in himself—all those characteristics meant that he didn’t want people around him who were smarter than he, better informed, or threatening to his ego in any way. As Speer said, Hitler’s “methods of necessity led to weak collaborators for his arbitrary method of choice brought no men with proper qualifications to the right positions” and the “inferiority” of his subordinates ensured that their subordinates would also be “inferior” (Overy 226). Speer draws the conclusion that “A system which makes the selection of the leading personalities dependent solely on the judgment, arbitrary discretion, and whims of the dictators inevitably leads to such results” (Overy 226). And that is the kind of system encouraged by the model of charismatic leadership.

Charismatic leadership, despite serious problems, remains the dominant model of leadership, especially in the popular culture of self-help books and management seminars. Americans’ persistent fascination with charismatic leadership is important for scholars of rhetoric because charismatic leadership is a theory of rhetoric and deliberation. Or, more accurately, it’s a theory of rhetoric that is anti-deliberation. The fantasy of charismatic leadership is that there are people whose ability to lead (that is, both make decisions and motivate others to go along with those decisions [deliberate and persuade]) is not discipline- or field-specific. It’s universal. People with field- or discipline-specific expertise inform these leaders who are then able to discern the correct course of action because they have a kind of judgment—extraordinary insight, vision, they’re great judges of people—that makes their assessment better than anyone else’s. This is an incipiently authoritarian model of power, in that power comes from the supposedly superior judgment of the leader. For a leader to admit error, uncertainty, or ignorance, then, is to reduce their power. Dissent, disagreement, and deliberation have problematic places in systems reliant on charismatic leadership, especially the more that the leader believes in their own charismatic leadership—they come to believe the myths about themselves (see especially Kershaw Hitler Myth 264)

Scholars in leadership have tried to manage the problem of leaders who lead organizations, corporations, and countries right off a cliff (sometimes called “the Hitler Problem,” Tourish and Pinnington 149). by distinguishing between good and bad charismatic leadership on the grounds of outcome and/or the leader’s intention. Both criteria lead one into the ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy and survivorship bias.

If good charismatic leaders are ones that get good outcomes, then Hitler was a good leader until, at the earliest December of 1941; some Germans began to lose faith in November of 1943, with the encirclement at Stalingrad; and US intelligence reports said that 25% of Germans still believed in Hitler in 1945, as Allied troops were crashing into Germany (Kershaw The End, Gellately Backing Hitler, Evans The Third Reich at War). There is the same problem with assessing leaders of corporations in terms of outcomes–what if they are getting good outcomes through processes that guarantee eventual disaster? Ken Lay of Enron, Eckhard Pfeiffer of Compaq, Adam Neumann of WeWork, Elizabeth Holmes of Theranos, Travis Kalanick of Uber—they were all celebrated as excellent examples of transformational leaders until the moment they weren’t. Until news broke about fraud, dodgy accounting, misleading claims, cultures of bullying and harassment, they were, after all, getting good outcomes–being lauded in the press, successful at finding backers, and effectively silencing dissenters (through intimidation, NDA, nuisance suits). Their methods of leading didn’t change; the outcomes did because the methods became public.

In effect, then, “good” charismatic leadership isn’t really a different management style from “bad” charismatic leadership as long as we measure by outcomes. It’s just leadership with accurate press.

There’s a similar problem with trying to distinguish good from bad charismatic leadership on the grounds of intent—if there is one thing about which people who met Hitler agreed, it was that he sincerely believed that what he was doing was right. Intending to do good, and doing good aren’t the same thing, and believing that one is on the side of good can contribute to exploitative and dishonest practices. The problem with much scholarship on charismatic leadership is that there is a “no true Scotsman” quality about it (leaders who are exposed as exploitative were never really charismatic leaders) as well as survivorship bias (only looking at leaders who seem to be getting good outcomes).

So, why am I talking to scholars of rhetoric about a leadership model backed by scholarship that is largely “no true Scotsman” and survivorship bias? Because, the rhetoric and ideology of charismatic leadership is probably second only to the just world model (in its most powerful form—prosperity gospel) in terms of frames from within which Americans imagine the possibilities, responsibilities, and stases of political discourse. Scholars who care about rhetoric as a critical project, as something that could help people deliberate better, need to understand the extent to which the rhetoric about charismatic leadership pathologizes (and sometimes feminizes) what scholars of deliberation promote as useful and effective deliberation.

Hitler’s rhetoric worked because the people in his inner circle made sure it worked, because he had a wickedly effective propaganda machine that continually presented him as someone who, as Rush Limbaugh said about Trump, “has excellent instincts,” despite all the evidence to the contrary. A large number of Americans think deliberation is unnecessary because the correct course of action (which just happens to benefit them or fulfill their political agenda) is obvious, and anyone who disagrees with them is villainous or the dupe of villainous entities (a way of thinking about politics not restricted to one position). A concerningly large number of Americans believe that the right course of action is to put in positions of power decisive people who get the real people, will refuse to compromise, and are willing to violate any norms of discourse, fairness, process, accountability, precedence, even legality in order to enact the policy every reasonable person knows is right. We are in a world in which “disruptive” is an end in and of itself.

In other words, a large number of people, all over the political spectrum, don’t want a democracy because they don’t want inclusive deliberation, compromise, negotiation, and accountability. They want their way, and they want violence if they can’t get it. Rhetoric is, at its best, the discipline of democratizing deliberation, the alternative to violence. The rhetoric of charismatic leadership is anti-deliberation; its cultural dominance explains a lot, I’m arguing, about our current culture of demagoguery. American worshipping (and I use that word deliberately) of charismatic leadership explains many otherwise odd things about our current political situation.

Speer’s insight was that charismatic leadership is always at least a little at odds with an administration of hiring the best people. The more that we value charismatic leadership as the best kind of leadership, the more that we sideline inclusive deliberation and accountability as political goods.

Passages from Ian Kershaw’s “The Hitler Myth”

Hitler building a road

“The extensified fragmentation of Weimar politics and eventual decline into little more than interest politics in the face of mounting internal crisis, entirely delegitimized the State system itself, wholly discredited pluralist politics, and paved the way for a full acceptance–already by 1932 of around 13 million Germans–of a new basis of unity represented in an entirely novel political form personalized in Hitler’s ‘charismatic’ leadership.

” In such conditions as prevailed in the last phase of the Weimar Republic, of the total discrediting of a State system based upon pluralist politics, the ‘functional’ leadership of the bureaucrat and the Party political politician as the representative of the ‘rational-legal’ form of political domination, imposing laws and carrying out functions for which they are not personally responsible and with which they are not identifiable, lost credibility. Salvation could only be sought with a leader who possessed personal power and was prepared to take personal responsibility, sweeping away the causes of misery and the faceless politicians and bureaucrats who prevail over it, and seeming to impose his own personal power upon the force of history itself [….] (255)

Hitler’s “well-documented fear of personal popularity and the corresponding growth in instability of the regime is further testimony of his awareness of the centrality of his integrative force of his role as Fuhrer. This integration was largely affective, for the most part forging psychological or emotional rather than material bonds. But its reality can scarcely be doubted.” (The Hitler Myth 257)

People really need to understand syllogisms

Photo of Americans being sent to concentration camps
https://anchoreditions.com/blog/dorothea-lange-censored-photographs

People reason syllogistically, and yet nowhere in a college or high school curriculum are people taught to recognize a syllogism, let alone when it’s gerfucked.

A syllogism is a way of reasoning: if A = B, and C = B, then C = A.

If all dogs are mammals, and Chester is a dog, then Chester is a mammal.

If all dogs [A] are [=] mammals [B], and Chester [C] is [=] a dog [A], then Chester [C] is a mammal [B]. So, if A = B, and C=A, then C= B.

As Aristotle pointed out, we don’t usually show our work. We are reasoning syllogistically, but our rhetoric is an enthymeme. We say, “Of course Chester is a mammal; he’s a dog.”

An enthymeme is a compressed syllogism. Instead of saying: A = B; C= A; therefore C = B (which, if all those things are really equally, must be true), people say C = B because C = A, assuming that you believe that A =B.

That seems weird and alien, but here are examples of times that people use enthymemes:
• “She’s in favor of reducing immigration, so she must be racist.”
• “She’s in favor of state-supported medical care, so she must be a socialist.”
• “She drives a Prius, so she must support Biden.”
• “That dog is a pitbull, so it must be dangerous.”
• “Trump supports Hydroxychloroquine, so it must be good.”
• “Trump supports Hydroxychloroquine, so it must be bad.”

Those are all enthymemes. If you rewrite them as syllogisms, you can see that the reasoning in every one is bad.

• “She’s in favor of reducing immigration, so she must be racist.”
That has the form of major premise: A (anyone in favor of reducing immigration) = (is) B (racist).
The minor premise is: C (she) = (is) A (in favor of reducing immigration).
The conclusion is: C (she) = (is) B (racist).

Or, to take it out of the letters, here’s the syllogism.
Major premise: Anyone in favor of reducing immigration is racist.
Minor premise: She is in favor of reducing immigration.
Conclusion: Therefore, she is racist.

• “She’s in favor of state-supported medical care, so she must be a socialist.”

Major premise: Anyone in favor of state-supported medical care is a socialist.
Minor premise: She is in favor of state-supported medical care.
Conclusion: She is a socialist.

• “She drives a Prius, so she must support Biden.”

Major premise: Anyone who drives a Prius must support Biden.
Minor premise: She drives a Prius.
Conclusion: She supports Biden.

I won’t do the others, since you get the point. The major premises are wrong.

Reducing immigration doesn’t necessarily mean someone is racist; Eisenhower was in favor of state-supported medical care; lots of people who drive Priuses don’t support Biden; not all pitbulls are dangerous; not everything Trump recommends is good; not everything he recommends is bad.

One of the reasons that scholars of logic kicked syllogistic reasoning to the curb is that it is not actually logical. The major premises tend to be stereotypes.

But, it is how we reason. That person is good because she was nice to me. I don’t want to sit next to that person on the bus because they seem sketchy. That person is smart because she agrees with me. That person has good judgment because she said I’m really smart.

There’s nothing wrong with reasoning through enthymemes, as long as we’re aware of our major premises, and willing to think about them critically. Most of us aren’t.

Take, for instance, the enthymeme: “Americans of Japanese ethnicity are dangerous because Japan attacked us.” If you break that out into a syllogism, you get:

These people (Americans of Japanese ethnicity) [ A] are dangerous [B] because Japan [C] attacked us [B].

That’s a bad syllogism.









On being nice to Trump supporters

people arguing
From the cover of Wayne Booth’s _Modern Dogma-

Cicero, in De Inventione, said that, if you are presenting an argument with which your audience already agrees, you land your thesis in the introduction. If you are arguing for something your audience disagrees, you delay your thesis. Oddly enough, as I’ve taught a lot of workshops across the disciplines for scholarly writing, I’ve found that Cicero is right. When people are making an argument their audience doesn’t want to hear, they delay their thesis, even in scholarly arguments (they have a partition instead, or sometimes a false thesis).

I have always required that my students write to a reasonable and informed opposition, and that means delaying their thesis, delaying their claims till after they’ve given evidence, beginning by fairly representing the opposition, getting evidence from sources their opposition would consider reliable, giving a lot of evidence, and explaining it well. I don’t have those requirements because I think this is what all teachers should teach–we shouldn’t. Since student writing requires announcing a thesis, giving minimal explanation, starting paragraphs with main claims, and various other non-persuasive strategies, it is responsible for people teaching the genre of college writing to teach students how to do that. I’m describing that pedagogy because I want it clear that I understand the value of reaching out to an audience and trying to find common ground.

The hope of rhetoric is that we can avoid violence by talking.

We use violence when we believe that we are in a world of existential threat, when we believe that the out-group is engaging in actions that might exterminate us. Sometimes that belief is an accurate assessment of our situation—Native Americans through the entire nineteenth century, Jews in Nazi Germany, free African Americans in the antebellum era, powerful African Americans in most of the nineteenth and twentieth century, Armenians in Turkey, and so on. Whether violence or non-violence is the most strategic choice for the people being threatened with extermination is an interesting argument. For me, whether third-party groups should use violence to stop the extermination is not an interesting argument. The answer is yes.

Sometimes the rhetoric of in-group extermination is simultaneously right and irrational. Antebellum white supremacists correctly understood that abolition would mean that their political monopoly would end were African Americans allowed to vote. Their sense of existential threat was the consequence of so closely and irrationally identifying with white supremacy–with believing that losing that system was essentially extermination. It wasn’t; it was just losing the monopoly of power. Racist demagoguery enabled them to persuade themselves that, because they were threatened with extermination, they were not held by any bounds of ethics, Christianity, legality.

That’s how demagoguery about existential threat works, and that’s what it’s intended to do. It’s designed to get people to overcome normal notions that we should follow the law, be fair to others, listen to others, treat children well, be compassionate, behave according to the ethical requirements of the religion we claim to follow, and so on by saying that, while we are totally ethical people, right now we have to set all that aside–because we’re faced with extermination. When, actually, we’re just faced with losing privilege. That connection is sheer demagoguery.

Republicans now correctly understand that allowing everyone to vote would end their political monopoly. White evangelicals correctly realized that they were losing the political power they had with Bush and Reagan. Coal miners are faced with a world that doesn’t need a lot of people to have that job. Racists, homophobes, and bigots of various kinds are being told they need to STFU. None of these groups are faced with being actually exterminated, but they are faced with their political power being lessened. And too many people in those groups listen to media that has taken the Two-Minute Hate to 24/7 demagoguery about existential threat.

Trump supporters have spent years drinking deep from the Flavor-Aid of the pro-GOP Outrage Machine, and so they believe a lot of things. They believe they’re the real victims here, that the media is against them, that white people are about to be persecuted, that there is no legitimate criticism of their position, that libruls have nothing but contempt for them and think they’re racist,that they are so threatened with extermination that anything done on their behalf is justified.

And here I have to stop and say that authoritarians (regardless of where they are on the political spectrum, and authoritarians are all over the place, but at any given time they tend to congregate on a few spots) misunderstand the concept of analogy. If, for instance, I say that supporters of Hitler reasoned the same way that squirrel haters are now reasoning, I am not saying that they are the same people (or dogs) in every way. I am not making an identity argument; I am making an argument about reasoning.

But, all over the political spectrum, people who are, actually, reasoning the way that people who supported the Nazis reasoned, are outraged at the comparison. It isn’t a comparison about identity; it’s a comparison about methods of reasoning.

We aren’t in a crisis of facts. Everyone has facts. We’re in a crisis of meta-cognition. We have a President who is severely cognitively impaired and obviously declining rapidly, fires people who disagree with him, can’t make a coherent argument for his policies, doesn’t argue from a consistent set of principles. Trump supporters can find ways to support him, but none of those ways fit all the other ways, let alone are ways that explain their opposition to out-group members. The debacle about ingesting disinfectants is just the latest.

We are at a point when the defenses of Trump are that he doesn’t have the skills to be President–he is thin-skinned (he was so obsessed with impeachment that he couldn’t pay attention to anything else), lies all the time (his height, weight, the number of people at his inauguration, whether he was talking to Birx), forces other people to lie on his behalf (such as Trump supporters lying that he was so obsessed with impeachment he couldn’t do anything else, although he also said that wasn’t true), refuses to listen to anyone (which his supporters defend by blaming the disloyal people), gives briefings when he doesn’t actually know what he’s talking about (every briefing), and often says things that aren’t what he meant (every defense of Trump).

What I’m saying is that Trump supporters grant all the criticisms of Trump–their argument is that he’s incompetent.

But their defenses of him show something about them–that they can’t put forward a rational defense of him. I mean “rational” in the way that theorists of argumentation use the term. They can’t put forward an argument for Trump without violating most of rules of rational-critical argumentation. (And, I’d love to be proven wrong on this, so if any Trump supporters want to show me an argument for him that follows that rules, I’d love to see it.)

In other words, support for Trump isn’t about any kind of rational support for his enhancing democratic deliberation, nor even his trying to ground his political decisions and rhetoric in a coherent ideology, but a “fuck libruls, we’re winning” rabid tribal loyalty that eats its own premises.

Trump happens to be the most obvious example right now, but, again, all over the political spectrum are people who can’t defend their positions in a coherent and consistent way. They can defend their positions—but by giving evidence that relies on a major premise they don’t believe, engaging in kettle logic, or whaddaboutism.

If we’re paying attention to Cicero, then we should find common ground with them, be fair to their representation of their own argument, and delay our theses. And, as I said, I think that is great advice.

But it isn’t useful advice when we’re arguing with people who, as soon as they sense you are going to criticize them, refuse to listen because they think they know what you are going to argue, and they know they shouldn’t listen. People well-trained in what the rhetoric scholars Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrecths-Tyteca called “philosophical paired terms” just assume that, if you’re saying Trump isn’t the best, then you are part of the ruling elite–just as Stalinists used to say that Trotsky must be a capitalist, since he criticized Stalin; Nazis said that anyone who criticized Hitler must be a Jew; anyone who opposed McCarthy was a communist; slavers said that anyone who criticized slavery must want a race war. If you aren’t with us, you are against us.

In the 1830s, the major critics of slavery were predominantly Quakers and free African Americans who described slavery accurately, but that (accurate, it should be emphasized) description hurt the feelings of slavers.

Slavers and pro-slavery rhetors said that any criticism of slavery was an incitement to slave rebellion. Much like pro-Trump rhetoric that inadvertently gives away the game–their argument is that he doesn’t have the skillset to be a good President–this rhetoric gave away that slaves hated being slaves, and that the actual conditions of slavery were indefensible.

Many people tone-policed the anti-slavery rhetors (to the extent of having a gag rule in Congress, which is pretty amazing if you think about it). Oddly enough, some anti-slavery rhetors said that these (accurate) descriptions of individual slavers beating and raping slaves were inflammatory, and so some of them tried to write conciliatory anti-slavery tracts. They were accused of fomenting slave rebellion.

Individuals can be persuaded to change their ways on the basis of individual interactions, and there are a lot of anecdotes saying that can work. That’s how individuals leave cults, for instance. But conciliatory rhetoric to groups of people who are drinking deep from a propaganda well is a waste of time.

If you have a personal connection to someone who is a Trump supporter, then building on that personal connection might work, but it’s worth noting that the notion of being able to change people is why people stay in abusive relationships.

But, when we’re talking about relative strangers–the strange world of social media interlocutors–then I don’t think engaging the claims is as useful as pointing out the inability to follow the basic rules of rational-critical argumentation. When people are fanatically committed to an ideology that is internally incoherent and incapable of defended in rational-critical argumentation—and that’s where support of Trump is now—no level of “let’s be inviting to them” will persuade them. It’s worth the time to be precise in our criticisms of their position, but not because being precise will be more or less rhetorically effective. It’s worth the time to be right.

People in rhetoric need to understand that some people are engaged in good faith argumentation, and some aren’t, and we behave toward them differently.

It is impossible to defend Trump through rational-critical argumentation.

Shaming Trump supporters on that point is a good rhetorical strategy. Whether you do that through conciliation with individuals or through generally pointing it out is an audience choice.







Emma Goldman

cat lying on a hat

When we were living in Cedar Park (or, as I call it, Cedar Fucking Park), there were neighbors who let their dogs out at night. Those dogs killed small dogs and cats, and a malfunctioning garage door meant that two of our cats were out while those dogs were looking for animals to kill.

We got two kittens, Winston Churchill (who ended up being more like Winston Smith) and a torby we named Emma Goldman. We are naming all our cats after anarchists from now on, because that’s what they are. (Although an argument could be made that they’re all believers in absolute monarchy but disagree as to who the absolute monarch is.) Winston brought home a virus, and it got into one of Emma’s eyes (iirc, a variety of herpes), and we were giving her eye drops and pills for I don’t even remember how long. Eventually, the vet recommended we give up and get the eye removed, so that’s what she did.

I still feel bad about this. After we did that, she changed personality. She became a loving and affectionate cat. She had obviously been in a lot of pain.

Being one-eyed had absolutely no impact on her ability to play with bits of string, correctly assess a jump, or various other activities that would seem to require stereoscopic vision. Cats are amazing.

She liked to sit in our laps while we were at our desks, or just sit on our chairs. She was not always gracious about letting us sit in our desk chairs. After a while, I discovered that having her sit in my lap while I worked hurt my back (I still don’t know why), and so I set up a basket on my desk for her. Jim continued to let her sit in his lap. She really got to like the basket, and I attribute my scholarly productivity to having a cat I could scratch while writing.

Once, she urped onto USB ports on Jim’s CPU unit that caused Jim to spend hours diving deep into the Windows registry in order not to get error messages. Personally, I suspect that she felt that the fish he had shared at dinner was over-cooked, and she was teaching him a lesson. I wouldn’t put it past her.

She was never actually a fat cat, but she had a kind of grandeur, and so the joke started about her being a Fat Cat Banker. She would have been a damn good banker. She was sensible, good at assessing choices, and she completely dominated the dogs. She was an early poster in the “cats against feminism tumblr,” arguing that she earned that chair because dogs (iirc).

We live on a busy street, near a creek that has coyotes, and so our cats are indoor cats. Jim built a catio for the cats, so that they could be outside and watch birds at a bird feeder, and Emma liked it. But our house is on clay that’s on limestone, and that means that doors suddenly don’t close the same way if there’s been the right amount of rain. One night, a door didn’t close, and Emma got out. We were frantic. Jim was walking the road, and Jacob and I were searching in the backyard, and she suddenly materialized in front of Jacob. She didn’t come running from another place, or come over the fence. She was just suddenly there.

That was her superpower. You couldn’t find her anywhere, and then, there she was. She did that in the house too.

Another time, she got out, and she got out of the backyard, and I frantically chased her. I had one of those nightmare-like slow motion experiences of watching her run toward the road while a car was coming. She hit a car. She bounced off the wheel.

After that, we would sometimes take her out in the backyard if we were going to sit and read and she was reliable. She would hang out and survey her demesne. We knew it was time when she wasn’t enjoying being in the yard.

She was a badass cat. She did what she wanted to do. She knew what she wanted, and she asked for it. She was clear on her boundaries, and enforced them without anger. I admired her. We had a rule about no cats on the dinner table, but once she hit a certain age, that became more of a guideline than a rule. She would often try to get food from me, but since I’m more vegetarian than not, that didn’t work out well for her (although it shows that she was attentive as to who was the bigger sucker). Jim, however, was a goldmine.

She was a torby, and we learned that torbies have a reputation for not putting up with shit (as Jim can say, since he had to have antibiotics for the time she bit him at a vet). Otoh, we spent the last three weeks giving her 100ml subcutaneously every day, and it was all good.

After Winston died, she would join us in the morning for snuggles. Sometimes—there was no clear pattern—she would come and sleep on someone for a while. When Clarence was in bad shape, and her kidney issues made themselves clear, she would come to the bedroom during the night and paw at the blanket till we adjusted to let her sleep under the covers with us. Friends recommended heating pads, and that helped, but she would still sometimes want to be with us. I don’t know why, but I know that she knew what she wanted, and asked for it. That’s who she always was.

She loved Pearl. She loved having Pearl boop her head. Pearl was completely intimidated by her, and so was always a little cautious about booping, which is so incredibly sweet on both their parts.

Because of social distancing, the vet put her down in the backyard she loved, in the sun. She was so weak that it took less than the vet expected. She is buried in that yard, just outside a window of the room she loved.

She was an oddly present cat. She was just always there. And so going through every room is being aware that she is not there. Even sitting in the backyard is being aware she isn’t there. She was always present in our lives for sixteen years.

A friend once said that, when someone you love dies, you never get over it, and you never stop thinking about them. It’s just that they move to a different place in your life. I admired Emma. I admired her ability to be loving, clear with boundaries, and rarely angry. I will miss her so much, and look for her in rooms for months, and I will think of her for the rest of my life. I will also keep myself from urping into Jim’s CPU, no matter how angry I am with him.

How persuasion happens

train wreck

Some time in the 1980s, my father said that he had always been opposed to the Vietnam War. My brother asked, appropriately enough, “Then who the hell was that man in our house in the 60s?”

That story is a little gem of how persuasion happens, and how people deny it.

I have a friend who was raised in a fundagelical world, who has changed zir mind on the question of religion, and who cites various studies to say that people aren’t persuaded by studies. That’s interesting.

For reasons I can’t explain, far too much research about persuasion involves giving people who are strongly committed to a point of view new information and then concluding that they’re idiots for not changing their minds. They would be idiots for changing their mind because they’re given new information while in a lab. They would be idiots for changing their mind because they get one source that tells them that they’re wrong.

We change our minds, but, at least on big issues, it happens slowly, due to a lot of factors, and we often don’t notice because we forget what we once believed.

Many years ago, I started asking students about times they had changed their minds. Slightly fewer many years ago, I stopped asking because I got the same answers over and over. And what my students told me was much like what books like Leaving the Fold, books by and about people who have left cults, changed their minds about Hell or creationism, and various friends said. They rarely described an instance when they changed their mind on an important issue because they were given one fact or one argument. Often, they dug in under those circumstances—temporarily.

But we do change our minds, and there are lots of ways that happens, and the best of them are about a long, slow process of recognition that a belief is unsustainable.[1] Rob Schenck’s Costly Grace reads much like memoirs of people who left cults, or who changed their minds about evolution or Hell. They heard the counterarguments for years, and dismissed them for years, but, at some point, maintaining faith in creationism, the cult, the leader of the cult, just took too much work.

But why that moment? I think that people change their minds in different ways partially because our commitments come from different passions.

In another post I wrote about how some people are Followers. They want to be part of a group that is winning all the time (or, paradoxically, that is victimized). They will stop being part of that group when it fails to satisfy that need for totalized belonging, or when they can no longer maintain the narrative that their group is pounding on Goliath. At that point, they’ll suddenly forget that they were ever part of the group (or claim that, in their hearts, they always dissented, something Arendt noted about many Germans after Hitler was defeated).

Some people are passionate about their ideology, and are relentless at proving everyone else wrong by showing, deductively, that those people are wrong. They do so by arguing from their own premises and then cherry-picking data to support that ideology. They deflect (generally through various attempts at stasis shift) if you point out that their beliefs are non-falsifiable. These are the people that Philip Tetlock described as hedgehogs. Not only are hedgehogs wrong a lot—they don’t do better than a monkey throwing darts—but they don’t remember being wrong because they misremember their original predictions. The consequence is that they can’t learn from their mistakes.

Some people have created a career or public identity about advocating a particular faction, ideology, product, and are passionate about defending every step into charlatanism they take in the course of defending that cult, faction, ideology. Interestingly enough, it’s often these people who do end up changing their minds, and what they describe is a kind of “straw that breaks the camel’s back” situation. People who leave cults often describe a sudden moment when they say, “I just can’t do this.” And then they see all the things that led up to that moment. A collection of memoirs of people who abandoned creationism has several that specifically mention discovering the large overlap in DNA between humans and primates as the data that pushed them over the edge. But, again, that data was the final push–it wasn’t the only one.

Some people are passionate about politics, and about various political goals (theocracy, democratic socialism, libertarianism, neoliberalism, anarchy, third-way neoliberalism, originalism) and are willing to compromise to achieve the goals of their political ideology. In my experience, people like this are relatively open to new information about means, and so they look as though they’re much more open to persuasion, but even they won’t abandon a long-time commitment because of one argument or one piece of data—they too shift position only after a lot of data.

At this point, I think that supporting Trump is in the first and third category. There is plenty of evidence that he is mentally unstable, thin-skinned, corrupt, unethical, vindictive, racist, authoritarian, dishonest, and even dangerous. There really isn’t a deductive argument to make for him, since he doesn’t have a consistent commitment to (or expression of) any economic, political, or judicial theory, and he certainly doesn’t have a principled commitment to any particular religious view. It’s all about what helps him in the moment, in terms of his ego and wealth. That’s why defenders of his keep getting their defenses entangled, and end up engaging in kettle logic. (I never borrowed your kettle, it had a whole in it when I borrowed it, and it was fine when I returned it.)

The consequence of Trump’s pure narcissism (and mental instability) and lack of principled commitment to any consistent ideology is that Trump regularly contradicts himself, as well as talking points his supporters have been loyally repeating, abandons policies they’ve been passionately advocating on his behalf, and leaves them defending statements that are nearly indefensible. What a lot of Trump critics might not realize is that Trump keeps leaving his loyal supporters looking stupid, fanatical, gullible, or some combination of all three. He isn’t even giving them good talking points, and many of the defenses and deflections are embarrassing.

For a long time, I was hesitant to shame them, since an important part of the pro-GOP rhetoric is that “libruls” look down on regular people like them. I was worried that expressing contempt for the embarrassingly bad (internally contradictory, incoherent, counterfactual, revisionist) talking points would reinforce that talking point. And I think that’s a judgment that people have to make on an individual basis, to the extent that they are talking about Trump with people they know well—should they avoid coming across as contemptuous?

But for strangers, I think that shaming can work because it brings to the forefront that Trump is setting his followers up to be embarrassed. That means he is, if not actually failing, at least not fully succeeding at what a leader is supposed to do for his followers. The whole point in being a loyal follower is that the leader rewards that loyalty. The follower gets honor and success by proxy, by being a member of a group that is crushing it. That success by proxy comes from Trump’s continual success, his stigginit to the libs, and his giving them rhetorical tactics that will make “libs” look dumb. Instead, he’s making them look dumb. So, pointing out that their loyal repetition of pro-Trump talking points is making them look foolish is putting more straw on that camel’s back.

Supporting Trump, I’m saying, is at this point largely a question of loyalty. Pointing out that their loyalty is neither returned nor rewarded is the strategy that I think will eventually work. But it will take a lot of repetition.



[1] Conversions to cults, otoh, involve a sudden embrace of this cult’s narrative, one that erases all ambiguity and uncertainty.

Abolitionist conspiracies, leftists as the “ruling class,” and the pleasure of implausible scapegoating

In the mid-1830s, the British writer Harriet Martineau visited the United States, and she found many slavers who were up in arms about the American Abolition Society having “flooded” the South with an anti-slavery pamphlet. She asked whether any of them had actually seen the pamphlet, and was met with outrage—how could she doubt the word of gentlemen? A lot of people didn’t doubt the word of those “gentlemen,” and the myth of the 1835 massive pamphlet mailing remains in history books (Fanatical Schemes, see especially 149-150, and Gentlemen of Property and Standing). It never happened. Martineau had already met with the people who had sent pamphlets to one post office, and who had agreed to send no more, so she suspected (correctly) that it hadn’t. She didn’t tell the slavers they were wrong, but she did ask what evidence they had, and their “evidence” was that their personal certainty, and the certainty of reliable people, all grounded in what their media said.

This mythical event was brought up in the next Congress, and people acted on the basis of a thing that never happened. The antebellum era had a lot of instances of that kind of thing—the fabricated Murrell conspiracy, various non-existent abolitionist plots, Catholic conspiracies against democracy.

People believed those myths for two reasons (which might actually be one): those myths were repeated endlessly by in-group (us) media, and those myths fit the overall narrative of that in-group media.[1] That overall narrative was one common to cultures of demagoguery: yes, we have a lot of problems, and it might look as though those problems are the consequence of slavery. But they aren’t! All of those problems are caused by the actions of Them.

Slavery had an almost endless number of ethical, practical, and rhetorical contradictions. People who claimed to be Christian rejected and deflected Jesus’ very clear commandment to “do unto others as you would have do unto you” (all cultures of demagoguery fail that test); they ignored, denied, and deflected very clear rules in Scripture about how to treat slaves; they reframed the very clear instructions about caring for the poor and weak as the need to enslave them. In short, Scripture is pretty clear: do unto others as you would have done unto you, take care of the poor and marginal. The problem for people who want to enslave, exterminate, or oppress others and yet want to see themselves as Christian is always how do we reconcile the cognitive dissonance?

We reconcile that cognitive dissonance through myths. And, oddly enough, the people who are now rationalizing a system that grinds the faces of the poor engage in the same non-falsifiable and extraordinarily self-serving myth in which slavers engaged: that people who are oppressed deserve their oppression.

This is an example of the just world model, the notion that bad things only happen to bad people, and that people who succeed earned that success, and that poor people are poor, not because of structural inequities, greed on the part of the wealthy, but because our system is too kind to the poor, making them choose to be poor.

From a Judeo-Christian perspective, the notion that we should be crueler to the poor in order to inspire them to be less poor requires a lot of intricate dancing in regard to Scriptural interpretation, with some ignoring or engaging in intricate explanations of anything Jesus said, in favor of open cherry-picking of the Hebrew Bible. It also requires a lot of intricate dancing in terms of data, with some serious cherry-picking. But, really, when people have decided that Jesus’ saying “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” doesn’t actually mean, well, doing unto others as you would have them do unto you, they can swallow a camel.

And they swallow a camel by swallowing circular arguments. Given that people whom we oppress are inferior, we can conclude they are inferior. Given that people who are poor deserve being poor, we can conclude that they deserve to be poor. Given that POC should be treated differently, we can conclude that they are different. Given that only inferior races are enslaved, we can conclude that those races are inferior. Given that we need to believe that slaves are happy, slaves are happy.

There are similar myths now: the American military is unbeatable, the free market solves all problems, government does everything wrong, cutting taxes boosts the economy, if you have enough faith you will be healthy and wealthy. People who are or were deeply committed to those myths have (or had) to explain slave rebellions, military quagmires, famines, situations in which even libertarians want the government to intervene, such as the Tea Party political figures who were outraged with what Obama did in 2008, but are now voting for a bigger bailout.

Failure presents people, and a community, with an opportunity to reflect sensibly on what we’ve been doing and thinking. The collapse of a relationship, failing a test, getting fired–these are all opportunities for us to tell stories about ourselves in which we behave differently.

Or not.

I had a friend who kept getting dumped because, his girlfriends said, he was too critical. I tried to suggest that maybe he should be less critical, but he insisted women were wrong not to appreciate how he was trying to help them. I used to have friends who lost money on timeshares multiple times. Maria Konnikova’s fascinating The Confidence Game describes how con artists con the same people multiple times.

Instead of reconsidering our commitment to an ideology, narrative, or sense of ourselves (a path that would admitting to people we were wrong, losing face, reconsidering all sorts of beliefs and relationships) we have the option of treating this situation as an exception. And it’s an exception either because of a lack of will—so if we recommit to our problematic ideology with greater will, then it will work. In other words, instead of the failure of a policy or ideology being an indication we should reconsider it, the problem is that we didn’t beleeeeeve in it strongly enough, and the failure is proof that it was the right course of action all along.

(No matter how times I see people react that way—and it happens in all the communities I’ve studied that ended up in train wrecks—it surprises me.)

Recommitting with greater will is almost always paired with scapegoating some group. They are the reason that our flawless plan keeps failing. And because They are so cunning and nefarious, we are justified in more extreme measures.

Normally, we tell ourselves and anyone who will listen, we would be kind to slaves, take care of the poor, respect the law (and so on), but we are forced to be heartless and suspend laws by Them. And what continually surprises me about the effectiveness of this scapegoating is how completely implausible the scapegoats are. Slavers picked on abolitionists—who, at the time they started getting scapegoated, were a tiny group of mostly Quakers. Hardly very threatening, and extremely unlikely to be fomenting race war.

Mid-19th century fantasies of a Catholic conspiracy to overthrow the United States involved a highly improbable collaboration among Irish, Italian, and German Catholics (the Irish wouldn’t even let the Italians worship with them in New York, let alone share political power) led by the Hapsburg Emperor and the Pope.

The Nazi fantasy about Jews had them as both communists and capitalists, a neat trick, and was persuasive enough that people accused any critic of Nazism of being either a Jew or a stooge of the Jews. As the scholar of rhetoric Kenneth Burke pointed out, that there appears to be a contradiction was taken by true believers as proof of the cleverness of the Jews.

Rush Limbaugh scapegoats liberals, who are “the ruling class.” As with the scapegoating of abolitionists or Jews, this scapegoating is simultaneously an elaborate and contradictory narrative, in which government employees, university professors (especially in the humanities), and environmentalists (hardly people with a lot of economic or political power), funded by George Soros and Bill Gates, are more powerful than actual billionaires who are actually in political office.

That this narrative is implausible and incoherent—if libruls were that powerful, they wouldn’t be grading first-year composition papers—just shows the cleverness of the libruls (as the apparent impossibility of an effective conspiracy of abolitionists, Catholics, Jews was evidence of the brilliant plan). Libruls are like the evil villains in old movies, who, instead of just shooting the hero, create Rube Goldberg machines to kill the hero and his sidekick.

The inchoate nature of the conspiracy (what, exactly, is the goal of the librul conspiracy? To work in the Post Office? Surely clever people would come up with a better endgame than that) means that Limbaugh can’t be proven wrong, that anything and everything can be blamed on the ruling elite, and no evidence that the GOP is actually the problem needs to be considered.

The American Anti-Slavery Society never flooded slave states with pamphlets; the problems with slavery weren’t caused by abolitionists.

[1] “In-group” doesn’t mean the group that’s in power, but the group people are in.

Arguing with extremists

My first experience of the digitally connected public sphere was Usenet in the mid-80s, and since then I’ve spent a fair amount of time arguing with people, including arguing with extremists. Here are some notes I recently made about what I’ve learned by arguing on the underbelly of the internet.

Highly-educated people don’t necessarily argue better than people with a lot fewer degrees.

People reason associatively, grounded in the binary of some things are good, and some things are bad. If something is associated with a good thing, it can’t be bad in any way. (This explains why people, in response to substantive criticism of a public figure, say, “S/he couldn’t have done that because s/he did this completely unrelated good/bad thing.”

Some (many?) people think and reason in binaries and extremes (all or none, always or never) when they’re threatened (and some people are easily threatened). Not everyone does this, but the people who don’t are rare; I’ve seen it all over levels of education, ideological commitment, apparently calm demeanor, discipline. It’s about how people handle threats (hell, I’ve had people who self-identify as skeptics do this, and I’ve caught myself doing it).

Some people argue vehemently because they really want to be right, and that means that they want really good arguments on the other side, and they’re open to good opposition arguments; some people argue vehemently because they are swatting away any disconfirming information. Those two kinds of people can look really similar in terms of tone, vehemence, and even snarkiness. It takes time to figure out whether someone is open to argument.

On the other hand, people who claim to dislike argument and just want everyone to get along can be the most rigid thinkers and least open to new ideas.

Far too many people don’t know how to do research or assess sources, and much teaching on that subject makes this situation worse. Also, having access to good sources is expensive, and doing good research is time-consuming.

Instead of doing research on the basis of the quality of argument of sources, people tend to rely on gut instincts about trustworthiness, and that generally means confirmation bias and in-group favoritism. This, too, is all over the political and educational map.

People completely misunderstand the issue of “bias” and have an incoherent epistemology about perception—highly educated people might just be worse on this than people on the street. They’re certainly no better.

People use bad examples to stereotype out-group and good examples to stereotype in-group.

People confuse “giving an example” (a datum or quote) with proving a point.

People engage in motivism way too fucking much.

Extremists argue the same way, regardless of where they are on the political spectrum, or even if it’s a political question at all.

People have bad stopping rules when it comes to research.

People pay too much attention to tone.

People tone police women and POC way too fucking much.

Charismatic leadership is a drug, and a lot of people are way too high on it.

People value loyalty to the in-group (and especially to the leader) more than truth because they redefine truth as loyalty.

No argument is too ridiculous if it enables you to say that you were right all along.

If a media source is in-group, makes their audience feel connected with them, makes their audience feel good about their beliefs and choices, then that audience will remain loyal no matter how many times that media source is just completely wrong.

Far too many people reason deductively from non-falsifiable premises, and think they’ve thereby proven a point to be true.

People are desperate to resolve cognitive dissonance, especially the dissonance created by being fanatically committed to a faction (or unwilling to consider any disconfirming information) and wanting to see ourselves as fair, compassionate, and rational.

People reason from identity way too fucking much.